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Home » On the Israeli hostage deal

On the Israeli hostage deal

The New Neo Posted on by

Nearly everyone on the right agrees that it’s a terrible deal. My initial gut reaction is to concur with that assessment. But I’m going to take a different position here – my second take, as it were.

How could anyone not have mixed feelings about any Israeli/Hamas hostage deal? On the one hand, there are those incredibly sympathetic hostages, especially the children. On the other hand, there is the terrible price to pay: rewarding hostage-taking through the freeing of people dangerous to Israel’s future security, and pausing the military operations against Hamas.

If we were to do a cold-blooded cost/benefit analysis, it would seem obvious that no such deal should be made. But the Israeli government doesn’t have a history of cold-bloodedness on these things. And I find that, on reflection, I’m not so sure that the obvious answer is actually so very correct.

I’ve often heard people who criticize the current Israeli government for not going in to free the hostages comparing lack of such efforts unfavorably to the successful raid on Entebbe in 1976, in which hostages on a hijacked airplane were successfully rescued in Uganda. Entebbe was an incredible operation by the Israeli forces that caught the attention of the world, but it had little similarity to the hostage situation Israel now faces, because in 1976 the Israeli authorities knew the hostages were being held together at the Entebbe airport. What’s more:

Mossad built an accurate picture of the whereabouts of the hostages, the number of hijackers, and the involvement of Ugandan troops, based on information from the released hostages in Paris. Further, Israeli firms had been involved in construction projects in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s: while preparing the raid, the Israeli army consulted with Solel Boneh, a large Israeli construction firm that had built the terminal where the hostages were held.

… IDF major Muki Betser later remarked in an interview that Mossad operatives extensively interviewed the hostages who had been released. He said that a French-Jewish passenger who had a military background and “a phenomenal memory” had provided detailed information about the number of weapons carried by the hostage-takers.

That’s not to say the Entebbe rescue operation was easy. It was justly famous for its planning, audacity, and success:

Initiating the operation at nightfall on 4 July 1976, Israeli transport planes flew 100 commandos over 4,000 kilometres (2,500 mi) to Uganda for the rescue effort. Over the course of 90 minutes, 102 of the hostages were rescued successfully, with three having been killed. One of the dead hostages, Dora Bloch, had been murdered by Ugandan authorities at a hospital in Kampala shortly after the Israeli rescue operation; she had fallen ill during the hijacking and was removed from the plane for treatment prior to the commandos’ arrival. The Israeli military suffered five wounded and one killed; Yonatan Netanyahu was Israel’s sole fatality of Operation Entebbe, and had led Sayeret Matkal during the rescue effort – he was the older brother of Benjamin Netanyahu, who would later become Israel’s prime minister. The Israeli commandos killed all of the hijackers and 45 Ugandan soldiers, and eleven of Uganda’s MiG-17s and MiG-21s were destroyed.

I don’t pretend to be any sort of expert on the matter, but I really don’t see any logistical similarities to the present hostage situation, which seems far more challenging. So I simply don’t see a successful rescue raid as possible. The choices facing Israel’s leaders are between allowing the hostages to stay under Hamas control and to probably be tortured and even killed because without a deal they are worth nothing to Hamas, or doing some sort of deal.

Given that black-and-white choice, and the enormous amount of pressure (not only from the families of the hostages but from other Israelis too) to make a deal, it’s not surprising that the government would agree to an exchange. So, how bad is this particular exchange under these particular circumstances? I’m not so sure it’s all that bad.

Here’s my reasoning: at this point, the most important factor is whether Hamas is destroyed by Israel. If Israel fails to do that, any refusal to do a hostage deal probably wouldn’t have given Israel much future advantage. After all, if Hamas continues to function, jihadis will do their best to repeat October 7 whether or not terrorists are released for hostages. Hamas has made that clear. So it rests on whether Hamas is destroyed. Of course, to the extent that this deal will make it harder for Israel to do that, it’s a bad deal. But I’m not sure that in the long run, stopping the fighting for a few days will matter all that much. Either Israel has the will and the ability to get the job done or it does not.

Reportedly, the released prisoners in this deal would not – unlike in the Shalit deal – include high-ranking terrorist masterminds. I read somewhere (although I cannot find the source at the moment) that although some of the list of hostages to be released have aided murderers, none have themselves committed murder. They are for the most part teenagers and women – not that that means they can’t be very dangerous, of course. But given the attitude of most of the current Gazan population and how devoted to terrorism and Jew-murder they are, I think that these foot-soldier terrorists on the list could easily be replaced with others if they were kept in prison, so I’m not sure their release will matter all that much. Gaza seems to have a nearly inexhaustible supply. What will matter most of all is whether Israel is victorious in the war on Hamas, and whether it does what needs to be done after that victory to make it less likely that future attacks will happen. I don’t think that depends on whether these particular terrorists stay in prison or not. And if Israel is successful in that endeavor, other terrorist groups might take notice.

I’m trying to look on the brighter side here, while remaining realistic.

[NOTE: A couple of things I had forgotten about Entebbe – if I ever knew them in the first place – were the following:

(1) The 12-person French crew of the airplane refused to be released and chose to stay with the hostages. That’s incredibly impressive.

(2) Israel got help from Jomo Kenyatta’s Kenya, which allowed the rescuers to refuel. “Idi Amin subsequently issued orders for the Ugandan military to kill all Kenyans living in Uganda, leading to the deaths of 245 Kenyan-Ugandans and the exodus of around 3,000 Kenyans from Uganda.” I had not know Kenyans paid such a high price.

(3) Two of the hijackers were German leftists – this guy and his girlfriend – showing early on the link between leftists and Palestinian terrorists.]

Comments

On the Israeli hostage deal — 42 Comments

  1. “Of course, to the extent that this deal will make it harder for Israel to do that, it’s a bad deal. But I’m not sure that in the long run, stopping the fighting for a few days will matter all that much.”
    ===
    My concern is that the humanitarian aid to Gaza will probably be accompanied by third country humanitarian aid workers (UN, EU, whatever). Should these aid workers stay in Gaza after the hudna expires, either voluntarily or coerced, they would then become human shields, leading to even greater pressure from their home countries to get the Israelis to cease their operations.

  2. Thanks for all this information, Neo.

    I feel like I’m drinking from a fire hose – so much information and new events coming at us every day. I don’t know how you do so much. But I’m very thankful that you have the desire and energy to keep us informed.

  3. How I enjoy having so many of my own thoughts articulated better than I would have done had I tried to write them.
    First pass thoughts – NO DEAL. “We fight for Unconditional Surrender – all hostages to be released”.
    Second pass – … we don’t get fast surrender, it’s going to take time, some hostages are dying, Bibi & Israel govt are blamed, wrongly but strongly, for the hostages not being released. Here’s a chance for some hostages.

    As you note at the end: “What will matter most of all is whether Israel is victorious in the war on Hamas, and whether it does what needs to be done after that victory to make it less likely that future attacks will happen.”

    To be victorious requires both international and internal PR. Whether current Hamas prisoners are released or not is most important for the PR issues, not the fighting on the ground (and underground weasels vs rats).

    Few are talking about what happens after / if Hamas does surrender.
    Israel should occupy and write up a modified Swiss constitution for a (third state) Gaza Palestine Confederation (5 cantons). With Israel temporarily in control of executive, judicial, army & police. Pushing for Singapore strict politeness authoritarianism, until a 2 million person Gaza that respects human rights of all people is established as successful.

    This can only fully start after Hamas surrenders, but perhaps they can fully occupy & control the North Gaza / Jabalia canton, setting up resettlement and reconstruction camps.

    It’s good to know the Arab side of the story, as Aljazeera explains facts and mixes in semi-propaganda. In maps, like I like:
    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/7/the-gaza-strip-explained-in-maps

    Israel should be planning various reconstruction projects to employ residents after Hamas surrenders. And as these projects become ready, they should publicize them, to put more pressure on Hamas to surrender.
    I have lots more fantasies … often wake up thinking of them.
    “You’re dreaming”
    “You’re delusional”

    I’m hopeful, but also fearful, and trying to be realistic, yet also helpful.
    For Gaza-Israeli peace. For world peace.

  4. *click* …and this conflict ratchets its way one step closer to the Old Normal. The West’s refusal to change how it deals with barbarity will inevitably lead to more barbarism; the consequences of paying the Danegeld is a lesson we continue to refuse to learn. Of course, this leads us also one step closer to the day a truly catastrophic act will occur, undoubtedly perpetrated by the primitives we’re assuaging right now.

  6. Israel should do whatever it takes to save the hostages, and once they are back in Israel, Israel should re-invade Gaza if need be, hunt down all the Hamas operatives and kill them all. Israel should not take any prisoners; they should shoot them all (after forcing them to talk).
    If it means totally leveling all of Gaza, they should do it.

    As for those Hamas officials living in Qatar, London, etc. Israel should hunt them down and kill them all no matter where they reside; just as they did to the Munich Olympic terrorists.

  7. “Nearly everyone on the right agrees that it’s a terrible deal.”
    ________

    Not I. My inclination is to trust the judgement of the Israeli government and IDF, rather than a bunch of keyboard warriors. Israel’s record is outstanding here. Why assume they are wrong this time?

  8. The suggestion that the ICRC will have access to those hostages (all of them!) who are not to be released over these coming four (five?) days is a highly salutary development in my view. Much could be learned by that.

    However, I’m now seeing a great deal of smoke being cast over this otherwise (previously) explicit term of the deal, so am beginning to feel like the sucker in a bait and switch operation. Of course we’ll see how it develops, but for now, cross fingers and hope, skeptically.

  10. I came across this video by a Major in the Indian Army who is quite pro Israel. He isn’t particularly bothered by the ceasefire thinking that it will give the Israelis time to work out their next steps in the war against Hamas. His take on Iran as a paper tiger is quite amusing too.

    https://youtu.be/xIiT6xtte6M?si=sK38h9ZdyFgckW4L

    My worry is that the treasonous snake Blinken will step in on day 3.5 and beat the drums for an extension of the ceasefire, this time for 10 days, and so on with no end. After all, this ceasefire worked so why not continue it, forever.

  11. I first learned about the Entebbe operation because I was reading a biography of Yonatan (Jonathan in the English text) Netanyahu. It was a fascinating account that focused on the events in his life that essentially prepared him to lead the raid.

    Neo’s assessment of the hostage problem is probably as close to correct as any outsider is likely to get, since we don’t know what proposals and counter-proposals went into making the deal. It looks like Israel can only get them turned loose in small lots, so Hamas can extend the bargaining for pauses. Once all the hostages are gone (if ever), then they have nothing to bid with. I suspect the price of each release will go up.

    I thought that restricting the exchange to the same sex was an Israeli win, but eventually they well get to the point of having to trade men for men. I was going to say “same age” except the Gazans are mostly teens, as Israel does not hold children captive.

    Here’s one of those proposals from the ToI post: “A senior Israeli official briefing reporters earlier said that US President Joe Biden sent CIA chief William Burns to Qatar in order to quash a Hamas demand to designate all Israeli women under 50 as soldiers, and instead to use that classification only for the five women soldiers on active duty who are held by the terror group.”

  12. Red State had the most details I could find yesterday. There seem to be some conflicts in reporting. I guess we’ll see what actually plays out.
    Bets on when and how Hamas will break whatever the terms are?

    https://redstate.com/streiff/2023/11/21/breaking-israel-and-hamas-reach-tentative-agreement-on-a-4-5-day-ceasefire-and-limited-hostage-release-n2166668

    This is how the bargaining started.
    https://babylonbee.com/news/hamas-offers-to-release-hostages-if-israel-agrees-to-not-exist

  13. The longer Israel ignores the source of Hamas’s monstrousness, the more certain it’s eventually defeat. To protest that Israel well knows the source, ignores that it refuses to name that source. You can’t defeat an enemy that you refuse to identify.

  16. Two excellent essays from Tablet Magazine, one on the dark side, and then one on the less dark — there is not much of a light side yet.
    https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/war-against-the-jews
    Some thoughts on the first pogrom of the 21st century BY DAVID BLUMENTHAL

    https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/we-are-not-alone
    Visitors to the Rebbe’s tomb ask Hashem for help, while those davening to the golden calf of D.C. politics get spurned BY ARMIN ROSEN

    I regret my lack of knowledge of the Hebrew words Rosen used, but I think I figured out a lot of them. He’s not writing to the gentiles.

    https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/hashem/

  17. Eeyore, Israel’s record of releasing 1200 hostages for Gilad Shalit is not what a lot of Israelis believe to be outstanding. Watch sdferr’s link above to Caroline Glick.

    I hope Neo’s brighter-side-second-look comes to pass, but as Jagimoto above implies, the hostage deal also implies that Israeli politicians are “going wobbly” to use Margaret Thatcher’s warning.

  18. @ Jagitmoto > “and this conflict ratchets its way one step closer to the Old Normal”

    Some people think we are already there.
    Sadly, I can’t find the link now, but it was along the lines of how quickly everyone in leadership positions pivoted from “We are all Israel” back to the usual “We think you ought to quit beating up on the poor Gazans and go home.”

  20. Two comments:
    1. The IDF will gain some information about how Hamas was using its hiding places from the hostages released. That information may have value in addition to getting the hostages released alive (which I did not expect).
    2. The Hamas people released will still be in Gaza, so if they wish to go back to their old ways, they can be added to the list of Hamas people who will ultimately be forced into unconditional surrender.

  21. A religious and historical argument for the swift redemption of captives, which somewhat explains why it is a moral imperative for many Israelis.

    https://www.commentary.org/avital-davidovich-eshed/the-hostages-and-why-we-must-redeem-them-a-history/

    I note, however, that (in the ancient world) redeeming captives who were going to be sold into slavery, in which case their fellow Jews are essentially bidding for the purchase and the world rolls on as before, is different from ransoming hostages who have no value to anyone except the Jews — which is why their price is often so high,

    Glick makes the point that the pressure to ransom hostages is very intense because we know who they are and personal stories are always compelling, especially after the media gets involved. The certain result will be the deaths of others, sometimes hundreds, but “we don’t know their names.”

    It’s kind of the opposite of the decision in The Trolley Problem, in a horrendous way, and I’m very glad not to be the one making those decisions.

    Glick is not optimistic about the ability of the IDF to keep control of surveillance with the drones down 6 hours a day, the aid (which Hamas will take), and their military momentum, but perhaps the pause will give their spies time to find the other hostages.

    https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/trolley-problem-moral-philosophy-ethics

  22. @ JohnnyB – Glick said that the released prisoners are allowed to choose where they are sent, and specifically cites the case of a woman who tried to kill her neighbor in front of the Jewish woman’s children but failed. The traumatized family will soon have that wannabe-killer back in their neighborhood.

  25. Sometimes there are no good options, just the choice of a bad option and an even worse option. Getting some hostages back is less worse.

  26. At this point surely any humanitarian aid entering Gaza will be confiscated by Hamas, so any aid does nothing to assist Palestinians and only fortifies HAMAS.

    This reminds me to the way Geldolf’s World Aid program ended up propping up African dictators and enabling their regimes.

    When your aid is going to end up in the hands of the regime, the responsible thing is to refuse aid.

  27. This is from the Scott Adams podcast this morning. Think of the pause / hostage swap as an intel op. The Israelis get some hostages back. They also relieve international pressure on them a little bit. OTOH, they get to observe how Hamas communicates, gathers hostages, moves hostages, and preps them for release. They construct a map of tunnel entrances and the current Hamas comm grid (whatever that is today). If they are releasing hostages in spurts, 12/day x 4 days, then they get to do the entire routine 4 times. Finally, afterwards, they get to debrief the hostages about their captors, locations and accommodations.

    Make no mistake, Israel is going to destroy Hamas. This is a step toward that goal. Note that they already turned the vaunted tunnel system into a 21st Century version of the Maginot Line. LOTS of effort and resources spend on precious little advantage. Cheers –

  29. I love Scott Adams, but that is just nonsense. Hamas’ “price” for releasing some hostages was a pause. And he wants us to believe that a pause is actually in Israel’s interest?

    This is at least sdferr‘a second post revealing murkiness on the details. Even at this late hour when everyone says there is a deal, there is a real chance Israel is getting played here.

  30. The is the mutilated beggar problem. A person who gives alms to a child mutilated to be a beggar does two things, they help the child, and they reenforce the system which hurt the child.

    Everyone wants to help the hostages, on both sides. But these deals just encourage more taking of hostages.

  31. In re Adams’ speculation: the IDF may not be happy about the pause operationally, but they aren’t going to waste any opportunities they can get out of it.

    I don’t see how Hamas gains anything by “playing” the terms; Israel is not going to let the aid flow and the drones slow until the thugs let the hostages go, even if it is one group at a time.

    Now, if Hamas has NO plans to release anyone, then they do get some time to re-arm, but very little compared to what they would get by following through.
    UNLESS Israel continues to let them delay things “just one more day.”
    How long would Bibi put up with that?

    ToI: “An Israeli source also said the four-day lull in fighting, per the deal, would be on hold and that Israeli military operations in Gaza would continue as long as the agreement is not finalized, Haaretz reported.”

  32. The Israeli offensive has been so brutally effective so far that I don’t think there’s much to be lost by a pause – so long as operations start back up again shortly. Israel attacked Hamas at the latter’s high-water mark – secure in its defenses, and with high morale after returning from their slaughter – and utterly crushed the organization. While I would prefer not to see Hamas rearm, even a full rearmament won’t change the current situation. And at best, Hamas will only get a limited rearmament.

    Further, word is getting out that Hamas’s troops that weren’t part of the special operation are suffering from low morale. They were told that the operation was going to be the usual “grab a few IDF hostages” affair. But it was a lot more than that, and now the Hamas grunts are having hammers dropped on them while the actual people responsible hide out either in Qatar or in hidden bunkers. Apparently the grunts are starting to resent that.

    Finally, it’s important to remember that it wasn’t just Israelis that were taken hostage. Israel can develop some genuine international good will be getting the foreigners back… and likely rely on support from foreign intelligence agencies in examining the evidence to figure out where the remaining hostages are. I’ve read that over 20% of the hostages are Thai guest workers. I bet the Thai government has intelligence assets assisting the Israelis as I type this.

  33. Here is an outstanding “illustrated history” of the Palestine-Israel situation up to 2011. The narrator sounds like Bill Whittle to me, but he’s not credited.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7ByJb7QQ9U
    Sep 19, 2011
    “Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has launched an international campaign to achieve recognition by the United Nations for an independent Palestinian state. Abbas and his international supporters claim that only Israel (with the United States) stands in the way of this act of historical justice, which would finally bring about peace in the Middle East.

    This video debunks the Palestinians’ claim and shows that Abbas has been lying about the origins and history of the conflict. Palestinian leaders have rejected partition plans that would have given them much more land for their independent state than the Jews were offered for theirs. Rather than being the innocent victims of a “dispossession” at the hands of the Israelis, the Palestinians rejected reasonable compromises and instead pursued their aim of getting rid of the only Jewish state in the world.”

    Commenters add “nuance” and cite “omissions” but it’s a quick history lesson if you like this style.

  34. @ Jagimoto in re “Some people think we are already there.”

    This is the post I was trying to find, by Daniel Pipes.
    https://www.danielpipes.org/22025/israel-has-quickly-reverted-to-its-bad-old
    “”Everything changed” in Israel on Oct. 7. Except it did not. Despite much talk of victory by the prime minister and survey research showing the public endorses a tough new approach, Israeli officialdom and its security establishment show signs of reverting to their old failed policies, even before the bodies have all been buried.
    Those failed policies mean primarily one thing: wrongly assuming that enrichment – more work permits in Israel, a larger fishing zone, outside funding – gives Palestinians something to lose, taming them and making them less inclined to aggress.
    Symptoms of that sad reversion include the following:

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