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Home » Is the Russian military somewhat of a Potemkin village?

Is the Russian military somewhat of a Potemkin village?

The New Neo Posted on by

Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine we’ve been arguing in the comments here about his motives and goals. Putting that aside, this post is about something else: the state of the Russian military.

And by “military” I mean army, navy, air force, that sort of thing – and not nuclear weapons, which are a separate (although perhaps related) matter. Nuclear weapons are an important matter indeed, however, because if it weren’t for Putin’s nuclear weapons, NATO and the US would almost certainly be defending Ukraine far more vigorously, if only to send them better weapons with which to repel the Russian attack. Putin’s nuclear arsenal, and his willingness to threaten it and leave the world guessing as to what he would actually do with it, deters them.

But at the moment, Russia’s war is being fought with more conventional means. For the first few weeks, many of the reports about Russian failures or stalls or the Russian military being “bogged down” were considered to be possible or probable Ukrainian propaganda and exaggerations. There’s probably still some of that. And it’s certainly possible that through sheer numbers and willingness to take and inflict heavy casualties that Russia will win militarily in the end. But over time I think it’s become more clear that the Russian military actually does have grave problems.

Some people were well aware of that already, as the video I posted yesterday makes clear. And last night commenter “J.J.” posted the following comment here:

After I read “Mig Pilot: The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko,” I knew the Soviet military was as corrupt as any military can be. Since the end of the USSR and the transition of Russia to a corrupt autocracy, I doubt that much has changed. I’m sure they have some well-trained elite units, but any army that has to draft soldiers will have morale problems. Especially if it is as unfair and corrupt as MP Nevzorov implies.

Soldiers and sailors will go through h**l, if they are well trained, well led, and treated fairly. I get the picture that the Russian military are busy protecting their little fiefdoms and privileges – as they were back in the USSR days. In other words, you use your rank to get extra perks and privileges – no fair treatment of underlings. Then there’s the problem of vodka. It is regularly abused by Russian men and the military reflects the society. So, I’m not surprised at this man’s predictions.

Indeed, what I saw of the poor maintenance of facilities in Russia when we visited in 2006, probably hasn’t changed all that much in 16 years because, while Russia has made some economic progress during that time, it has not had the amazing progress seen in China.

Thus far, MP Nevzorov’s insight has been pretty spot on. They seem to be poorly lead, poorly trained, and not well motivated.

So, is the Russian military at least somewhat of a Potemkin village? That doesn’t mean they can’t inflict great damage – they can – but it certainly hampers them in that effort. And the deleterious effects may be even greater in Ukraine, because reports are that mud season has been a problem (we know about mud season in New England), and troops were not even told they would be fighting in Ukraine and they don’t consider Ukrainians the enemy. So there may be a lot of increased internal psychological conflict and morale may be even lower than usual.

About Potemkin villages:

In politics and economics, a Potemkin village is any construction (literal or figurative) whose sole purpose is to provide an external façade to a country that is faring poorly, making people believe that the country is faring better. The term comes from stories of a fake portable village built by Grigory Potemkin, former lover of Empress Catherine II, solely to impress the Empress during her journey to Crimea in 1787.

The term seems especially apropos because the story was about a Russian, and the Crimea was involved. The story may not be true – which would also be apropos, wouldn’t it? – and of course the Russian military is hardly wholly a facade. But still, maybe somewhat of a facade, at least in terms of its fighting power.

If so, why is this the case, and why has it persisted? I’m not even remotely an expert on this, but from what I’ve read it seems some of the factors are money problems (cutting corners), graft and corruption, maintenance problems, design problems, morale problems, and drinking problems. That’s not meant to be any kind of exclusive list. I’ll add possible motivation problems, not a meritocracy, even maybe sabotage, reliance on conscripts, and a top-down too-rigid command structure.

Believe this or don’t believe it, as you wish. It’s from an Australian news site:

There’s also this report about big problems with Russia’s precision-guided munitions.

And to return to the question of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, I wonder how well-maintained that is. Of course, we don’t want to have to find out for real.

I also wonder how our military is doing in these woker-than-woke days. As I said in a previous post, our exit from Afghanistan wasn’t the least bit reassuring.

[NOTE: Here’s another interesting video. This one’s from 2019, and it is an interview with Oleksiy Arestovych, who is a Ukrainian military advisor (among other things). His analysis of what Putin is after conforms quite closely to the views of Angela Stent discussed yesterday in this post:

If this guy’s been helping to prepare the Ukrainian forces for this war, I think it explains some of their relative effectiveness.]

Comments

Is the Russian military somewhat of a Potemkin village? — 65 Comments

  1. Even making allowances for pro-Ukraine propaganda, the relative ineffectiveness of the Russian military is becoming more and more apparent. This is a surprise, to western observers and possibly also to Putin.

  2. Given the essentially revanchist disposition of the régime, the world benefits if the military is rendered ineffective by graft. Let’s hope the disposition of the régime changes (in Russia and in China as well).

  3. If you talk with people who have served in the military most will say that the backbone of any arm – Army, Navy, Air Force – are Non-commissioned officers.

    NCO’s … The Russians, reputedly, have terrible NCO’s.

    One of my Marine buddies (Note: there are no FORMER Marines) who previously served says one indication of that maybe (if true) the number of high ranking Russian officers who have been killed. They’re up front, he says, because the NCO’s aren’t up to doing their jobs.

  4. If two reports in the NY Post are correct, there may be fragging going on in the Russian army: “A Russian soldier reportedly drove over his colonel with a tank — while two other service members were caught venting about strongman Vladimir Putin’s ‘bulls—’ invasion of Ukraine amid reports of heavy losses.”

    https://nypost.com/2022/03/24/russian-soldier-ran-over-commander-with-tank-in-protest/

    An updated report states, “A Russian colonel has died after being intentionally run down by his own troops, who were upset over the casualties in their unit, Western officials said Friday. Russian ‘Colonel Medvechek of the 37th Motor Rifle Brigade’ was killed after being run over by his soldiers as a ‘consequence of the scale of losses that had been taken by his brigade,’ the Evening Standard reported. It was not immediately clear if the slain higher-up was the same person as Col. Yury Medvedev, who was reportedly wounded when run down by his own troops in a tank Thursday and evacuated to a Belarusian hospital.”

    https://nypost.com/2022/03/25/russian-colonel-dies-after-reportedly-being-run-over-by-his-troops/

  5. I have been devouring multiple viewpoints of the Russia and Ukraine situation for the past four weeks. There are a number of Twitter feeds, Substack articles, blogs, news sites, and links that include some very knowledgeable analysts, authors, reporters, activists, and think tank people with Russian expertise and many with hands-on military backgrounds. Of course each source has to be read with due skepticism, but with enough input a few patterns seem to emerge with some reliability.

    The anecdotes of corruption and disfunction in Russian society and its military are prevalent, and some argue that the military is well down the status hierarchy in the regime when compared to the security services, internal and external, and the intelligence agencies. Much military spending is diverted to corruption resulting in shoddy equipment and preparation. They rely on conscripts who lack sufficient training and motivation, and have no culture of non-commissioned officers which is the tier that accomplishes the most in rival militaries. Field communications are not secure and reliable, and logistics suffers from poor organization and upkeep of transport vehicles.

    Most educated Russian ethnics find ways to avoid military service, that is a slowly declining demographic, while the minority ethnic groups whose population is growing are typically rural and poor and uncommitted to Putin’s Great Russia project.

    Add to all of this a very nasty culture of brutal and cruel officers and regime elites, and troops are not highly valued and well treated. The old Russian way of war continues in use, head on troop movements with little innovation or adaptability, relying on brute force to pulverize the targets. Much less effective than the model used by committed, intelligent Ukrainians fighting to save their homeland.

    This guy has some really interesting Twitter threads, scroll back a long ways to see some of his insights about Russia

    https://twitter.com/kamilkazani

  8. Tuvea –

    “NCO’s … The Russians, reputedly, have terrible NCO’s. ”

    Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) doesn’t follow the Western-style NCO system. The terrible Russian NCOs in relation to their US counterparts is unsurprising, because the Russians never attempt to cultivate them.

  9. Arestovich is really a very good analyst who soberly assesses various situations, not only in Ukraine. All his predictions during the war in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan-Armenia) in 2020 turned out to be correct

  10. I think it’s wrong to apply western sensibilities, even battlefield sensibilities, when assessing the Russian battle performance. Propagandistic filtering aside, I wonder if we see the Russian battlefield losses and evaluate or frame them according to our experiences with the American military. It’s wrong to do this.

    I worked for about 5 years in post-breakup Kazakhstan, in an area that had very, very little Western contact before our projects. Virtually all of the equipment was Soviet or post-Soviet manufacture to a military specification. The Soviets had a very different approach to military philosophy. Their equipment looks like it will rattle to pieces, but it is designed to be field-serviced, to run in mud on dirty fuel under conditions of extreme, pounding abuse.

    When I worked there, I was surprised on a daily basis on their capacity for suffering. It is astonishing, seemingly bottomless. So when you hear of large numbers of casualties and the supposed inexperience of the troops, do not evaluate this with your picture of American troops in mind. Russian troops are expendable and plentiful. They expect to suffer terribly in the field, and they will. Their equipment will appear to fail and be abandoned, but I think we will see that these abandoned pieces can be quickly put back into service. Putin knows this better than most anyone else. He means to take Ukraine or part of it and I think he’s in it for the long haul.

  13. First off I do not give a ton of credence to all the stories of Russian troops killing their leaders. It seems to me it is in the Ukrainians best interest to yell this from the roof tops. For morale purposes. But I think the eagerness that our own media and alphabet agencies are touting this. Give me pause as they all seem obsessed with promoting narrative and do not give one toss on accuracy.

    As for the the Potemkin village aspect. I think some of that is likely true. As the entirety of the Russian military’s strategy throughout its history is simply overwhelming with numbers. Be it with equipment or men. Quality and training have always taken a back seat. With a few notable exceptions like rocketry.

    I think the level of propaganda has been unusually high as this entire campaign is still viewed as both sides as very winnable. And likely is. As long as Russia does not up the ante with internationally forbidden weapons. And the west continues to supply small arms and equipment.

  15. I remember forty years ago, there was talk about how great (what was then) the newest T-72s were. They had such a low profile, they were hard to hit. And they were fast. A tank commander I knew in the Israeli Army told me the low profile was achieved by not have a separate floor for the turret. So when the turret swung around, the people inside have to move with it. In extremely cramped space. So for every one round a T72 could fire, an Israeli tank could get off five or six rounds.

    He also told me they were death traps. If they were hit, they would easily catch fire and the only exit was the top hatch. (Israeli tanks have an emergency exit that’s near the bottom.) Also, one reason they could move faster was they were lighter weight because the gauge of steel used in construction was thinner. Essentially, they weren’t as well armored as they should’ve been.

    I know it’s been forty years…

    But has it changed much? What I’ve read over the past ten or fifteen years, is that corruption is worse in the Russian Army than it was in the Soviet Army…

    (I only know that this is what I was told forty years ago by someone who would know. Admittedly, he could’ve been having one over on me, but a lot of other stuff was indeed true, so I figure this tank info must be as well )

  16. Aggie,

    One of the issues with the Russian military. Has been the less than replacement level of the demographics.
    The entire population is shrinking rapidly. With military aged men being at the for front of this. So from the Russian perspective it is in their best interests to expand their sphere of influence now. As it becomes far less likely they are able to one generation from now.

  17. “I think it’s wrong to apply western sensibilities, even battlefield sensibilities, when assessing the Russian battle performance”

    Soviet doctrine during the Cold War was designed to emphasize “more casualties now for fewer casualties later”. The first wave might take horrendous casualties. But it would successfully dislodge the first line defenders and take their ground before the defenders could withdraw. This would cause the second line of defense to not have enough time to prepare, which would mean that the Soviet second wave would take fewer casualties when it attacked. The end goal, of course, was to cut casualties even further by reaching Amsterdam before the Americans did.

    So Russian casualty numbers might not mean much. The question, instead, is whether they’re making good progress and keeping pressure on the Ukrainian defenders.

  18. perhaps their military is a Potemkin Military, perhaps not.
    However, after the Winter War, Hitler thought the Red Army was a Potemkin Army

  19. The Germans made a big deal of generals leading from the front. In fact, they were usually surveying the situation, not “leading”.
    Senior officers have a number of responsibilities, among them training their unit to operate without them.
    If, instead of the German survey-the-situation reason for being up front, a general is trying to get a couple of platoons unstuck and moving, he’s failed his job. It’s possible that circumstances do not allow him to succeed.
    I take these deaths as a tell the company and battalion level command is pretty much uniformly incompetent.

    I recall one former military commentator remarking that the Russians do their maintenance with a crowbar. It wasn’t praise.

    However, it’s relatively easy to do tube artillery. Somebody at the fire direction center calculates the elevation, deflection, and charge. Guys on the guns crank the handles, guys at the ammo shop lay out the charges, then load and shoot is pretty simple. About the only thing that goes wrong is a gun jams, but that means the rest of the battery fires some extra rounds to make up for it.

    You don’t need geniuses or fanatical berserkers to run the guns.

    So it’s possible that the Russians may reduce their efforts at fire and maneuver and just shoot a pot load of shell (old Brit term).

  20. It’s hard to evaluate the Russian military performance because…

    A. The U.S. and western European military and intelligence communities pretty clearly expected Ukraine to swiftly collapse. Covering up for that mistake is shaping the narrative of virtually all news coverage.

    B. We’re getting little to no information about how the Ukrainian military is doing, except in relation to supposed Russian military losses. Even if every report on things going wrong for the Russian military is correct, the inability or refusal to report on anything going right for the Russian military produces a false picture of the conflict.

    Here’s map showing a French estimation of how things stand in Ukraine.

    https://twitter.com/JackPosobiec/status/1507513746360606720/photo/1

    And given a willingness the fight, the Ukrainian military is nothing to scoff at, with I believe almost three times as many men in uniform as Germany and spending more than twice as much of its GDP on the military as Germany does.

    But while its destructive power seems fairly potent, the brokenness of Russian civil society since the end of the Cold War does seem to be reflected in a lack of martial excellence in its soldiers.

    Mike

  21. The Soviets had a very different approach to military philosophy. Their equipment looks like it will rattle to pieces, but it is designed to be field-serviced, to run in mud on dirty fuel under conditions of extreme, pounding abuse.

    Aggie:

    The story of the AK-47:
    _________________________

    The [AK-47] and its variants owe their global popularity to their reliability under harsh conditions, low production cost (compared to contemporary weapons), availability in virtually every geographic region, and ease of use.
    …
    The AK-47 was designed to be a cheap, simple, easy to manufacture rifle, perfectly matching Soviet military doctrine that treats equipment and weapons as disposable items.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AK-47

  22. So Russian casualty numbers might not mean much. The question, instead, is whether they’re making good progress and keeping pressure on the Ukrainian defenders.

    They don’t seem to be making good progress.

  23. The story of the AK-47:

    The basic design is pretty much a copy of the M1 Garand, believe it or not:

    1) Same trigger design
    2) Both have rotating bolt breach locking with duel opposed lugs
    3) Both have long stroke gas systems

    The obvious difference is the detachable mag on the AK, but more fundamentally the AK uses a bolt carrier instead of the goofy M1 op-rod.

  25. I remember forty years ago, there was talk about how great (what was then) the newest T-72s were. They had such a low profile, they were hard to hit. And they were fast.

    The low profile is an advantage in open fields but has issues in hilly areas. Specifically, it reduces how much you can depress the barrel so you have to expose yourself more when firing from a ridge or hill.

    Also, T-72 has an auto loader. This reduces the crew to 3 men, but isn’t faster, and I believe the gun has to move to a certain elevation to reload. It is also less reliable and it is said it sometimes attempts to load the crew causing injuries.

    Having only a 3 man crew might seem to be an advantage, but it is an issue if they have to sand guard or if they have to fix the tank. Track repair is difficult and would benefit from a larger crew. In the situation in Ukraine I would think having another crew member watching for anti-tank teams would be very handy.

    The T-72 also has the issue of the ammunition going off and blowing the turret off. Tank fires are more an ammo then fuel problem.

  27. I think it’s wrong to apply western sensibilities, even battlefield sensibilities, when assessing the Russian battle performance. Propagandistic filtering aside, I wonder if we see the Russian battlefield losses and evaluate or frame them according to our experiences with the American military. It’s wrong to do this.

    Well, the comparisons to US casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq isn’t very valid, IMO. Our losses were actually very light from a historical perspective and they were different types of wars.

    I think the historical Russian stoic nature isn’t going to be as stoic as before, for several reasons:

    1) They have had a chance to enjoy the benefits of modern society

    2) Modern communication so better knowledge of what is going on

    3) An aging population makes the young more valuable

    However I think you do have a point.

    But, the deal is, they seem to be doing poorly in terms of accomplishing their goals, and are also looking weak. Stalled advances, damaged vehicles all over, when they should be encircling large Ukrainian forces using motorized warfare. Putin may not care about loses, but he cares about results, and he cares about the perception of the Russian militaries capabilities.

  28. ForgottenWeapons.com has done a number of videos regarding the AK-47, its varients and inspirations/predacessors IIRC. One of the points was that Kalasknikov spent considerable time sorting out which parts of the weapon needed precision or special treatment such as chrome plating, and which could be simple sheet metal stampings.

    A big part of the design success was the intermedaiate cartridge, 7.62×47, a much less powerful cartridge that the standard military full power rifle cartridge. Which was good enough at shorter ranges and controllable in automatic fire. The Germans in WWII had that idea first with the STG-44 IIRC.

    Richard Aubrey would know much more about this, as would Parker, who is missed.

  29. You mean 7.62x39mm.

    The Germans in fact had that idea at the end of WW1 but didn’t act on it until much later. But their 7.92mm Kurtz was developed long before they developed their “assault rifles”. Their assault rifles started with the Mkb-42 prototypes (produced by two companies and combat tested), then became the MP-43, then MP-44 and finally the Stg-44. The MP designation was to hide the development from Hitler. The MP-43, MP-44 and Stg-44 were all basically the same weapon.

    The Soviets initially tried to make the AK from sheet metal, but had trouble with that and went with forged receivers. Later they introduced version that had a sheet metal receiver (AKM).

    In the 1970s they began to introduce the AK-74, basically an AKM but with the newer 5.54x39mm round. These were first seen in Afghanistan in the 80s and a sample was brought to the US by Soldier of Fortune mag. This rifle is common in Ukraine.

  30. Also, speaking of AKs:

    One video IIRC of the previous Ukrainian president had a guy in the background who was holding an AK and his mag fell out, and he tried to put it back in, and didn’t seem able to. He ended up just holding it in trying to act if everything was fine.

    Someone just posing with a gun he didn’t know how to use? Or a broken rifle or mag?

  31. Don:

    Thanks for the correction, memory failure, and smart phone laziness. 🙂

    There is a lot of history to it. To say nothing of the changes to infantry doctrine based on the AK-47.

  32. There are two, informal, definitions of “reliable”. One is that it doesn’t break down very often. The other is that, to keep functioning, it takes more, or less, regular maintenance.
    The AK is supposedly famous for both. The M16 and its variants need more regular maintenance….but they don’t just quit functioning. That was an issue upon their intro back about fifty years. Had to do with chamber metallurgy and crummy propellant.
    Problem is, for the purists, a full size round had a lot of advantages. It can penetrate more than the reduced rounds. So what might be cover from the AK or M196or AK74 is not with the full-size round. Fewer fighting positions, then, on a battlefield. They are effective at longer ranges. There is some concern about ceding the battlespace beyond 450 meters, which is why the move toward an intermediate cartridge, powered up from the current crop of jumped-up twenty-two..
    All very well, but what does it mean in the current fuss?
    Mech guys don’t have to carry huge numbers of rounds. That’s what vehicles are for. You could carry a full size battle rifle and two hundred rounds…picture an M14, and be fine. You’re not humping through the swamps with no resupply until Wednesday. Weight is less of an issue.
    But the vehicles have heavier weapons and good optics and aiming, so maybe you don’t need long range effectiveness. Okay. Maybe you don’t. But since the APC carries your spare ammo, you can afford it anyway. And since Ukraine looks about as scenic as Nebraska excepting the occasional tree line, long-range effectiveness could be useful. This would be particularly true in the defense, since you’d be looking at the Russians, up and moving while you’re in a hide. The further away they are when you can start hitting them–presuming you don’t have a couple of vehicles with MG or light cannon–the better. Then they either deploy on the threat so the AT guys have a shot, or you have more time to scoot.
    Some US units have a “designated marksman”, maybe one per squad. He carries an M14 with the full size NATO round. It means they do want to be able to do some damage at 800 meters even without the MG. Which means they’re concerned about long-range effectiveness.

    Anyway, this argument can go for hours.

    Russian small arms aren’t going to self-destruct when convenient. The other stuff, vehicles and so forth, are more or less famously designed for rough usage. Some of their single-seat fighters have oversize tires and landing gear to allow them to operate from contingency airfields. “operate from” is not what they’d prefer to do but “land safely” on a crappy road is better than not when you’re out of options. Taking off again is a separate question.

    But whatever the hardiness, the envelope will be pushed…have to…and losses will ensue.

    Failure of preventive maintenance on account of lack of senior NCO who breathe the doctrine will stress the built-in hardihood.

    Back fifty plus years, we learned how to tell if a mech unit–should we be so assigned–was up on its maintenance. Greasy fingerprints on the manuals were a good sign. All the issue tools on hand. And you could check that out before lunch. Point is…it was important. Really, really important.
    Some of the inspection protocols seemed nonsensical. Is a tear in the canvas as bad as an engine that wouldn’t run? Worse. Far worse. If the engine were in the rear for major maintenance and we had the paper work for it…everything was cool. Except for that canvas thing. Anal. OCD.
    But when it came to it, we had a pretty good ready-to-go ratio.
    It needs a culture.
    If the Russians don’t have such a culture…going to have trouble.

  33. Event from WW II. My father was an Infantry platoon leader and sometimes company commander until they could find another captain.
    Once, in a slot combining the two, he and his platoon came around a corner and saw a bunch of Germans withdrawing a light antitank gun. My father pointed and yelled to fire and the GIs began firing with their semi-auto Garands.
    The Germans, all armed with the German version of the submachine gun returned fire. Shortly, all the Germans were down and none of the Americans., But leaves and branches were falling. Automatic fire from the hand-held is overrated. The Boche did, however, manage to trim some trees with their muzzle rise.

  34. Reading the comments about the Russian army expecting large amount of causalities at the start to overwhelm the other army. But the young soldiers of 50 to 75 years ago did not have a “softer” life before the army as many of the young 18yr olds now have. The shock of military life is indeed a shock. To them and to ours. But that is where the training comes in and that does take good NCO’s all up and down the line.

  35. Richard,

    It has become common in the AR15 community to not clean the rifles often. There is an idea that they run better wet, although that’s probably true of most anything. I like wet since it probably reduces wear, but they seem reliable dry in my experience.

    What I expect that might cause reliability issues with the AR is the GI mags, which can be excellent in good condition but the feed lips can deform slightly and cause jams and it could be difficult troubleshooting that. That is largely done away with by modern plastic mags like Magpul which don’t deform without breaking. These came out around 2006, so for a long time the GI mags were the best you could do. AK mags were ALWAYS solid (and heavier).

    ARs are not just reliable but have a very long lifespan generally. But they are less robust in certain ways. They are well engineered as a shooting machine but they are a shit club. And less than ideal as the basis of a spear (using bayonet). With an AK you could use it like a club and if you manage to break of the buttstock it will still shoot. The AR you would likely damage the buffer tube with less force.

    On the other hand, talking machine guns, the Russian PKM is considered outstanding. Reliable, decent barrel change, light weight yet controllable.

  36. Lots of good comments from those of you who know about rifles, tanks, and maintenance. Also, NCOs. God love ’em, they are the backbone of the military. I was taught to always see to the needs of the men under me before seeing to my own needs. (Leadership 101) When you have good NCOs that works all the way down the line. That way men know they are part of the team and important to the mission. That builds cohesion and loyalty. My impression is that the Russian military doesn’t work that way. The NCOs and officers use their positions to perks and don’t show loyalty and concern for their subordinates. As a result, the lower ranks don’t see themselves as valued team members. It’s got to affect morale.

    Motivation is important as well. Russia invading a fellow Slav nation is like the U.S. invading Canada, a fellow Anglosphere nation. There would bound to be some misgivings about why we would do that. Russians may not get much news that isn’t state approved, but in this wired world there are bound to be citizens who question the official party line.

    None of this is to say the Russians aren’t a formidable foe. What has happened thus far indicates they aren’t necessarily on a par with some Western nations’ militaries. Their main ace-in-the-hole is their large nuke position. And that commands respect even if it’s been poorly maintained.

  37. “Also, T-72 has an auto loader. This reduces the crew to 3 men, but isn’t faster, and I believe the gun has to move to a certain elevation to reload.”

    This is correct. The bigger problem with this is that it forces the gun to “reset” between each shot, meaning that the tank commander needs to reacquire the target each time. This slows the rate of fire down even more than the auto-loader itself does.

    However, my understanding is that later Soviet/Russian tanks aren’t afflicted with this issue. They still have auto-loaders, but they no longer need to reset the gun between shots. They’re still slower than a skilled manual loader, though.

  39. Don,
    I’m bigger than most guys so the M14 and associated ammo weren’t wouldn’t have been as much of an issue for me. We had M14 in Basic, M16 in Infantry AIT, M14 in OCS. Hauling one or the other around, manual of arms, so forth, the change one way or the other wasn’t a concern. Not many guys thought so in garrison.
    Diff is when you load up toward half your body weight. Everything’s an issue. “Throw the joker outta yer deck of cards.”

    When I was in, 69-71, the effective range of both 14 and 16 was, iirc, 462 meters. No idea why that stuck with me. Had nothing to do with the performance of the round, but of at what range the average Infantryman could hit a satisfactory number of times with iron sights. So it was all about rear sight-front sight distance. Cumulative millennia of discussions of ballistics down the tubes…… Tragedy.

    That said, the muzzle energy of each were pretty close to identical. The 14 preserved if much further down range. How much were you willing to pay in other stuff the grunt couldn’t carry to get that down-range energy?

    I was on orders but my brother–USAF–was killed so I didn’t go. This is all a matter of theory or one-degree-of-separation for me. A senior NCO, having been with MACV, advising ARVN troops said he carried a pistol. If in contact there would be rifles available. So even if you bust one over some guy’s head, there’ll be another.

  41. And your point is what Geoffrey? Truth bombs, maybe, or click bombs?

    ‘Vlad could have nuked Ukraine bit he hasn’t yet.’ Has Vlad used thermobaric, chemical, or biological munitions yet? If not, does that show he’s a good guy after all?

  42. Those inclined will read the articles and conclude what they will.

    Never said or even implied that Vlad is a good guy. Just that he’s not the only bad guy leading the unwitting.

  43. Vlad does have that minor bad distinction of having invaded a neighbor. That would be Ukraine. Oh, and not just once. Unwitting indeed.

  44. Never denied nor excused any of Putin’s invasions. Just have argued that when a great power becomes convinced that its strategic security is under threat, it will do what is necessary to prevent that predictable vulnerability from materializing. That’s not an excuse, that’s a reflection of great power realities.

    Nor does it matter whether it is assured that, that capability will never be used, as it simply cannot afford that level of risk.

  45. GB. From which it follows that we must ask,”Does having secured his borders, his buffers, his glacis, is he now in a position to threaten us with a quick move and if so…what do we do?”

    “threaten” is the key word here, not what if he actually moves.

  46. I’m coming in way late, but one of the problems with the conscripts is that their term of service is 1 year. Subtract out the term of boot camp, and by the time that year is up they may be sufficiently trained in their occupational specialty to be useful. The bigger problem is vehicle maintenance, specifically the lack thereof, when they were in base. I saw one twitter multi post thread that predicted that by the end of April that Ukrainian forces will be able to counter attack at will because the Russians will be out of or low on beans and bullets.

    Guessing some of these guys will see their term come and go, but they will not be released until after they’ve retreat…withdrawn…from Ukraine. That’ll be great for morale.

  47. Richard Aubrey:

    Not as if that was the situation in the Cold War with the Warsaw Pact (indeed it was). I assume you may be asking Geoffrey to consider that?

    Great powers, existential threats, and so forth, borders (Kalinigrad created) and peoples rearranged at the behest of the Kremlin. What’s not to like?

    But, whatever.

  48. om. Point is, and I don’t know if this applies to GB, some people think that a great power straightening out his…whatever…due to threats from some one else is justified. Border, tariff policy, etc.
    But the issue becomes what the straightened-out-against see.. There is a correlation between Russia’s interest in no NATO borders and their advantage should they wish to attack westward.
    No NATO doesn’t mean no US troops. So that will have to be part of the requirement. No US troops. No NATO troops doing some friendly interoperability training and swapping goulash recipes.
    IOW, Putin won’t be satisfied until the buffer states are incapable of defending themselves and nobody is required by treaty to help them.
    What does that look like from our side and does what it looks like from our side justify or at least make it practical to do Something to cancel some of the threat? IOW, be in Putin’s position.

  49. Richard Aubrey,

    Putin implied a willingness to us nukes if ‘forced’. He surely knows that the reverse is true as well. Putin is aware of NATO’s refusal to categorically reject a first strike, if in the West’s judgement it becomes necessary. Putin is not stupid nor is he suicidal.

  50. Richard,

    I don’t have military experience but I have shot long range competition, and used an AR15 to shoot out to 800 yards many times (the AR I used was a 20″ A2 configuration built to be “service rifle” legal; i.e., service rifle class in competition). Iron sights, prone with sling, etc.

    Note that in Highpower competition (the standard NRA rifle competition which is shot at 200, 300 and 600 yards) the AR15 dominated the M14s (M1As in civilian use) even at 600 yards.

    Potentially an AR can hit well out to where the bullet goes transonic, so I probably couldn’t shoot much farther than 800 yards with accuracy with my setup.

  51. Never denied nor excused any of Putin’s invasions. Just have argued that when a great power becomes convinced that its strategic security is under threat, it will do what is necessary to prevent that predictable vulnerability from materializing. That’s not an excuse, that’s a reflection of great power realities.

    NATO was only a military threat to Russia in that it means Russia faces a much bigger calculation in gobbling up a NATO member. Hence why Ukraine wanted NATO membership.

    The bigger threat to Putin is having a nearby democracy with Western values. Putin wants to maintain his strongman position, a free Ukraine is a threat to that.

  52. That said, the muzzle energy of each were pretty close to identical. The 14 preserved if much further down range. How much were you willing to pay in other stuff the grunt couldn’t carry to get that down-range energy?

    Energy per se doesn’t mean much. See the writings of Dr. Fackler.

    Comparing ball ammo to ball ammo, the 5.56 tends to have good terminal ballistics (impact on a living target) at close ranges due to bullet fragmentation. Most 7.62 NATO ball doesn’t fragment. At longer distances neither will fragment and all you will get is a handgun like wound where the bullet simply crushes the tissue. Both should penetrate well as far as you can hit, and the difference in wounding capability is the size of the bullet and however they tend to tumble at that distance. (note that in shooting at 800 yards I was shooting an 80 grain bullet that was still supersonic so it would have ~ twice the momentum as a .22lr at that distance; not massive wounding potential but sufficient to be lethal).

    The only real advantage to 7.62 NATO is penetration in soft material like wood. It also penetrates much deeper in flesh so it is vastly better as a big game round.

  53. Don.
    The M16 initially had reduced rifling, reducing the gyro stabilizing effect, thus allowing for “keyholing” in the target, making a larger wound channel.
    The downside is it’s a lousy brushbuster and against various kinds of obstacles and thin-skinned vehicles.
    The original 30.06, so goes the story was speced to order so that it had the energy to kill a cavalry horse at a thousand yards., Now, absent skylining, you can’t see a horse at a thousand yards. Point is, serious damage was required at that range. Most militaries had their version of the same performance, used in rifles, squad autos, various light and medium MG and some aviation applications.

    Since the platoon leader–and for all I know today, the company clerk–has the comms to call in fire, long-distance damage is less necessary and can be reduced to save weight.

    Still, what is cover for/from the 5.56 is not, necessarily, from the 7.62 and the difference expands as the distance increases.

    It’s why the rifle platoon has a pair of MG firing the 7.62.

    But consider 30 guys firing the M14 from rest, one round every two seconds, a twenty round mag. In forty seconds, six hundred rounds went down range. If the target is a house at one thousand yards, pretty much every round hit.

    To do that with two MG would be likely impossible unless the bursts were so long that…the gun might overheat and the beaten zone is half the local area code.
    And you’d know where the next six hundred rounds aren’t coming from.

    Point is, the only advantage to the 5.56 is weight of the ammo and the weapon. The downsides have to be accepted. Except, as I mentioned, when it’s mech infantry or in a defensive position.

    Not sure if they make 5.56 AP, but I’m pretty sure I recall 7.62 AP. I know the full size round preceding the NATO common, in most nations’ inventory, included the AP potentiality. Could be handy. Not all armor on a vehicle is the max armor in the manufacturer’s brochure at every aspect. Might get lucky.

  54. Don: “The bigger threat to Putin is having a nearby democracy with Western values.”

    Exactly. Any tyranny is threatened if its citizens can see how bad their lives are ion comparison to a freer society. Thus, the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall.

    During the Cold War it was Communism against free market democracy. Today it’s all forms of tyranny (Communism is necessarily a tyranny) versus free market democracy.

    Our problem is that, since the 1960s, the communists have been burrowing into our institutions with great success. We won the Cold War but are losing the post-Cold War peace.

  55. The M16 initially had reduced rifling, reducing the gyro stabilizing effect, thus allowing for “keyholing” in the target, making a larger wound channel.

    The M16 started with 1 in 14″ twist rifling IIRC, changed to 1 in 12″ since the slower twist rate didn’t work well in artic conditions, and was eventually changed to 1 in 7″ twist.

    It still keyholes in the target, all spitzer type bullets tend to do that. It keyholes, breaks apart and fragments at close range (high velocity).

    Now, not all bullets are equally prone to keyholing, and the AK47 7.62×39 military ball is usually “late” to do so and may go through someone before it does. But it will eventually keyhole, because the bullet has gone unstable and it wants to fly but first since that’s the heavy part.

    Point is, the only advantage to the 5.56 is weight of the ammo and the weapon. The downsides have to be accepted. Except, as I mentioned, when it’s mech infantry or in a defensive position.

    That’s not the only advantage of 5.56. It has less recoil impulse, allowing faster follow up shots and it is also easier to shoot because of this. The European nations reduced the size of their targets after adopting 5.56 because their soldiers were shooting better.

    As a tactical round, the only advantage 7.62 NATO has over 5.56 is better penetration in soft media, like wood and flesh. 5.56 even has a slightly better trajectory.

    And, as I said, the 5.56 AR15 has dominated the M14 (M1A) in competition out to 600 yards.

  56. Our problem is that, since the 1960s, the communists have been burrowing into our institutions with great success. We won the Cold War but are losing the post-Cold War peace.

    Just watched bloviating Joe call for Putin to go (rather stupid thing to call for), and talk about freedom vs tyranny. But Joe represents tyranny here, which is worse than in Ukraine where it is normal. I support Ukraine in their war, but we have a huge problem. The mitigating factor is the incompetence and stupidity of those who wish to rule us.

  57. @ geoffrey > “Those inclined will read the articles and conclude what they will.”

    I read them both.
    I then accessed a few more articles from both.
    (1) Consortium News is citing reports from Russian media sources contradicting the Ukrainian sources. I don’t see that as an advance.
    They are also reprinting articles about Ukraine from Max Blumenthal.
    Do a few look-ups on him; I do not consider him a trustworthy source because of his history.
    (2) Are we now considering MSN & Newsweek to be credible unbiased sources?

    Conclusion: Fog of war, competing stories with no trusted arbiter, and the bias of all sources make it hard from this distance to decide who to believe. Particularly since any given story or source can be mixing (A) objectively true statements (even if we can’t verify them ourselves) with (B) possibly true statements (no one really knows) with (C) false claims.

    I do NOT accept “leaked stories from the Pentagon” as anything other than (B) because of their history of promoting what are now known to be (C).

    “Never said or even implied that Vlad is a good guy. Just that he’s not the only bad guy leading the unwitting.”

    I do agree with this, but it’s very, very unclear who the other bad guys are, what they are “leading” with and why, and who (if any) are the good guys.

    Repeating Frederick’s mantra: I know Russia invaded Ukraine and the Ukrainians are fighting back. To which I add, I know a lot of civilians have fled the country and a lot are dead and injured (I do find it hard to dispute some of the photos that have been published).
    Beyond that lies speculation, much of it rivaling the plot lines of Game of Thrones, of which I have been posting my fair share.

  58. Don.
    Better penetration is my point. Soldiers like to take cover, either in a well-prepared position or behind whatever’s handy.
    It’s why being on the defense is an advantage compared to guys up and moving.
    The penetrating capability of the larger round takes a certain proportion of the cover on the battlefield out of use. Sometimes that’s discovered when rounds come through, sometimes when an experienced soldier is looking at a potential position.
    The same applies to buildings, which is why I used the example of the house at a thousand yards.
    The individual Infantryman is more effective with the larger round, presuming issues such as weight are dealt with. And that would be, as I say, with mech Infantry and in the defensive.

  59. The advantage of more rounds and lighter recoil impulse more than make up for lost penetration. The advantage of 5.56 is present almost in any situation. The advantage of 7.62 requires a specific type of situation.

    Even mech infantry are going to be limited in how much ammo is carried, read House to House, David Bellavia had almost no full mags left when he cleared a house by himself that contained 6 insurgents in Fallujah. They were Bradly dismounts but short on ammo at that point.

  61. BTW the link above showed the 5.45 do the best and the 7.62 NATO do the worst in tree penetration.

    The wild card here is the bullet used, which has a significant impact, and I think the 7.62 NATO has the most potential. But in practice it isn’t given that it is best.

  62. Don:

    IIRC and from online media the DOD is working to replace some parts of the small arms 5.56 and 7.62 menagerie with a 6.8 mm based cartridge system (at least three different designs for the 6.8 mm cartridge system). Anyway the drivers appear to be deficiencies of the 5.56 regarding range, lethality, and performance against modern body armor used by peers or near peers.

  64. om,

    I doubt 6.8 happens. The projects to replace 5.56 look like they are intended so some government contractors make buck more than anything else.

    Much of the claim that 5.56 is inadequate for the ranges in Afghanistan is based on being outranged by insurgents armed with PKMs. Bipod mounted machine guns firing full powered cartridges. The M16 family outrange AK47s and AK74s and other Russian assault rifles, although the base M4 is dated at this point. The problem we had with our equipment is more that the PKM fills a roll that our M240s are too heavy for and M249 has less range. A US PKM copy or an updated light weight M60 would be the better solution.

    I don’t believe 6.8 mm SPC improves on 5.56 with respect to performance against body armor. In fact that’s an area where 5.56 does well due to higher velocity. 6.8 is pretty much designed to improve on lethality, particularly when dealing with certain barriers but not body armor or greater range. The marginal improvements it offers doesn’t justify it. Except for elite units in specific situations, maybe.

  65. Even making allowances for anti-Russian Resistance propaganda, the relative ineffectiveness of the NATerrorO military is becoming more and more apparent. This is a surprise, to Easern and possibly also to Zelensky.

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