Home » The Russians and Chinese can’t be all that happy about the performance of their defense systems in Venezuela

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The Russians and Chinese can’t be all that happy about the performance of their defense systems in Venezuela — 33 Comments

  1. A simple answer could be that the systems were not energized at the time of the attack. A good reason for that would be to avoid what happened in Iran a few years ago when a civilian airliner was shot down shortly after taking off. Air denial systems don’t work well in areas known for civilian traffic.

    The problem with that answer is the US called for the closure of that airspace days prior to the attack. Whatever your feelings on US doing so, it at least prevented the potential of US and allied countries flying commercial traffic near Caracas. With that type of warning, why have your air defense systems turned off? The Venezuelan military should expect an attack was imminent and should want to know when such an attack was happening with as much early warning possible and, assuming they wanted to protect Maduro, they would have wanted to repel that attack.

    I write this because of the sentence mentioning “limitations on these architectures” and “integrating intelligence”. A limitation is use in civilian airspace and integrating defense in civilian airspace. The US could have done less warning, and it would be likely those systems wouldn’t be on. I think the US suspected those systems were not that capable and were happy to prove so. Indeed, I almost think that was as much a message being made as the capture of Maduro.

  2. I think it is worth considering that the U.S. had the opportunity for weeks to demonstrate for the operators of the Venezuelan radar warning system what assets they could expect we would employ, and how those assets would behave. Naturally, in the event, all assets would behave quite differently.

    Sun-Tzu, white courtesy phone for Sun-Tzu.

  3. ECM has come a long way from my days in the Navy. What we had in the 1960s was the equivalent of the stone age compared to what they have today.

    No matter their frequency, all radars have to emit. Electronic jammers can detect and jam the signal. I’ve been told that modern jammers can even destroy the radars’ magnetron in some instances.

    Today electronic warfare is different than it was even in 2001. The technology has grown by leaps and bounds.

  4. I asked Grok if the electronic warfare supression systems on the Growler could defeat air defense systems like the JY-27.

    Yes, the electronic warfare (EW) systems on the U.S. Navy’s EA-18G Growler aircraft have demonstrated the capability to defeat radars like the Chinese JY-27, as evidenced by their successful use in the January 3, 2026, U.S. operation in Venezuela.

    The Growler’s advanced jamming pods (such as the ALQ-99 and Next Generation Jammer) overwhelmed Venezuelan air defenses, including JY-27 systems, through intensive electronic jamming, spoofing, and cyber-electromagnetic attacks that blinded radars and disrupted command networks.

    Key Factors in the Defeat JY-27 Vulnerabilities: The JY-27 (a VHF-band, meter-wave radar designed for anti-stealth detection) has inherent weaknesses like poor angular resolution, making it inaccurate for targeting, and it’s susceptible to modern EW tactics despite claims of jam resistance.

    Its mid-2000s technology lacks integration with AI-driven data fusion or robust networked defenses, leaving it outmatched by 2026 U.S. capabilities.

    Growler’s Effectiveness: In the Venezuela raid, Growlers conducted pre-strike surveillance to map defenses, then applied spectrum-dominance techniques (e.g., low-probability-of-intercept signals and decoys) to neutralize the JY-27 without detection.

    This allowed stealth aircraft like F-22s and F-35s to operate undetected, with the JY-27 failing to spot any incoming threats up to 310 miles away.

    Broader Context: The operation exposed the JY-27’s real-world limitations when integrated with Russian systems (e.g., S-300 missiles), as the entire network was degraded, preventing any engagements.

    Analysts note that while VHF radars pose challenges to stealth, they can still be countered by advanced EW platforms like the Growler in layered attacks involving space, cyber, and intelligence assets.

    This real-world example confirms the Growler’s air suppression electronics can defeat such systems under operational conditions, though specifics of classified jamming techniques remain undisclosed.

    I then asked to respond to reports the air defense systems were never activated.

    Reports from the January 3, 2026, U.S. operation in Venezuela (Operation Absolute Resolve) indicate that the Venezuelan air defense systems—primarily Russian-made like the S-300VM, Buk-M2E, and S-125 Pechora-2M, along with Chinese JY-27 radars—were indeed present and part of the defensive network but failed to engage or down any U.S. aircraft.

    However, the failure wasn’t due to the systems simply not being activated by Venezuelan forces (e.g., turned off or left dormant by choice). Instead, they were actively suppressed, disrupted, and in some cases physically destroyed through a multi-layered U.S. approach involving electronic warfare (EW), cyber effects, anti-radiation missiles, and overwhelming aerial assets. Key Details from Analyses Suppression via EW: U.S. platforms like the EA-18G Growler used radar-jamming to flood the electromagnetic spectrum, forcing Venezuelan radars (including the JY-27) to shut down to avoid detection or overload.

    If radars activated, they exposed themselves and were targeted by AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), creating safe air corridors for U.S. helicopters and stealth aircraft.

    This aligns with descriptions of the systems being “disabled and dismantled” rather than inactive from the start.

    Other Contributing Factors: Experts highlight additional reasons for the defenses’ ineffectiveness: Overwhelming U.S. force (over 150 aircraft outnumbered the defenses).

    Potential cyber intrusions that neutralized systems pre-emptively.

    Poor Venezuelan operator training, integration issues, and lack of readiness (e.g., systems may not have been at peak alert due to the surprise element).

    U.S. intelligence on Russian systems from Ukraine, enabling effective countermeasures.

    Expert Quotes: Ralph Savelsberg (missile expert): “The success of this raid is not solely a reflection of the quality, or lack thereof, of the equipment. Quantity has a quality all its own: The aircraft involved in this mission vastly outnumbered the defenses.”

    Mark Cancian (CSIS defense expert): “The United States probably took [Venezuelan air defenses] out several ways. Cyber might’ve been one piece of it. The United States of course has anti-radiation missiles to take out the radars themselves.”

    Mattias Eken (RAND missile defense expert): “A well-planned, multi-domain Western operation can suppress or bypass even advanced Russian systems.”

    In summary, while some radars may have “shut down” as a direct result of U.S. jamming, the overall narrative from defense analysts and reports is one of active defeat through EW suppression and kinetic strikes, not passive non-activation. If you have a specific report in mind claiming otherwise, sharing the source could help clarify!

    Take it for what it’s worth. Grok doesn’t have access to classified information, but does do a good job of scouring the web for information from a variety of sources.

    Some of the videos show strikes on air defense systems where missile systems appear to be cooking off (continuous rapid explosions). I think we not only jammed the systems, but targeted them. Grok agrees:

    Several civilian-recorded videos from the January 3, 2026, U.S. strikes in Venezuela (Operation Absolute Resolve) show clear signs of secondary explosions—often described as “cooking off”—following impacts on Venezuelan air defense systems. These are characteristic of missile-laden launchers (like the Russian Buk-M2E or S-300 variants) detonating their own ordnance after a direct hit, producing multiple rapid blasts and intense fires. Key Examples from Videos. Footage geolocated to Higuerote Airport (Miranda State) captures a massive initial explosion followed by prolonged secondary detonations and fire, widely interpreted as a strike on a surface-to-air missile (SAM) launcher. Analysts note the pattern matches ammunition “cooking off.”
    Similar clips from La Carlota airbase and other sites around Caracas show destroyed Buk-M2E systems with aftermath fires, though some focus more on the initial blasts.

    These videos, primarily shot by residents on cellphones and shared on social media, show distant nighttime explosions with bright flashes and sustained burning rather than up-close details.

  5. We can’t rule out the idea that the U.S. military’s hardware systems are simply better than the detection systems being used in Venezuela, and that their planning and execution went astoundingly well.

    It feels good to say something like this about the U.S..

  6. Here is a former fighter pilot, Max Afterburner, adding analysis to the press conference where Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan “Razin” Caine, described how the US performed the operation, “Operation Absolute Resolve”.

    Fighter Pilot Reacts to General’s EXPLOSIVE Military Brief on Maduro Capture
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOpnzb7ZKK0

  7. From Operation Sindoor to Venezuela: How Chinese weapons, radars keep failing — Explained
    TOI World Desk | TIMESOFINDIA.COM | Jan 8, 2026, 17:24 IST

    In Venezuela, America’s EA-18 Growlers reportedly played a crucial role in the mission by deploying advanced electronic jamming and communications-disruption capabilities. The Growler is a carrier-launched electronic warfare aircraft built not for delivering ordnance, but for controlling the electromagnetic battlefield. During the Venezuela operation, it formed part of a large US aerial force that disabled China-supplied radar and communication networks, enabling special forces aircraft to move into and out of Venezuelan airspace with speed and minimal resistance.

  8. ECM/ EW is a complex environment, not something your average unmotivated conscript will master. On top of that the high end stealth hardware is VERY hard to spot if it is approaching in the proper sense. In the Bosnia/Croatia confrontations in the late 90’s the stealth vehicles were best spotted from side or under aspects. Even if you get signals back from the side I suspect they are subtle and not long lasting as the target leaves your scan area. Likely the High stealth platforms went in first and took out the more capable radars (which had been likely being teased by FA-18G Growlers for some period). With those eliminated the Growlers make a hash of the radar signals while the slower and less stealthy MH-60 enter the scene. Meanwhile Air Defense Command and Control is racing about like a chicken with its head cut off, and sitting on the issue as they try to figure out how to report it without looking like chumps. By the time they get their stuff together Maduro and his lady are in a chopper headed out to sea.

  9. I also suspect the Chinese and Russian hardware didn’t communicate and integrate with each other well.

  10. It seems to me China and Russia have hardware that is having problems dealing with US hardware, and they should consider their actions carefully when dealing with a president like Trump.

    With Biden (or Kamela) in office they didn’t have much to worry about.

  11. this is not particularly new. at least for Russian hardware: see Iran, 2025, where the Israeli air force outperformed them as well. though, IIRC, these are only the latest two examples of this performance imbalance

  12. I think the contractor in called npal, they are having an acme problem, once an accident, another coincidence,

  13. I doubt there is a simple answer here. But the first question might be, ‘were they configured to operate as designed, and in operating condition?’

    Given the state of most everything else in Venezuela, and its 25 slide to its present position, it’s easy to guess that perhaps maintenance and expertise might have been mitigating factors, and also easy to speculate whether these were things known to the Special Forces.

  14. US tech superiority is great to see in action.
    It was probably available to US forces in Afghanistan, but Biden was unwilling to fight, and kill, tens or hundreds of thousands of poorly armed Taliban.

    Taiwan’s protection depends on continued US tech superiority.

    There’s a new Trump directive to push Raytheon to stop buybacks and instead invest more in America. Also to reduce salaries. Which I favor, for most major defense contractors whose main customer is govt.

  15. Trump is the man.
    Any CCP plans to invade Taiwan are lengthening their timelines.
    Hopefully out to ‘Forever’.
    Meanwhile, buyers for their radar detection system are prolly cancelling orders left and right.
    Beep Beep!

  16. I think it’s an issue of “Trump is bluffing. He’s never gonna invade…” **

    …so they were pretty certain those systems would never be tested.
    (Same with Iran this past summer.)

    ** …BUT if he DOES dare to actually attack us, then our allies in the DPUSA and the MEDIA and EU and the UN—together with Tucker Carlson—will take care of him, but this time for good!!!

    File under: Feelin’ lucky??

  17. The Growlers are from Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet which is based at NAS Whidbey Island. One of many unique activities in western Washington.

  18. For those radars to see US aircraft, stealth or otherwise, they have to be active. And active radars can be located from much further away than they can detect anything.
    And what US forces can locate, they can usually kill, one way or another.
    To hearken back to tactics used in a previous war: in the Persian Gulf War, the initial hole in the Iraqi air defense network was blasted by Army AH-64 attack helicopters. Air defense radars optimized to look for fast moving stealth jets don’t do too well at seeing helicopters coming in a few feet above the trees.

  19. @ Sennacherib > “Remember if you don’t defeat them, you are just training them.”

    Yes, the downside is that now China and Russia have some clues on how to improve their hardware and performance.

    It remains to be seen if they CAN.

    @ bill (poor communication between systems) & Don (dealing with US arms & Trump’s objectives): Agreed, on all counts.

  20. Two items for consideration:
    What does this say to CCP planners wrt Taiwan?
    Use Google Earth to look at The Three Gorges Dam; history’s largest glass jaw.

  21. Does anyone think that perhaps the Venezuelan military is simply poorly trained and/or incompetent thus allowing the US to render their defense system ineffective??

    You can bet your house that China and Russia will learn from this experience and attempt to develop better defense systems.

  22. The lesson? Don’t sell your junk to untrained, unprofessional gangs?

    But if you are going to use your systems in another country (Donbas, Ukraine) have your military (undercover) operate it (to shoot down a civilian airliner).

  23. It’s a mistake to think our success was due, even in part to the lack of training or ability of the Russian/Chinese military hardware. This is just how good our military is. Israel demonstrated it in the 12-day Iran war.

  24. It is a mistake to sit in eastern Washington and think training of the Maduro minions or the equipment they were using had no effect on the outcome.

  25. It is a mistake to rely on AI for original thinking. :0

    “Anything” and “even in part” used to mean something in journalism.

  26. I subscribe to Rod Dreyer’s substack and he pulled some long quotes from a recent publication that posits that the total failure of the vaunted Russian and Chinese defense systems to stop the US raid in Venezuela signals a sea change in geopolitics. We are now back to the age where nuclear deterrence is the only true power.

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