Anyone thinking of getting a pineapple tattoo, however, might want to think twice: “Several women on TikTok are seriously regretting their tattoos of an upside-down pineapple after choosing the design without knowing its meaning. A quick Google search would inform eager ink seekers that the turned-over fruit is commonly used as a symbol for swingers looking for a good time.”
From the comments: “This once again shows my dad was right. A tattoo is a permanent reminder of a temporary bad decision. I can’t tell you how many times I asked someone what the tattoo was supposed to be and they answered, ‘a mistake.'”
Interesting video. I did not know about Dole being the brother of the Gov of Hawaii. I remember while living in Hawaii in the early mid 50’s the huge Pineapple fields, and the Sugar Came fields.
Cold here today, was minus 8 officially and my house it was just minus 6, but it has warmed up to a balmy minus 3.
On a side note: we have several sources of heat for our house. We put in “mini splits” several years ago and they work great to heat and cool the house. However at about 5 degrees they cease to provide heat. So I turn on the electric baseboard heaters, thus using a lot of electricity. When we built our house 45 years ago we were advised to put in baseboard heaters because NG was getting expensive and at the time the more electricity you used, the per Kilowatt price dropped. That didn’t last long though. This morning the temps in the house were in the low 60’s with the heaters running all night. When NG is outlawed for hotwater heaters and furnaces the usage of electricity will be huge.
I will add that our house was built using 2×6’s on 16 in centers, extra insulation, insulation between floors including the crawl space. Several years ago I added blowen insulation to the attic and we put in triple pane windows. We also have passive solar panels to preheat the water. We also put a heat exchanger on the solar system so that when the storage tank gets up to 100 degrees I get in effect a force air furnace in all downstairs rooms. We have done what we could to mitigate energy usage. We do have a dual fuel stove which the idjts here in CO are pushing to outlaw.
We crafted policy for the people without consulting them. If our public health officials had led with less hubris, the course of the pandemic in the United States might have had a very different outcome, with far fewer lost lives.
Instead, we have witnessed a massive and ongoing loss of life in America due to distrust of vaccines and the healthcare system; a massive concentration in wealth by already wealthy elites; a rise in suicides and gun violence especially among the poor; a near-doubling of the rate of depression and anxiety disorders especially among the young; a catastrophic loss of educational attainment among already disadvantaged children; and among those most vulnerable, a massive loss of trust in healthcare, science, scientific authorities, and political leaders more broadly.
“…failures…”
Beg to differ.
HTH do you think THEY got Biden “elected”??
And how do you think they’re in the position they are in now—taking the country on a rollercoaster ride to hell?
Failure?
It was a rip-roaring success…and it gets ever more successful with each passing nightmarish day….
Nonapod– Aren’t we lucky? In regard to the gross mishandling of the pandemic, Brandon has decided to “officially end two emergency declarations related to the virus on May 11, nearly three years after they were first declared. . . . The Biden administration says in the policy statement that the end of the public health emergency will lead to the immediate termination of Title 42, which allows law enforcement authorities to swiftly send migrants back across the border. . . . [And] Once the emergency expires, people with private insurance will have some out-of-pocket costs for vaccines, tests and treatment, while the uninsured will have to pay for those expenses in their entirety.”
Wow! Life imitates art; in this case the art is SNL. The footage of the Finnish National Transgender figure skater made me think of the hilarious Martin Short – Harry Shearer SNL skit on male, synchronized swimming.
It’s downright hilarious, but the audience and the other skaters are all participants in the new, Emperor’s New Clothes farce regarding gender, so none laugh.
SHIREHOME, they now make mini-splits that operate down to -30 degrees.
Units down to -13 degrees are very common.
I’ve used Mitsubishi, LG and Panasonic units and all have been very reliable.
The Panasonic operates down to -10 degrees in a rental unit, and the renters are very happy with it. Occasionally, the temps here drop below that, so it still requires some resistance heaters.
Even now the author of the Newsweek mea culpa fails to understand much.
Brian, yes they do but the costs are very much higher than I paid for mine. We have Mitsubishi installed and do like them. Operating as A/C they are very efficient and keep the house cool, even have to turn them down otherwise get too cold. I have 6 units.
RTF and Mike Plaiss: What’s even better than the Finnish transgender figure skater? A lesbian mayor of color dancing to a drumline during a Lunar New Year parade in Chicago:
Light-in-the-loafers, “who is seeking re-election next month, was captured on video busting moves while surrounded by a drumline at Sunday’s parade. Her carefree dancing prompted one Chicago news outlet to blast her as ‘detached from reality.'”
Her white “wife” is nowhere to be seen in the video.
Got nothing on pineapples and Europe, except to note that there’s a great scene involving a pineapple in Peter Greenaway’s 1982 movie “The Draughtsman’s Contract”, which is set in England in 1694.
I’ve been staying out of the back-and-forth about Ukraine, Russia, and NATO. Until now. This piece in Foreign Affairs on George F. Kennan’s warnings about Ukraine, Russia, and NATO is relevant and revealing:
By the way, Kennan and Talbott use the terms “expansion”, “extension”, and “enlargement” with regard to NATO.
Kennan was famously unsympathetic to the plight of minority populations and the aspirations of small countries. Reading the section of his memoirs that deals with the Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939–well, let’s just say that empathy for the persecuted does not seem to have been in Kennan’s repertory. He lived up to his middle name: Frost. Still, he usually called things accurately.
After the Uvalde, TX shooting, I asserted that a NE cop would have acted. Some people here gave me grief.
Today at noon, a guy walked into a Target in Omaha with an AR-15 and started shooting.
An Omaha cop shot him dead within 6 minutes of the first call.
About 3 years ago, a convicted felon was going for his gun in his pants. The Omaha cop got his hand on the felon’s gun and shot him dead.
Real politic, see Thucidides and the Melian Dialog. Kennan would fit right in as an Athenian? Sucks to be anywhere near Roosia.
Cornhead:
Nothing against the Omaha police. But that’s a very poor comparison to the situation the police faced in Uvalde, which was extremely different in most of its details. I have been distracted from putting out my further posts on Uvalde, but they are about 50% finished in draft form and I do intend to publish them at some point in the not-too-distant future.
Funny how being unsympathetic to the Czecks and the Sudatenland worked out. Poland, France, all the rest of western Europe, and then the roadshow went further east. Real politic left a lot of cold (Frosty) dead little people.
Intellectuals without humanity?
@Hubert
Got nothing on pineapples and Europe, except to note that there’s a great scene involving a pineapple in Peter Greenaway’s 1982 movie “The Draughtsman’s Contract”, which is set in England in 1694.
Ah, a classic.
I’ve been staying out of the back-and-forth about Ukraine, Russia, and NATO. Until now. This piece in Foreign Affairs on George F. Kennan’s warnings about Ukraine, Russia, and NATO is relevant and revealing:
A good contribution all the same, though I disagree with it in a few key ways I'll describe. But on the whole Kennan was a brilliant man and far sighted indeed, but I do think he had a fair few flaws. Starting with the fact that he mostly saw Russia and the Soviet Union from the perspective of Moscow, the (relatively) rich and (absolutely) powerful Imperial Center for something like 500 years. This would be the equivalent of being "inside the Beltway Bubble" but on Crack Cocaine, and to further Kennan's own analogy would be a bit like writing eloquently about the Corn Belt, its interests, and its wants without ever having left DC. Some – even many – people can do it, but there will be something lost.
And indeed, something was lost. The most acute example I can think of is in the decades between the Mexican-American War and the Election of 1860, when the generally Free Soil if not outright Abolitionist popular sentiment in the Midwest clashed with and seethed at the generally more pro-Slavery parties dominating DC and things like the Fugitive Slave Acts.
This I think underlines one of Kennan's main problems with his analysis, as you point out.
Kennan was famously unsympathetic to the plight of minority populations and the aspirations of small countries. Reading the section of his memoirs that deals with the Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939–well, let’s just say that empathy for the persecuted does not seem to have been in Kennan’s repertory. He lived up to his middle name: Frost.
In short, he seriously underestimates the kind of justified, hateful contempt that people in “Flyover Country” might get for their “betters” in an imperial capital if they feel they are not given due respect and consideration. But as hateful as DC has been, the closest thing it has done to territories in the US as Moscow did during the Holodomors and the earlier “Southern Wrath” of Pyotr the Great around the time of Poltava was the Grant/Sherman Total War in the Confederacy, and maybe some dashes of the brutality of the “Indian Wars”. And that was rare.
Should the Ukrainians achieve independence on their own, Kennan advised the State Department, Washington should not interfere, at least initially. It was nearly inevitable, however, that an independent Ukraine would be “challenged eventually from the Russian side.” If in that conflict “an undesirable deadlock was developing,” the United States should push for “a composing of the differences along the lines of a reasonable federalism.”
This was a fair idea, but the problem is that Kennan does not seem to have any good answers for what happens if one side or the other rejects such ideas of a “reasonable federalism.” Nor should this have been a novel concept; calls for a Reasonable Federalism started early in modern Russian History and reached a climax in 1917, only to then collapse in the next year or two due to violence, polarization, and ultimately Bolshevik invasion.
This is particularly notable because Putin is frankly not interested in a “reasonable federalism” or even a case where Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine are autonomous. We know this for a couple reasons I’ve detailed before.
Firstly: While he didn’t start the Transnistrian, Abkhazian, or South Ossetian conflicts he did inherit them, and he has demonstrated a fairly consistent policy (if one revealed through inconsistent and two faced diplomacy). He has repeatedly played Lucy-with-the-Football in relations with Georgia and especially Moldova, on one hand promising his “Good offices” to help reintegrate Transnistria to Moldova in exchange for concessions only to them do an about face and defend any actions of the Transnistrian government and even propose expanding a similar separatist scheme to Gaguzia, with the idea of ultimately giving dominance over Moldovan politics as a whole.
Secondly because Zelenskyy actually proposed a plebiscite to try and divide the territory of Donbas so long as it was conducted freely, with international observation and with both sides keeping their troops away. This was controversial at the time and got Zelenskyy a lot of flak among domestic Ukrainian politics (as you can see in the linked article at an English-language Ukrainian-focused Soros mouthpiece), but it was something Putin simply rejected.
If Putin ever articulated a response to this offer, I have never seen it in years of looking. Which admittedly is quite possible given my limited language faculties, but still shows how he did not take it seriously. And I think this is for a few reasons, which I articulated here.
This also dovetails with something Kennan wrote about the difficulties drawing a line to separate” Russia” and “Ukraine”, but from another angle. I do think that Putin has little interest in any definitive resolution to Ukraine (at least until he can obtain total victory) Precisely because that would involve drawing a line down on Russian gains and the rest of the water going under the bridge, permitting things such as a now-eager Ukraine to join NATO, which of course Putin (and most Russian governments) would not like.
So in short, we can’t really push for a “reasonable federalism” even if we want to because there’s no serious market for it. The Ukrainians (including I’d guess at least a plurality if not an outright majority of Russo-Ukrainians) flatly want the Kremlin out of their country and the return of sovereignty over all of Ukraine’s acknowledged 1994 borders territory. The Kremlin on the other hand is loathe to not only accept the Ukrainian stance but also the idea of “autonomy” in a settled way precisely because it would deprive them of their ability to play politics within a united Ukraine.
Notwithstanding the vicissitudes of the last 75 years, Kennan’s advice remains relevant today. A federation allowing for regional autonomy in eastern Ukraine and perhaps even in Crimea could help both sides coexist.
See above. Putin – and I think many Russian leaders -are fundamentally not interested in coexistence, or even in some kind of stable peace settlement that would consolidate many of their gains in the wars so far at the expense of ruling out or undermining the possibility for future gains. I think this does dovetail with what Kennan wrote about how Russians see Ukraine and how loathe they are to accept Ukrainian separation and independent existence, but Kennan and Costigliola I think do not follow this train of thought to its logical destination, and one handily borne out by examination of previous Ukrainian history (especially its most contentious eras from the late 1400s through to the early 1700s, and in the first half century of the 20th century).
A good example of how Moscow will likely seek to abuse and undermine “reasonable Federalism” in Ukraine can be seen from the Pereyaslav Agreements of the 1650s, which shocked Khmelnitsky (who himself was a thoroughly ruthless warlord and pogromer as well as a seasoned soldier), who was disgusted and alarmed by the high-handed authoritarian attitude of the “Servitors” of Moscow tasked to be assigned as emissaries and distressed by the extremely onesided terms of the agreement for vassalage to the Tsar, which he feared (Correctly as it turned out) could be “altered”, Darth Vader style. He ultimately agreed in the face of the threat of continued war with Poland-Lithuania and the possibility of Ottoman and Crimean ravaging, but came to regret it and died seeking some way out, only for what remained of Cossack unity to collapse following his death into what is charmingly titled “The Ruin”, which saw a bunch of great powers meddle in affairs on the “Wild Plains” and assorted Cossack factions try to manipulate them, and saw Russia’s Tsars win most of this. They would then go on to steadily suffocate what remained of Cossack privileges and independence in the coning century or so.
Kennan does not offer much if anything in the way of how Ukrainian nationalism or interests might be safeguarded even in a compromise with the Kremlin, and as you note that was far from his main concern. Fair enough, but even a realpolitker should note that those are the main concerns of Some people (a failure that helped lead to Metternich’s comprehensive defeat in the Greek War of Independence, to name just a few).
Moreover, as a fellow history nerd there are a few cases where I feel Kennan gets the situation staggeringly wrong on an objective level or sees things with double standards, in a very “Inside the Moscow Beltway” style.
To quote:
The economy of the Ukraine (SIC) is inextricably intertwined with that of Russia as a whole. There has never been any economic separation since the territory was conquered from the nomadic Tatars and developed for purposes of a sedentary population. To attempt to carve it out of the Russian economy and to set it up as something separate would be as artificial and as destructive as an attempt to seaprate the Corn Belt, including the Great Lakes Industrial Area, from the economy of the United States.
Emphasis added by me.
Now a few things.
Firstly: the reference to “The Ukraine”, which had fallen out of favor even in Soviet sources during the 1930s, which would be very impolitic and seen as inaccurate, sort of akin to using the term “Negro” to refer to Black People. This I think helps establish the lens Kennan is looking at this from, as a particularly old fashioned kind of Muscovite POV.
But secondly and of far more substance: it’s really, REALLY odd to see Kennan claim that there has never been any economic separation” between the core of Russia and “the Ukraine”, considering how such is testified abundantly by our sources. Including Russian literary ones, such as Nikolai Gogol, a collection of whose short stories I include at this link as well as a telling introduction..
Gogol is best known as a writer of extremely dark, morbid, and surreal stories. And rightfully so. But not as many know him as an amateur historian, ethnographer, folklorist, and Greater Russian Absolutist, albeit one with close ties to “Southern Russia”/”Ukraine.”
So it’s worth reading what he wrote, interspaced with the commentary of another noted English language expert of Russia and Russian literature, John Cournos.
More than that. The nomad and romantic in him, troubled and restless with Ukrainian myth, legend, and song, impressed upon Russian literature, faced with the realities of modern life, a spirit titanic and in clash with its material, and produced in the mastery of this every-day material, commonly called sordid, a phantasmagoria intense with beauty. A clue to all Russian realism may be found in a Russian critic’s observation about Gogol: “Seldom has nature created a man so romantic in bent, yet so masterly in portraying all that is unromantic in life.” But this statement does not cover the whole ground, for it is easy to see in almost all of Gogol’s work his “free Cossack soul” trying to break through the shell of sordid to-day like some ancient demon, essentially Dionysian. So that his works, true though they are to our life, are at once a reproach, a protest, and a challenge, ever calling for joy, ancient joy, that is no more with us. And they have all the joy and sadness of the Ukrainian songs he loved so much. Ukrainian was to Gogol “the language of the soul,” and it was in Ukrainian songs rather than in old chronicles, of which he was not a little contemptuous, that he read the history of his people. Time and again, in his essays and in his letters to friends, he expresses his boundless joy in these songs: “O songs, you are my joy and my life! How I love you. What are the bloodless chronicles I pore over beside those clear, live chronicles! I cannot live without songs; they… reveal everything more and more clearly, oh, how clearly, gone-by life and gone-by men…. The songs of Little Russia are her everything, her poetry, her history, and her ancestral grave. He who has not penetrated them deeply knows nothing of the past of this blooming region of Russia.”
Indeed, so great was his enthusiasm for his own land that after collecting material for many years, the year 1833 finds him at work on a history of “poor Ukraine,” a work planned to take up six volumes; and writing to a friend at this time he promises to say much in it that has not been said before him. Furthermore, he intended to follow this work with a universal history in eight volumes with a view to establishing, as far as may be gathered, Little Russia and the world in proper relation, connecting the two; a quixotic task, surely. A poet, passionate, religious, loving the heroic, we find him constantly impatient and fuming at the lifeless chronicles, which leave him cold as he seeks in vain for what he cannot find. “Nowhere,” he writes in 1834, “can I find anything of the time which ought to be richer than any other in events. Here was a people whose whole existence was passed in activity, and which, even if nature had made it inactive, was compelled to go forward to great affairs and deeds because of its neighbours, its geographic situation, the constant danger to its existence…. If the Crimeans and the Turks had had a literature I am convinced that no history of an independent nation in Europe would prove so interesting as that of the Cossacks.” Again he complains of the “withered chronicles”; it is only the wealth of his country’s song that encourages him to go on with its history.
Too much a visionary and a poet to be an impartial historian, it is hardly astonishing to note the judgment he passes on his own work, during that same year, 1834: “My history of Little Russia’s past is an extraordinarily made thing, and it could not be otherwise.” The deeper he goes into Little Russia’s past the more fanatically he dreams of Little Russia’s future. St. Petersburg wearies him, Moscow awakens no emotion in him, he yearns for Kieff, the mother of Russian cities, which in his vision he sees becoming “the Russian Athens.” Russian history gives him no pleasure, and he separates it definitely from Ukrainian history. He is “ready to cast everything aside rather than read Russian history,” he writes to Pushkin. During his seven-year stay in St. Petersburg (1829-36) Gogol zealously gathered historical material and, in the words of Professor Kotlyarevsky, “lived in the dream of becoming the Thucydides of Little Russia.” How completely he disassociated Ukrainia from Northern Russia may be judged by the conspectus of his lectures written in 1832. He says in it, speaking of the conquest of Southern Russia in the fourteenth century by Prince Guedimin at the head of his Lithuanian host, still dressed in the skins of wild beasts, still worshipping the ancient fire and practising pagan rites: “Then Southern Russia, under the mighty protection of Lithuanian princes, completely separated itself from the North. Every bond between them was broken; two kingdoms were established under a single name—Russia—one under the Tatar yoke, the other under the same rule with Lithuanians. But actually they had no relation with one another; different laws, different customs, different aims, different bonds, and different activities gave them wholly different characters.”
Again, I want to emphasize this. Gogol was a proud Russian nationalist and even a hardline absolutist. He consistently identified this region as “Southern Russia”, “South Russia”, or otherwise as a part of Russia. His Taras Bulba was meant to be a paean to incorporate the Cossack struggles for independence and privlege into the greater mythology of Tsarist ideology. He would never have thought for a second that what we call Ukraine should be separate from or independent of Russia.
AND YET this most fervent of Russian Nationalist folklorists happily admits that there was an ACUTE separation in almost all matters – including economic- by a mixture of the Mongol Ordas and the Lithuanian eviction of them and the ensuing development of Polish-Lithuanian Noble culture (and the Cossack reaction to it) on the “Wild Fields.”
And while Cournas takes pains to point out Gogol’s limitations as a scholar and historian (especially in terms of whatever we can call objectivity) these talks of cultural, political, and economic separation have since been borne out in the nearly 200 years since he worked.
In particular I would recommend Gordon Linda’s “Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the 16th Century Ukraine” (which is notable because it focuses on affairs before the most famous outbreak of Cossack Violence with Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s Uprising) and Christopher Witzenrath’s “Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598–1725” since they help put affairs into perspective on opposite sides of this divide and also show how these regions and peoples fit into the grander stage.
Suffice it to say, while economic connections between the centralizing “Russian” state around Moscow in the North and the “Wild Fields” of “The Ukraine” in the South were never ENTIRELY disconnected, they did function very independently and up until the end of the 16th century had limited contact between them due to various things such as a decline in river transport to and from Moscow.
On the subject of “Sea Breeze” the Naval exercise between Ukraine and various NATO nations that Russia was invited to…
The Russians, seeing (and not without reason) no conceivable purpose in this exercise other than an anti-Russian one, at once declined the invitation. But the various NATO powers, including Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S.; among others, appear to have accepted it with alacrity, and the naval vessels of these and three other NATO countries (including, curiously, the Turks) are reported to have appeared in the Black Sea, as guests of the somewhat unreal Ukraine navy, as little as 10 days or a fortnight ago.
A few things.
Firstly: i cannot for whatever reason on Earth explain why Kennan found it “curiously” that the Turks would be participating in naval exercises in the Black Sea. It IS after all one of their major areas of maritime interest and has been for centuries, much longer than a united, modern Russian state has been from the rise of Moscow. Even people who OPPOSED the Turkish participation in these exercises and were worried (as I am) about Turkish power in the Black Sea should absolutely have not been surprised about them having an interest or found it “curious” any more than we should find it “curious” that North Korea is trying to exert influence on South Korea.
Secondly: This letter was written in 1997. Kennan and the Russians should have full known there was no shortage of turmoil on the Black Sea littoral, including ongoing ethnic wars in Georgia, tension in Moldova, an international dispute in Snake Island, and the Armenian-Azerbaijiani War just further in. If Kennan and the Russian Command could not envision the exercise as having anything but an anti-Russian purpose, they lacked imagination.
Thirdly: was an excellent quote from the biting satire “The Ambassador” by the brilliant Mads Bruegger, which repeated the line (regarding international diplomacy) “if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.” I’m not sure where Bruegger got this line or if it is original to him, but it is very trenchant and fits with diplomacy through the centuries.
I think it also holds there. By outright rejecting participation in Sea Breeze and condemning those taking part in it, Russia missed a chance to get “at the table” (and thus make the exercise in part about cooperation between the Russian Navy and the other participants) and made it take on a more distinctly anti-Russian hue. It also meant giving up on all possible ways of influencing the exercise and its participants from the inside.
“Now, you and I both know that there is no more sensitive a point in all Russian diplomatic and military history of the modern era than the question of the entry of foreign warships into the narrow waters of the Black Sea. Our people may know nothing about history, but the Russians certainly do. And there is scarcely any other subject of their military-naval history, the Napoleonic and Hitlerian invasions excepted, which has more painful memories for them — memories of the entry of British and French fleets into the Black Sea, and their attacks on the Crimea and Sevestopol in particular, in the Crimean War.”
Now, I have a low opinion on the historical knowledge of most people, including my fellow Americans, but I do know history more than most. So a few things stood out to me.
Firstly: It’s queer that Kennan is going on about the bitter memories Russians have of British and French navies entering the Black Sea and ravaging Russian naval posts on its coast (which leaves the open question of how the Russians got such stations on the Black Sea in the first place, which is an interesting series of stories in its own right that Kennan is curiously mute on)…..
…. and yet Kennan *DOES NOT* so much as allude to WHY the British and French navies wound up entering the Black Sea and attacking Russian naval positions.
Namely, the Russian government sending armies into the “Danubian Principalities” under Ottoman overlordship after a diplomatic crisis in 1853, resulting in Ottoman resistance…
And like Pearl Harbor, this proved to be simultaneously one of the most strategically disastrous naval engagements in Russian history as well as an almost-complete victory for them. Because while it established that the Turkish navy could not hope to compete with the Russian one in the Black Sea, it ALSO provided every possible motive and opportunity for the Turks to call in Western navies that COULD. Namely Britain and France (with Piedmont-Sardinia showing up later as an honorable mention). And their far larger, better trained, and increasingly ironclad and rifled warships and marine detachments stormed into the Black Sea (and elsewhere) with the full blessing of the Ottoman Sultan and public support. The Crimean War is known as the Crimean War because this broke the back of Russian logistics for their army in the Danubian Principalities and forced them to withdraw, while allowing the Allies to bombard, blockade, and land at a host of Russian targets, most notably in Crimea but along essentially ALL of Russia’s coastlines from the Pacific to the Baltic, and show that the British, French, and even Italians could maintain more effective supply lines going all the way back to their metropolitan homelands (if not always WELL USED ones) than the Russians could to the Dnieper River less than a fifth of the distance away.
The result was a shattering defeat and saw the Russian Black Sea Fleet be forcibly disbanded and the water turned into an Ottoman Lake for about 20 years, until sea changes and Ottoman overreach allowed Russia to engage in the war of 1877-1878.
B: It’s interesting and understandable that Kennan brings up the specific issue of Russian concern about foreign warships in the Black Sea, because it was the core of the Montreux Conference to renegotiate international convention and law regarding use of the Dardanelles/Hellespont, and the later Straits Crisis. The Soviets and Turkey formed a united front at Montreux to push for greater Turkish control over the Straits in the face of resistance from the likes of the British, Greeks, French, and to a lesser degree Italians and largely won….
This unsurprisingly did NOT sit well with the Turks, who started detaching themselves from the Soviets and looking for somebody- ANYBODY – who would support them against the Kremlin. This culminated in Turkey almost siding with the Axis in WWII, and ultimately saw them reach out to the US and UK to oppose the Soviets in the “Great” Straits Crisis of 1945-46.
So Montreux (which I’ve seen unironically cited as an example of Russian-Turkish cooperation, and to be fair it kind of is but quickly went sour) and Soviet obsession with controlling the Straits to dictate what ships could and couldn’t go through over the concerns of other stakeholders nearly led Turkey to join the “Hitlerite” invasion and certainly led them to take a benevolent neutrality towards the Reich and its friends in the Black Sea War, and ultimately led to Turkey siding with and joining NATO.
I’ll also note that this became the “New Normal” and something Russia accepts with some grumbling only AFTER firm, united, and decisive action by the West and other stakeholders to tell the Soviets to F*** off.
Thirdly: It’s worth noting that the first mentions of “Russians” or at least the peoples that would BECOME Russians in a MILITARY context (there were some mentions earlier socially and politically) came in the 800s AD/CE, and specifically about the 860 raid and siege on Constantinople by what was basically a composite Viking-led fleet. This would be a bit akin to if the Tuareg suddenly showed up with a massive war fleet off the coast of New York City and proceeded to try and pillage it. So obviously, Russian conduct on the Black Sea hasn’t always been defensive.
And yet Kennan brings up none of these.
The reason why I mention all of this is that I might acidly conclude that there are some common themes to these stories. Namely that diplomacy and concern for what warships are around on the Black Sea are a two-way street, that Russia cannot simply ignore the rights and interests of the rest of the planet in regards to them and expect to be successful diplomatically, and that Russian aggression against its neighbors on the Black Sea has CATALYZED further international involvement in the Black Sea.
One might accuse my particular observations of being shaped by my status as a Westerner who is not fond of the Kremlin, and I can’t say that isn’t true, but I can also say that doesn’t invalidate the points. In particular Montreux and the Straits Crisis is notable precisely because it shows how the Kremlin overplaying its hand in an overbearing and thuggish manner undermined its long term goals and led to a backlash that forced it to concede the point.
And frankly I do think that Strobe ultimately gets the correct point: that by engaging with both Russia and the nations on its border, NATO is offering Russia the chance for a chance on peaceful relations on its Western frontier, and that NATO involvement with Ukraine would not preclude attempts to cooperate with Russia. Apparently (as Kennan admits) it was ultimately Russian leadership that rejected this deal and helped poison that cooperation.
Many analysts tend to portray the current conflict as “Putin’s war,” but Kennan believed that almost any strong Russian leader would eventually push back against the total separation of Ukraine.
I agree with this to some degree, and I think that while the war is deeply personal it isn’t PRIMARILY personal, and that while Putin is important as a man he is even more important as a front man and leader of various interest groups in the Russian “Deep State” among bureaucrats, “Security Services”, and the military (as shown by his inheritance of many of the policies that came about before he took power re: Transnistria).
But that raises the question of how we can engage with such a strong Russian leader, especially if one proves to be unwilling to engage in good faith.
Finally, the realities of demography and geography dictate that Russia in the long run will remain the principal power in these often tragic “bloodlands.” For the sake of both regional stability and long-term U.S. security,
This I cannot be so sure about. Russia remains a titan of the region, it is true, but demographically it is in a state of collapse as ethnic Russians break down while Muslim birth rates skyrocket. This and the bloodletting of the wars risks Russia’s eclipse.
Washington needs to sustain a hardheaded, clear-eyed empathy for the interests of the Russians as well as of the Ukrainians and other nationalities.
I absolutely agree. The issue I have with Kennan is that his excessively Russian and “Muscovite” orientation lead him to ignore that part of such a hardheaded, clear-eyed empathy involves being willing to tell the Kremlin to “Get on its Bike” (to borrow a British saying) and knowing when to do so. ESPECIALLY in regards to former diplomatic settlements made with Russia and others, like Budapest 1994 and Astana 2012 (both of which the Kremlin violated).
Montreux and the Straits Crisis is a clear example of this. Ultimately, diplomacy is a two way street and nowhere has Russia’s governments failed more egregiously than with engaging with the countries on their “Near Abroad’ and making themselves DESIRABLE partners.
That’s on them.
Ultimately I find Kennan to have gotten too entrenched in Moscow’s “Beltway” perspective for his analysis, and to have also subscribed to the kind of over-emphasis on fetishizing stability and united governments versus separatist ones, as well as “Great Power Diplomacy” at the expense of local actors.
This also reminds me of the foreign policy of the US and much of the West towards Yugoslavia and Milosevic’s Serbian-dominated government in Belgrade for much of this period. Where contrary to a lot of the memes, the US, Germany, and others worked hard to try and PREVENT the breakup of Yugoslavia by doing things like inking the Brioni Agreement (getting Croatia to put a moratorium on its own democratic declaration of independence), which allowed the JNA to invade Slovenia (only to get repulsed).
It took a long time for the West to recognize that a united Yugoslavia with one head that it could deal with was not coming back, and that Milosevic etc. al.’s atrocities and foreign relations were not in their interests.
I see shades of this here.
And further on being sucky to be next to Roosia; Canada must bless its lucky stars for Seward’s Folly. They could have had much worse neighbors?
@om
I would not go that far. If anything Canada might rue Seward’s purchase depriving them of more territory. The Russians knew they could not hold the region against British, American, or French dedication and it is a miracle it was not grabbed during the Crimean War. At the time the US was the country relevant that they had the best relations with (how times have changed!) so they sold it.
Turtler:
History doesn’t seem to show much territorial enchroachment of the US into Canada since Russia sold Alaska to the USA. Funny that.
But Brain E might enjoy this Frontline interview with Julia Iolof, especially around 11 minutes where she speaks about Gorbachev and NATO eastern “expansion.”
The Frontline interview is with Julia Ioffe. Grain of salt its PBS.
Smartphone doesn’t let me edit comments in a timely way.
The Marines gave up their tanks a year ago IIRC. Can’t afford to keep the and can’t deploy them?
@TR
I am not a military person (though I am friends with many) and my research and expertise are informal at best, but I cannot see this boding well.
Rockets are nice tools to have and the US has long lagged in them on many counts, but they cannot do everything. The last time the USMC “worked” as an almost purely light infantry force was the lead up to WWI. It may ultimately be light infantry at heart but it needs a lot more teeth and combined arms to carry out its mandate.
@om
I generally do not trust PBS further than I can reach them. A better piece of evidence is simply that the documents in question rarely fi ever actually say what Putin and co claim they do, which is why they generally have to be selectively quoted and distorted.
As I mentioned before, Putin is nakedly lying about what Baker said and did. Leaving aside the question of WTF “military jurisdiction” (which is what Baker talked about not moving an inch East) is, THE KEY FACT IS THAT BAKER WAS NEVER POSITIONING THIS AS A PROMISE, BUT HIS OWN THOUGHTS AND PREFERENCES.
WHICH WOULD NEED RATIFICATION BY OTHER PLAYERS.
So by claiming this was a promise when it so obviously was not, Putin can be shown to be lying and many of those highlighting this as important can be held as not having read the fairly clear document.
Turtler:
She reinforced your point, and I don’t need all caps to say that. 🙂
om,
Why did you suggest I watch the Julia Ioffe interview? Do you think it accurately reflects the inner workings of how Putin views the world?
Also, a couple of days ago you linked to a Perun video describing Russia’s military strengths. Do you agree with their assessment? What does that bode for the war in the next six months?
Turtler, I had a comment in the 1/30 open thread, that I’ll repeat here.
The transcript you linked to had this exchange between Baker and Gorbachev:
“Baker: I want to ask you a question, and you need not answer it right now. Supposing unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisprudence or troops will not spread east of the present boundary?
Gorbachev: We will think everything over. We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable.
Baker: We agree with that.“
Brian E:
Because at 11 minutes or so she also relates that Gorbachev did not get promises that NATO would not expand in Eastern Europe, and that Vlad’s claims about that are bogus. She agrees with Turtler and not with your assertions. In fact she speaks directly about Gorbachev and what he said about NATO.
Regarding Perun’s warning about the underlying strengths of the Russian military, it is sobering but a longer term threat than in the next six months. The Roosians have been incompetent, extravagant in killing Russian soldiers, and brutal in their attacks on Ukraine. They just don’t care. But they can learn and do have advantages as yet in manpower, arty, long range fires, air to air missile systems, and airpower. Ukraine won’t be conquering Russia, but Vlad may loose his war on Ukraine. Roosia has done the genocide thing before to Ukraine; that tends to focus one’s attention.
Perun has many other analyses of the weaknesses of Vlad’s military. It is fortunate for Ukraine that Europe and the west in general are not underestimating the threat of Roosian imperial aggression. If and when the Kerch Bridge is taken out that will change Vlad’s position in Crimea in a very bad way.
Perun has been posting weekly analyses mostly about the war on Ukraine, but also about defense economics and such since March 2022. If you want to look at them, they are available on YouTube. I’ve been linking to them since March 2022.
om, so you think she is accurate on this point. How about the rest of the hour-long interview?
@Brian E
Apologies for the delay, I was out getting dinner (and fielding some questions from the people at Victory Girls Blog).
The transcript you linked to had this exchange between Baker and Gorbachev:
“Baker: I want to ask you a question, and you need not answer it right now. Supposing unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisprudence or troops will not spread east of the present boundary?
Gorbachev: We will think everything over. We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable.
Baker: We agree with that.“
Indeed, this is true.
However, this goes in to a few things.
Starting with – to redub Clinton – what the meaning of “we” is, as well as the question of how far Baker saying “We agree with that” could have gone or been reasonably interpreted (which – spoiler alert – is definitely not the same as Putin is claiming).
Anyway, now for a supremely long copypaste:
Baker: If that happens, our troops will return home. We will leave any country that does not desire our presence. The American people have always had a strong position favoring this. However, if the current West German leadership is at the head of a unified Germany then they have said to us they will be against our withdrawal.
And the last point. NATO is the mechanism for securing the U.S. presence in Europe. If NATO is liquidated, there will be no such mechanism in Europe. We understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.
We believe that consultations and discussions within the framework of the “two + four” mechanism should guarantee that Germany’s unification will not lead to NATO’s military organization spreading to the east.
These are our thoughts. Perhaps a better way can be found. As of yet, we do not have the Germans’ agreement to this approach. I explained it to Genscher and he only said that he will think it over. As for [French Foreign Minister Roland] Dumas, he liked the idea. Now I have given an account of this approach to you. I repeat, maybe something much better can be created, but we have not been able to do that yet.
Gorbachev: I want to say that in general we share this way of thinking. Indeed, the process has begun and is underway. And we need to try to adjust to the new reality. A mechanism is needed that would assist stability in Europe–a very important center of world politics–in remaining undisturbed. Of course we have some differences in looking at this situation. I think there is nothing terrible in that. The most important thing is not to approach this situation in too simplistic a manner.
Firstly, we want the situation in Europe to improve. The situation cannot be allowed to worsen as a result of what is taking place. We need to think about how to act under conditions of the new reality. A question arises: what will this Germany be like? How will it tend to act in Europe and the world? These are fundamental questions. And as we see it, they are perceived differently in, say, Paris, London, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest.
Baker: I understood that.
Gorbachev: Yesterday I spoke with Jaruzelski on the phone. He knows that you are in Moscow right now; he also knows that Kohl and Genscher are arriving tomorrow. Considering this, Jaruzelski expressed his opinions on a number of questions, about Germany in particular. And Germany is a real question for a Pole! He thinks that contact should be maintained and we should consult on this question. He expressed the opinion that the presence of American and Soviet troops in EuropeEurope (SIC) is an element of stability.
In Czechoslovakia and Austria there is apprehension that powers might develop in a unified Germany that would lay claim to the 1938 borders–the Sudeten region, Austria. Of course, today such claims are not being voiced. But what will happen tomorrow? And in France and Great Britain the question arises: will they remain major players in Europe? In short, it is easier for us in this situation due to the mass and weight of our countries. Kohl and his team are speaking to us with an understanding of what that means.
Baker: I agree.
Gorbachev: Thus, it is necessary to proceed delicately and with consideration, understanding the national feelings of the people and not hindering them, but aiming to channel the process. As for a “four + two” or “two + four” mechanism that would rest on an international-legal foundation and provide an opportunity to consult with each other and evaluate the situation, maybe following our exchange of opinions we should continue consultations with our partners in the West and the East–you as you see fit, and we correspondingly. That does not
7yet mean that we have an agreement, but we should continue to seek one. You said that the FRG did not express agreement with this approach. As for Modrow, judging by our talks with him it seems that he will support such an approach. Tomorrow we can ask Kohl what he thinks about this.
Baker: That would be good. But I would like to voice one precaution.
Even if we have a chance to convince the Germans to support the ‘two + four” approach, this should only be done after March 18, only after the GDR’s self-determination, and after they begin discussing the internal aspects of unification. Otherwise they will say that the four powers’ pressure is unacceptable, and unification is solely a German question. Our approach provides that unification’s internal aspects are indeed a matter between the two Germanys. However, the external aspects must be discussed with consideration of Germany’s neighbors’ security interests; they must be acceptable to them. Besides that, we must discuss Berlin’s status. If we approach the matter in that way there is a chance that the Germans will agree to the proposed mechanism.
I must once again admit that I did not discuss this at all with the chancellor, and Genscher did not give me an answer. He only said that he will consider this approach. I think that he will approve it. But with the chancellor it is a different matter: he is a candidate in the forthcoming elections.
Gorbachev: This is a very important factor that leaves its imprint on the situation.
Baker: Such are the whims of democracy. He will have to act very carefully in order not to create the impression in Germany that he is handing the question of Germany’s unification over to others.
Gorbachev: I would like to tell you about the symposium that was recently organized by the Evangelical academy and which was attended by representatives from all the FRG and GDR parties and groups, with the exception of Modrow’s party. As a result of the discussion most of the participants spoke in favor of the confederation. The GDR representatives emphasized that the two Germanys’ economic convergence does not have to mean a sell-out or colonization of the GDR. They said they do not want to be spoken to like little children.
The second conclusion was that unification must take place only on the territory of the present-day FRG and GDR, respecting existing boundaries, and keeping the two parts of Germany members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.
At the same time there were differences of opinion. Some FRG and GDR representatives spoke in favor of making the future Germany a neutral state. However, the majority of representatives of the two countries spoke in favor of preserving membership in the two unions, which would change from military to new political structures.
8[Willy] Brandt’s speech was the most surprising. He asserted that no one should hinder Germany’s self-determination. He said that the Germans should not wait for the CSCE process, that the all-European convergence should not precede Germany’s unification but the other way around–Germany’s unification should take place earlier. He rejected a confederation and spoke in favor of a federal German state. At the same time the West German part of this federation must remain in NATO. As for the former GDR–it needs further consideration.
Many FRG representatives criticized Brandt for fueling German nationalism, and for trying to get ahead even of Kohl.
The speech by the renowned scholar, [Carl Friedrich] Weizsäcker (brother of the current FRG president), was very interesting. He said that it is necessary to avoid aggravating German nationalism for many reasons, one of them being that it could lead to a wave of nationalism in the Soviet Union. He understands what a reminder of the past war means for a Soviet person. He also emphasized that an outburst of nationalism in the USSR could become a threat to perestroika. The more Germans shout for unification, the more it implicates the neighbors. In Europe, Weizsäcker stressed, Auschwitz has not been forgotten.
The writer Günter Grass emphasized that a unified Germany has always been a breeding ground for chauvinism and anti-semitism. The economic costs of unification were also discussed. A number was given: in the next 8-10 years the economic price of unification will amount to 50 billion marks. The speakers emphasized that when the Germans find out about this they will think thrice whether unification is worth it.
This is the interesting mosaic of opinions. I told you about it in such detail because I think that in the end we should not fall under a wave of emotion, we should not yield to this pressure and move away from considerations and predictions about what all this could mean and how to channel this process. There are powers in both German states that see the danger. This is important. I would ask you to tell the president that we want to stay in contact with you, to exchange information and, if necessary, ideas about this problem.
Baker: I will do that without fail. I would like you to understand: I am not saying that we should yield to a wave of emotion. But I think that soon Germany’s internal integration will become a fact. In these circumstances our duty before all people and our duty for the sake of peace in the world is to do everything possible in order to develop external mechanisms that will secure stability in Europe. That is why I proposed this mechanism.
As for the economic price of unification, most likely this question will be discussed during the election campaign. However, I think that it will be swept over by the emotional outburst, by people’s striving to unite and be together.
I want to ask you a question, and you need not answer it right now. Supposing unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisprudence or troops will not spread east of the present boundary?
Gorbachev: We will think everything over. We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable.
Baker: We agree with that.
Gorbachev: It is quite possible that in the situation as it is forming right now, the presence of American troops can play a containing role. It is possible that we should think together, as you said, about the fact that a united Germany could look for ways to rearm and create a new Wehrmacht, as happened after Versailles. Indeed, if Germany is outside the European structures, history could repeat itself. The technological and industrial potential allows Germany to do this. If it will exist within the framework of European structures this process could be prevented. All of this needs to be thought over.
Much in what you have said appears to be realistic. Let us think. It is impossible to draw a conclusion right now. You know that the GDR is closely tied to us, and the FGR is our primary trade partner in the West. Historically, Germany and Russia have always been strong partners. We both have the possibility to make an impact on the situation. And we could use these possibilities when we develop a rational approach that considers our and other countries’ interests, when we develop a corresponding mechanism. We should not underestimate these possibilities. Of course, right now the matter is complicated by the election campaigns and the intensity of emotions that are heating up society right now. We will watch the situation and think about how to act.
Rough Code:
Italics = the excerpt you quoted.
Bold = Parts I find worth emphasizing.
Underline: Parts within the Bold I find worth particular emphasis.
@Brian E Part 2
Right. Sorry for the long Bakerse post. Now to actually get to talking about it.
Chief among them is how much both parties obsess about the actions of others outside the US and USSR, their different opinions and policies, and fear that some (especially the Germans but also third parties) will do things neither the US or USSR wish to varying degrees (ranging from going full Nazi again to simply telling the Four Allied Powers of WWII that German Reunification is not subject to them). Baker and Gorbachev repeatedly commiserate on this issue and in fact repeatedly discuss attempts to try and manipulate the policies towards their desired outcomes.
What stands out here is twofold.
Firstly: the need for sensitivity to the public opinion of other nations and their publics, as well as (later) American public opinion.
Secondly: How starkly Baker and Gorbachev implicitly reject the claim by the article authors that the Soviets have the right to veto German Reunificaiton, or at least feel they cannot push the point.
These points are worth noting because they bring things back to my central points. Namely the changing policies of parties in constitutional democracies (be they republics, constitutional monarchies, or so forth), and the opinions of the Central and Eastern European former Pact countries and societies. Aka the exact things that Putin etc. al. focus so hard on ignoring or arguing should not count.
This is further reinforced by the final paragraph of the document.
10Baker: I said to Eduard yesterday: in April, May, and June last year, when I started saying for the first time that we want to help perestroika, that we trust Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, American conservatives attacked me with criticism. But now, when we are reconsidering the COCOM rules and discussing the possibility of your participation in international financial organizations, the same conservatives are saying: why do the Russians give Cuba MIG-29s? Of course, Cuba is not a threat to the U.S. But it is a certain threat to some small democratic countries in Central America. Castro continues to export revolution. There is only one person he criticizes more often than Bush, and that is Gorbachev.
A few takeaways.
Firstly: How depressing it is to see an H. W. Bush appointee speak of “American Conservatives” as an outside entity.
Secondly: That Baker brings up domestic pressure from the US (specifically the US Right) and criticism regarding the Bush Admin’s policies.
So with these points in mind, let us bring us back to the point. What does “we” mean, in this context, when Baker said “We agree with that”?
The first interpretation is the Schizophrenic/Royalty explanation, that by “We” Baker meant him personally.
The second interpretation is that by “we” Baker meant himself and the members of the delegation, or at least in their official stance (regardless of the private context).
The Third is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, and likeminded individuals in NATO.
The Fourth is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, and the Bush Administration’s Executive.
The Fifth is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, the Bush Admin’s Executive, and likeminded NATO individuals.
The Sixth is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, the Bush Admin’s Executive, and the US Government as a whole.
The Seventh – the Putin interpretation – is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, the Bush Admin’s executive, the US Government, and NATO as a whole (presumably including the US).
The first is obviously false. Baker is quite willing to specify “I” when he is making a statement about his personal assessment.
But at the same time so are interpretations Six and Seven. We know this because Baker makes clear allusions to dissent within NATO and contrary opinions showing that no such NATO unity of opinion was forthcoming. This goes double for the idea that this represents the US government as a whole, given how Congress is in charge of making and approving treaties and this “assurance” never went through the Treaty approval process (for obvious reasons).
For the benefit of the argument, I will be interpreting the “we” Baker mentions in the broadest possible sense: that of meaning Five, where Baker talks for himself, his delegation, and the Bush Executive and likeminded figures in NATO.
The problem with this, however, is simple. And it is something Baker is at pains to note. These people are not dictators. Nobody elected them President of NATO. They are greatly uncertain about whether they will even be able to make policies on these matters, and if they will that these policies will withstand domestic criticism and not be overturned in election. This is why Baker and Gorbachev spend so much time on matters like German politics.
It also clarifies the limit of this assurance. That while it reflected the stance of the Bush Administration at the time (and I think well into the future, given things like the fiasco of the Chicken Kyiv Speech), it isn’t legally binding even to them, let alone to the US government and nation as a whole, let alone to all the member states of NATO.
Which helps explain why when situations changed (as they did drastically and violently – often literally violently – ) those assurances broke down. Especially after Bush was turfed out by Clinton, and in an ycase under the criticism and scrutiny that emerged following the Soviet Hardline coup, the outlying areas of the USSR exploding into violence, and Yugoslavia during the turn of the decade.
Now, this is important because of the context it puts on Putin’s claims. Especially the idea that Baker etc. al. lied to “Russia”/the USSR.
I frankly think Baker was sincere, and this is borne out by evidence. But sincerity by some political/bureaucratic appointees by one President is not all consuming or all binding. Moreover, while I have a fairly low opinion of Putin (especially as of late), let’s make it clear.
He’s not THIS ignorant or stupid. He is a stellar example of Dunning-Kruger in Action, but this does not mean he is that dumb. He’s nowhere near as intelligent as he thinks he is or as he’s made himself out to be, but he’s also not UNIntelligent. You don’t become a “Chekist” Logistics Officer and Administrator (even at a mid rank) if you’re Ben Crumb tier stupid. You also don’t pull off the numerous plans Putin made on his way to power that way.
And while it is clear he has been caught in his own bubble of Yes Men for too long who have told him what he has wanted to hear, I REALLY don’t think that applies legally, given how astute he has been at exploiting the literal letter of the law and treaties.
So I think he has had reasonably competent lawyers who have gone over this and painstakingly pointed out to him what these documents are, what they *aren’t*, what he can use them to try and delay NATO expansion or smear his enemies, and how he can’t use them.
And in any case trying to put the intentionally-cautious statements of a James Baker who is painfully aware of his limits and those of his government (and has these acknowledged by Gorbachev) as some kind of binding assurance on all of NATO does not wash. I’m also very sure Putin knows they don’t wash. Which is why – after eliminating the impossible or the astronomically unlikely – I conclude he is simply lying, knowing most people will not look as deeply into this or realize the limits Baker has to make assurances (especially without an official agreement approved by Congress).
@Brian E Part 3
More complete reply to your comment on the previous side here.
Hubert, thanks much for that fascinating Kennan link.
Extraordinary prescience and powers of analysis.
Nonetheless, I’m not sure how such wisdom might help to resolve the current war peacefully (i.e., his idea of “Federation”)…
…unless Russians stop being Russians and Ukrainians stop being Ukrainians…
i.e., at the leadership level…which doesn’t seem very likely to occur.
That is, there has to be some level of trust (i.e., willingness to trust) by the Russians and/or willingness to give up certain levels of sovereignty (whatever that might mean) by the Ukrainians, neither of which possibilities seems terribly realistic.
And so alas, war…until either total victory/defeat…or total exhaustion.
The WTF, though, might have the answer with its uber-goal of Global Reset(TM)!
…where “Reset” means reducing the standard of living globally (except for the elites, of course), which means global food and energy shortages…which may lead to the “total exhaustion” option above.
But this may take time…though probably not as much as one might assume.
(After all, the world is in a mess and Schwab is in a hurry…so how many more egg production facilities have to be burnt down? Or other food-processing plants? How many more pipelines have to be sabotaged or otherwise shut?)
All of which “peace” (and “humanity” and “Globe-Saving”) “initiatives” may feed the fires of the “Eat Bugs, Go Electric, Save the Planet” warriors…leading to peace in Ukraine??…
I listened to the first 15 minutes only and found a few minutes pertinent up this topic; “even a blind squirrel finds an acorn from time to time.” You can call me and she squirrels, but it was Frontline on PBS and I had already had enough progressive spin by then (and better thing to listen to) so stopped there and posted the comment. I didn’t suggest that any other parts of the interview were significant.
Feel free to comment on the rest (45 minutes or so) of the interview.
Turtler has done a thorough fisking of Putin’s spin (lying) about NATO IMO, again. Time to go to work.
Baker swears this was a legit election even though he warned against motor voter rules and lobbies for iranian interests so hes reliable
Yeltsin warned against nato expansion well in his sober moments phillip short has remembered that history didnt begin yesterday as much as we pretend it did
To make a parallel with the control faction, sanctioning indonesian oil would lead to japanese reaction
+ Bonus:
Has Manchin suddenly regrown a pair?
“All GOP senators, Manchin challenge Biden’s ESG climate investment rule ‘politicizing’ Americans’ 401(k)s;
“Sen. Braun and Rep. Barr are introducing a bipartisan disapproval resolution to challenge a new Biden admin rule”— https://www.foxnews.com/politics/gop-senators-manchin-challenge-bidens-esg-climate-investment-rule-politicizing-americans-401ks
(For that matter, has Sinema?…)
Opening grafs:
‘…Every Republican senator and Democrat Joe Manchin are introducing legislation that they hope will terminate the Biden administration’s new environment, social and governance (ESG) rule, which they say “politicizes” the retirement savings for 152 million Americans.
‘The Biden administration’s Department of Labor unveiled a rule in November, set to go into effect on Jan. 30, that allows retirement plan managers to factor environmental and social issues into investment decisions….’
Turtler: thanks for your detailed gloss on Kennan and for the history seminar. Please be assured that I mean that seriously, not sarcastically. I don’t know what you do for a living, but I suspect you may have missed your calling. Have you considered teaching history (at a private school)?
Speaking of doing things for a living: that’s what I have to do now. Will try to respond to a few of your and other commenters’ (Om, Barry, Miguel…) points in more detail later today or this evening.
@miguel Cervantes
I have no great love or fondness for James Baker and these documents do a good job of illustrating how and why. However, in the context of these discussions I do believe he was being sincere and while part of this is borne out by examining the actions, I think it is otherwise supported by how blunt many of the points are. Baker makes his personal preferences clear (and willingly makes distinctions between them and admin policy when they diverge). It also paints him as incredibly manipulative, lamenting criticism by “American Conservatives” while openly discussing German (and other) willfulness and the need to manipulate them in concert with Gorbachev.
Had it been as simple as “Baker promises on behalf of NATO or The US” then I would not have written the past several posts because I would need to conclude Putin had a point. The issue, of course, is that it was never this simple. And Baker points this out explicitly and Gorbachev accepts this. Baker isn’t President of NATO and cannot make binding commitments on its behalf when he cannot even guarantee he can make binding commitments on behalf of his administration or the US because that is not how US politics works.
And unless Putin or whoever he had read this through on his behalf managed to miss the obvious context of Baker and Gorbachev hashing out the differences in NATO and the limitations – which would make them idiots – I can safely conclude Putin did not honestly consider this a binding assurance (because again, the Kremlin KNOWS the importance of Congress and how fickle US Presidential Administrations can be, or at least how short lived their stances are).
Yeltsin warned against nato expansion well in his sober moments phillip short has remembered that history didnt begin yesterday as much as we pretend it did
Sure, but that also means I can dredge up
More than half a millennium of Soviet and Russian imperialism and brutality in these countries going back to at least Aleksandr Nevaskoy’s terror tactics against Baltic peoples who he accused of “rebelling” against Novgorod for the crime or being levied by the Teutonic Order.
Which also shows how history is a two way street.
And the talking heads consistently pointed out the importance.
To make a parallel with the control faction, sanctioning indonesian oil would lead to japanese reaction
Except sanctions on oil to Japan were Western reactions to Japanese actions. Namely the systematic violation of prior agreements regarding China and later French Indochina. The Japanese junta has nobody to blame but itself for playing rope a dope one round too long so that the West got sick of trusting their words and decided to neuter their military capacity.
@Hubert
Turtler: thanks for your detailed gloss on Kennan and for the history seminar. Please be assured that I mean that seriously, not sarcastically.
Thank you kindly.
I don’t know what you do for a living, but I suspect you may have missed your calling. Have you considered teaching history (at a private school)?
I have, but other obligations distract me.
As for what I do for a living, very very odd jobs. I am mostly tied to the home and working from there, so I do a lot of stuff. Have been studying to get accredited as a Legal Transcriber though, which I think fits, as well as doing work as a game beta and alpha tester.
Speaking of doing things for a living: that’s what I have to do now.
Nice. I hope it fits.
Will try to respond to a few of your and other commenters’ (Om, Barry, Miguel…) points in more detail later today or this evening.
No worries, take your time.
Turtler,
I think it’s reasonable to conclude Baker was speaking for the administration. In negotiations, no one cares what the SoS’s personal opinion is. And if he were advancing a personal opinion, he would say he needed to go back to the President.
I agree it was a commitment that the Bush administration was making that could only be enforced while Bush was in power.
Gorbachev at that point had few bargaining chips, except blowing up the world, so I imagine Baker was seeking to reassure Gorbachev about NATO expansion. It was unacceptable to the Russians.
And yes, American foreign policy in the last few decades must seem like one drunken sailor after another wandering down the street.
The default American view regarding Russia over the last few decades, is the Monroe Doctrine for me, but not for thee.
I believe Putin was sincere about NATO expansion to Ukraine being a red line, and I think he sincerely believes Ukraine is rightfully Russian. Like Kennen, he doesn’t think Ukraine is a country.
While it may be posturing about the Baker guarantee about NATO expansion eastward, there were other events, including the coup overthrowing Yanukovich. After the overthrow, no doubt Putin was concerned that the next pro-Western President (and likely even more nationalistic/fascistic (since I can’t use the word nazi)) would renege on the Sevastopol lease. And Ukraine was seeking NATO membership after its EU associate membership.
While I think the Ioffe interview I watched was suspect, she did make the point that Putin hated Khrushchev for gifting Crimea to Ukraine (even as part of the SU) and Gorbachev for being weak.
What was the final trigger to the invasion? Did Putin think Biden was in Ukraine’s pocket and wanted to get ahead of an American response? Remember in Dec. 2021 Biden kept warning Ukraine publicly that Russia was going to attack? I thought that was odd at the time. Is it more likely Biden was provoking Russia to attack?
Ioffe had nothing good to say about Trump– except she acknowledged that the Javelins Trump had sent to Ukraine was a key reason the original assault on Kiev failed.
om, re: the Ioffe interview. I wasn’t sure whether I was listening to a journalist or Putin’s psychiatrist, based on her speculation what is going on inside Putin’s head. Here analysis is pretty standard fare.
Why is the fact she was born in Russia and her family left when she was seven relevant? She has a BA in history, with an emphasis on Russia.
She said she initially was worried the war would last several years, but now thinks “this war will be over soon.” We’ll see how good her predictive powers are.
“…unless Russians stop being Russians …”
Guy Sorman on a heroic Russian whom, with everything going on in and around the world, it is easy to forget….
“Navalny in Hell;
“Today’s Russia, seen through its political prisons, shows itself to be even crueler than previous regimes.”— https://www.city-journal.org/navalny-in-hell
Opening grafs:
H/T Powerline blog.
‘His cell measures two meters by three meters. It is made of concrete, freezing in winter and torrid in summer. Is there a window? I doubt it, but his lawyer doesn’t tell us. The prisoner, with back problems and a cough, receives no medical treatment. Thanks to international pressure, he has gained one privilege: a tea kettle. For ten hours a day, he must stand, under the observation of sadistic guards. Occasionally, the prisoner is taken out and subjected to forced labor—sewing while seated on a chair that is too low for his large, emaciated body. And so his condition worsens.
‘The prisoner is Alexei Navalny, an opponent of Vladimir Putin, seemingly the only remaining one well-known outside Russia. Putin tried to poison him, a method he is fond of, but without success. Navalny, who had gone to Germany for medical care, returned voluntarily to be judged by a puppet court and condemned to decades in prison. Why did he return?….’
@Brian E
Back at you.
I think it’s reasonable to conclude Baker was speaking for the administration. In negotiations, no one cares what the SoS’s personal opinion is. And if he were advancing a personal opinion, he would say he needed to go back to the President.
Agreed, and this was the conclusion I came to from analyzing the document in question here, https://www.thenewneo.com/2023/01/31/open-thread-1-31-23/#comment-2664344 , where I argued that Baker was stating the opinion of himself, the Bush Admin, and likeminded officials in NATO rather than anyone more or less.
Which is no small feat since it indicates a major US Administration – and the one that saw the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union – was at least claiming to be uninterested in expanding NATO. But it’s a far cry from Putin’s claims.
I agree it was a commitment that the Bush administration was making that could only be enforced while Bush was in power.
Well, there were ways to get that commitment to be enforceable beyond Bush’s administration. But that would require getting it in writing so to speak, and preferably passed through the Congress. And even that would only militate against it in the intermediate period rather than stop it entirely since Congress could simply void the treaty again.
This I think loops back to the point that Baker, Gorbachev, and others (including one of Gorbachev’s chief lieutenants, Shevardnadze), pointed out. That a diplomatic settlement that was acceptable to the Soviet Union/Russia could only be reached by intensive consideration of the former Pact and SR members as well as public opinion. Which is precisely the stuff that Putin and others have used these assurances (real or false) to try to ignore.
Gorbachev at that point had few bargaining chips, except blowing up the world, so I imagine Baker was seeking to reassure Gorbachev about NATO expansion. It was unacceptable to the Russians.
Agreed, but he also pointed out the limitations of his power and even that of the US and the importance of taking into consideration the nations there. It also implicitly talks on the risks of political pressures changing tides.
It also leaves something important unsaid. What happens if stopping short of NATO membership was unacceptable for say the Poles or Hungarians or the Baltics?
It’s actually worth noting that Ukraine was one of the relatively few nations in Europe that actually showed little interest in NATO membership (it WAS interested in cooperation with the US and NATO but not on the whole at the expense of Russia) and pursued a policy of either constitutional or quasi-statuary neutrality… Until the invasions of 2014. Which brings us back to the issues of perverse incentives.
And yes, American foreign policy in the last few decades must seem like one drunken sailor after another wandering down the street.
I’d argue for much longer than that – don’t even get me started on Kissinger – but it has had iits points. Moreover, I’ll note one of the frequent features was attempts to reach out to Moscow to come to a modus vivendi (sometimes at the direct expense of the nations in Russia’s “Near Abroad”, see Reset). Mark Steyn – who is thankfully much better now – pointed out the problems with this policy as far as it extended to Putin and Russia’s current political class not long after 9/11, and it seems like we have been slow there.
The default American view regarding Russia over the last few decades, is the Monroe Doctrine for me, but not for thee.
I completely disagree and I hate this argument with the passion of ten thousand suns precisely because it’s mangling what the Monroe Doctrine is, both in theory and in how it has been executed for decades. And while sure one can say that part of my irritation is nationalist prejudice as an American and that might not be completely untrue, it’s still an attempt to draw a false equivalence.
How do I know this?
Well, let’s go back to what Baker said.
10Baker: I said to Eduard yesterday: in April, May, and June last year, when I started saying for the first time that we want to help perestroika, that we trust Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, American conservatives attacked me with criticism. But now, when we are reconsidering the COCOM rules and discussing the possibility of your participation in international financial organizations, the same conservatives are saying: why do the Russians give Cuba MIG-29s? Of course, Cuba is not a threat to the U.S. But it is a certain threat to some small democratic countries in Central America. Castro continues to export revolution. There is only one person he criticizes more often than Bush, and that is Gorbachev.
The entire decades old existence of Castro’s Island Dystopia just off Florida’s shores and his continued bad behavior is one of the greatest testaments to both how the “Russia’s actions in its near abroad are comparable to the Monroe Doctrine” argument falls flat and to the limitations of American power and resolve, as well as its (often misguided in my opinion) tolerance. And while you might be able to argue that Baker admitted Cuba was not a threat to the US but to “democratic nations” in Hispanic America while Putin can claim Ukraine is a threat to Russia, there’s something to be said about the fact that the Castro Regime is the only one on planet Earth to have knowingly tried to spark a nuclear WWIII, first by (understandably enough) lobbying for Soviet transfer of nuclear weapons of both tactical (ie defensive, only able to land in its littoral) and strategic (ie able to strike the US), and then proceeded to try and pressure, manipulate, and lie to its Soviet patrons to try and trigger a nuclear first strike. Which only fell through due to a combination of Soviet frustrations breaking the blockade and fear of reports from Soviet missile crews that the Cuban military was acting weirdly on their perimeter and might be trying to seize the sites.
It is certainly true that the US’s relations with the Castros are not WARM (and in light of the nature of the Cuban regime I think this is absolutely appropriate) but they are also nowhere near as adversarial from the US’s POV as is often noted (and why I note that a vast majority of the alleged CIA Assassination Attempts on Castro are known only through the allegations of a book…. published by Fidel’s personal bodyguard… who has proven to have the moral character of a Himmler and also a willingness to lie to support the party line).
And that’s all the more acute since 1990 when this meeting was held Castro has indeed had horrifying great success exporting the revolution, such as helping the Sandinistas retake Nicaragua after being voted out and helping manage a nightmarish Chavista dictatorship in Venezuela, as well as many of the Bolivarians. These are threats at are at least in the same ballpark as that Ukraine supposedly presents, but which the US has responded to in a decidedly muted fashion
Simply put, Putin’s actions towards his neighbors would be AT BEST comparable to US enforcement of Monroe during its broadest and most violent term, from around the 1890s to FDR’s “Good Neighbor” Policy turn. And even then they likely go well beyond that.
Which is also why I note that Monroe was and is originally and primarily about foreign colonial expansion in the Western Hemisphere (at least without the acceptance of the US), and while several US administrations interpreted it more broadly and its implications might go beyond that it does not explicitly rule out US tolerance of home-grown, indigenous hostile regimes like Fidel and Raul, Hugo and Nicholas, etc.
The US has co-existed in an uneasy peace with a regime that tried to start a nuclear war for half a century. Putin invaded Ukraine because of an EU Association Agreement that turned violent, where his local vassal committed such crimes that his own party got sick of him (or at least distressed) and kicked him out of office following a failure to appear before the Legislature. That would’ve been a really extreme action for the US even during the Cold War and the “Banana Wars” in its “near abroad.”
I believe Putin was sincere about NATO expansion to Ukraine being a red line,
I agree, but I believe that Putin’s talk about NATO expansion to Ukraine being a red line is ultimately a red herring. He invaded Ukraine not because of talk of NATO expansion into it (which had been going around for years to little effect) but because of Euromaidan and the constitutional crisis there. Ironically pushing Ukraine towards considering joining NATO in a way it never really had (at least without Russian approval and co-joining).
Which is probably one reason why commentary on this – especially from the Kremlin – works to play up the NATO angle and even the idea of a “Biological Cuban Missile Crisis” (because apparently Kremlin simps think that probably-unethical offshored biological research equals Certain Biological WMD and that no Ukrainian administration – even the pro-Putin Yanukovych one- had any issue with this for years). Because it touches on legitimately deep strands of Russian political and cultural beliefs and is a lot easier to justify than “Yeah we invaded a country and lied about it because our Literal Mob Boss Client President got in trouble with his own Parliament for trying to massacre protestors about him going back on a campaign promise to negotiate a trade agreement iwth the EU.”
and I think he sincerely believes Ukraine is rightfully Russian. Like Kennen, he doesn’t think Ukraine is a country.
Agreed with the caveat that I’m not sure I’d go so far as to say Kennan doesn’t believe Ukraine is a country, though he acknowledges many in Russia do not. I have accused him of having an overly “Muscovite” view but he did not dismiss or deny the existence of Ukrainian nationalism.
While it may be posturing about the Baker guarantee about NATO expansion eastward, there were other events, including the coup overthrowing Yanukovich.
There was no coup overthrowing Yanukovych.
Yanukovych (and his cabinet) was confronted about his abuses of power and the Constitution by the Ukrainian Legislature that was on the whole Democratically Elected at the same time he was… and which by and large was dominated by *his own coalition.* And constitutionally they had every right to demand he and his members of cabinet appear before them to answer questions on conduct like most parliamentary systems.
Yanukovych (probably recognizing that even if he and his ministers could safely go to Kyiv to attest, that they had no legal or ethical answers to justify his conduct) instead decided to flee the country, making him incapable of carrying out the duties of Ukrainian President. Which led the Rada to backdoor a removal of power by essentially declaring him incapable.
It’d be a bit like if a US Presidential Cabinet initiated Article 25 not because the President was physically indisposed, but because they had abandoned their position and the like to flee to a country without an extradition treaty to avoid facing charges. That isn’t a perfect parallel (since Article 25 is instigated by the Cabinet and targets only the President while the Ukrainian case was instigated by Parliament/The Legislature/The Verknovna Rada and targeted the Cabinet as a whole), but it’s close enough to be illustrative. That it was a non-impeachment way of removing the President on the grounds that they were incapable of carrying out their duties. Which Yanukovych taking shelter in Russia obviously wasn’t, and whose prior conduct had caused plenty of… let’s just say “Doubt’ that he would actually abide by his legal duties anyway.
So the Rada essentially dismissed the Yanukovych Cabinet and began cobbling together a caretaker cabinet while preparing for general elections and holding hearings and trials about the atrocities Yanukovych and his co had committed during the crisis. And they were midway through doing this when the first Russian Fed Spetznaz hit.
Now, is there more to this story including in the forms of foreign involvement from scum like Nuland and other foreign actors? Absolutely. But that doesn’t make it a “coup.” It also wasn’t an overthrow of the Government but the dismissal of the Executive Branch by the Legislature.
This is also pretty important to understand things like what went on and how Ukraine was faring.
After the overthrow, no doubt Putin was concerned that the next pro-Western President (and likely even more nationalistic/fascistic (since I can’t use the word nazi)) would renege on the Sevastopol lease.
Which they would legally have EVERY RIGHT to do, as Putin admitted. Which is also why Putin and co have tried to play up the false “Coup” angle (because apparently a legislature removing a corrupt, tyrannical President from power legally is a “coup”… huh, where have I heard this rhetoric before? Gavin Newsom call your office) as well as the “Crimean and Donbas Self-Determination!*”
Because even he cannot deny the fact that a legitimate Ukrainian Government would have EVERY RIGHT to back out of the Kharkhiv Lease Agreement so long as it was done by its proper method. And why the invasions have been justified by faux-humanitarian and self-determination concerns rather than “OMG We might lose Sevastopol in a few years!”
And Ukraine was seeking NATO membership after its EU associate membership.
Not really. Even “Yats” (he of the infamous mention on Nuland’s phone) was at best lukewarm about NATO membership and pretty much until the first Russian troops seized Crimea there was limited appetite for joining NATO.
But in any case, even if I granted this assertion, the fact is that Ukraine had every right to seek NATO membership and the Russian Government acknowledged this no later than the Astana Declaration of 2012. Which is again why Putin is so reliant on “Nazi Baiting” and insisting that Yanukovych was overthrown in a “coup.” Because otherwise he has even less of a legal leg to stand on than he otherwise did.
While I think the Ioffe interview I watched was suspect,
Agreed, and why I do not use her.
she did make the point that Putin hated Khrushchev for gifting Crimea to Ukraine (even as part of the SU) and Gorbachev for being weak.
I agree this is true, but I also think this points to the limitations and prejudices Putin had.
The reassignment of Ukraine from the Russian SR to the Ukrainian SR by Khruschev is often remembered as a frivolous, pointless case of megalomania personally attributable to Khruschev. And that actually makes some degree of sense given the host of OTHER cases where Khruschev’s megalomania and whimsy played out… but it doesn’t fit here. The reassignment was an intensely studied thing that might have been spearheaded by Khruschev but dug in essentially the rest of the Central Committee/Presidium and many experts (real or so-called) and debate, and was floated around during Stalin’s last years.
And it had a brutally unsentimental reason. That the Russian SR’s administration had thoroughly botched its administration of Crimea, failing to properly develop it prior to the war and to help modernize its naval facilities and fortifications (thus helping to pave the way for the Nazi/Romanian Conquest of it), and screwing up the recovery.
Khruschev viewed this as an administrative reform, not a national statement. But acknowledging this would puncture some very notable holes in the predominantly nationalistic narratives about Crimea (and moreso in the Russian ones than the Ukrainian ones), which also touch on some of the problems Putin is facing trying to sustain the occupation now.
While Gorbachev was weak (though likely nowhere near as saintly as he’s portrayed), but he was also in charge of a fundamentally weak system and tried to save it.
What was the final trigger to the invasion?
I guess it’d depend on which invasion. I’m assuming we are talking about the open one early last year.
Did Putin think Biden was in Ukraine’s pocket and wanted to get ahead of an American response? Remember in Dec. 2021 Biden kept warning Ukraine publicly that Russia was going to attack? I thought that was odd at the time. Is it more likely Biden was provoking Russia to attack?
I don’t know, but it is ultimately not very relevant IMHO. The exact reasons Putin invaded will probably not be known until the Kremlin’s archives get opened (if that), and at least some of them were probably on false grounds (since it is very clear Putin got REALLY bad intelligence analysis, worse than even my gut feelings on the matter after watching the ugly fighting in the Donbas for 8 years or so) and many were opportunistic.
What I think matters more is how this dovetailed with Putin’s wider political habits and the opportunities. Suffice it to say, Putin has been quite able to dance around an issue until he finds an opportune moment (or what he thinks is) and then to jam a justification in. As someone who watched Georgia 2008 play out in real life I can attest to that.
Ioffe had nothing good to say about Trump– except she acknowledged that the Javelins Trump had sent to Ukraine was a key reason the original assault on Kiev failed.
Agreed, and I’m glad for that at least. Trump was hideously smeared as a puppet of Putin in spite of being willign to risk far more.
om, re: the Ioffe interview. I wasn’t sure whether I was listening to a journalist or Putin’s psychiatrist, based on her speculation what is going on inside Putin’s head. Here analysis is pretty standard fare.
Agreed. And while I might fall into some of that personally I try to minimize it to what I think can be demonstrated from his actions and some of his rhetoric.
Why is the fact she was born in Russia and her family left when she was seven relevant? She has a BA in history, with an emphasis on Russia.
She said she initially was worried the war would last several years, but now thinks “this war will be over soon.” We’ll see how good her predictive powers are.
For what it is worth – and I am by no means a flawless man (I thought Putin would not openly invade) – I think this will last at least another year. Likely more. This has been nasty attritional fighting and even if public support for one side or the other starts collapsing rapidly it’ll probably take a while to play out.
And all the fighting we have seen in this war so far and in many of its kin (like Georgia and Nagorno-Karabach) points to long, bitter fighting.
Thanks for the responses to my questions about the US Marines, everyone. 🙂
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Anyone thinking of getting a pineapple tattoo, however, might want to think twice: “Several women on TikTok are seriously regretting their tattoos of an upside-down pineapple after choosing the design without knowing its meaning. A quick Google search would inform eager ink seekers that the turned-over fruit is commonly used as a symbol for swingers looking for a good time.”
https://nypost.com/2023/01/26/i-got-an-upside-down-pineapple-tattoo-i-didnt-know-its-hidden-meaning/
From the comments: “This once again shows my dad was right. A tattoo is a permanent reminder of a temporary bad decision. I can’t tell you how many times I asked someone what the tattoo was supposed to be and they answered, ‘a mistake.'”
Interesting video. I did not know about Dole being the brother of the Gov of Hawaii. I remember while living in Hawaii in the early mid 50’s the huge Pineapple fields, and the Sugar Came fields.
Cold here today, was minus 8 officially and my house it was just minus 6, but it has warmed up to a balmy minus 3.
On a side note: we have several sources of heat for our house. We put in “mini splits” several years ago and they work great to heat and cool the house. However at about 5 degrees they cease to provide heat. So I turn on the electric baseboard heaters, thus using a lot of electricity. When we built our house 45 years ago we were advised to put in baseboard heaters because NG was getting expensive and at the time the more electricity you used, the per Kilowatt price dropped. That didn’t last long though. This morning the temps in the house were in the low 60’s with the heaters running all night. When NG is outlawed for hotwater heaters and furnaces the usage of electricity will be huge.
I will add that our house was built using 2×6’s on 16 in centers, extra insulation, insulation between floors including the crawl space. Several years ago I added blowen insulation to the attic and we put in triple pane windows. We also have passive solar panels to preheat the water. We also put a heat exchanger on the solar system so that when the storage tank gets up to 100 degrees I get in effect a force air furnace in all downstairs rooms. We have done what we could to mitigate energy usage. We do have a dual fuel stove which the idjts here in CO are pushing to outlaw.
Pretty amazing article about the failures of the Scientific community… in Newsweek of all places. It’s very sad and infuriating when it’s all laid out like this.
We crafted policy for the people without consulting them. If our public health officials had led with less hubris, the course of the pandemic in the United States might have had a very different outcome, with far fewer lost lives.
Instead, we have witnessed a massive and ongoing loss of life in America due to distrust of vaccines and the healthcare system; a massive concentration in wealth by already wealthy elites; a rise in suicides and gun violence especially among the poor; a near-doubling of the rate of depression and anxiety disorders especially among the young; a catastrophic loss of educational attainment among already disadvantaged children; and among those most vulnerable, a massive loss of trust in healthcare, science, scientific authorities, and political leaders more broadly.
“…failures…”
Beg to differ.
HTH do you think THEY got Biden “elected”??
And how do you think they’re in the position they are in now—taking the country on a rollercoaster ride to hell?
Failure?
It was a rip-roaring success…and it gets ever more successful with each passing nightmarish day….
Nonapod– Aren’t we lucky? In regard to the gross mishandling of the pandemic, Brandon has decided to “officially end two emergency declarations related to the virus on May 11, nearly three years after they were first declared. . . . The Biden administration says in the policy statement that the end of the public health emergency will lead to the immediate termination of Title 42, which allows law enforcement authorities to swiftly send migrants back across the border. . . . [And] Once the emergency expires, people with private insurance will have some out-of-pocket costs for vaccines, tests and treatment, while the uninsured will have to pay for those expenses in their entirety.”
https://nypost.com/2023/01/30/president-biden-to-end-covid-19-emergencies-on-may-11/
Wow! Life imitates art; in this case the art is SNL. The footage of the Finnish National Transgender figure skater made me think of the hilarious Martin Short – Harry Shearer SNL skit on male, synchronized swimming.
It’s downright hilarious, but the audience and the other skaters are all participants in the new, Emperor’s New Clothes farce regarding gender, so none laugh.
https://twitter.com/JackPosobiec/status/1619560033985130496?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1619560033985130496%7Ctwgr%5E377e0efad110473d98518e027ce402258cdd97f5%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Face.mu.nu%2F
If I remember right there’s a particularly great line where Martin Short says, “I’m not a strong swimmer.”
Mike Plaiss,
Yes. Absolutely!
Christopher Guest has an hilarious, bit role as their choreographer.
https://youtu.be/AEvLap_49gk
“I”m not a strong swimmer.”
SHIREHOME, they now make mini-splits that operate down to -30 degrees.
Units down to -13 degrees are very common.
I’ve used Mitsubishi, LG and Panasonic units and all have been very reliable.
The Panasonic operates down to -10 degrees in a rental unit, and the renters are very happy with it. Occasionally, the temps here drop below that, so it still requires some resistance heaters.
Even now the author of the Newsweek mea culpa fails to understand much.
Interesting
https://www.techspot.com/news/97435-rolls-royce-teases-small-nuclear-reactor-space-travel.html
Brian, yes they do but the costs are very much higher than I paid for mine. We have Mitsubishi installed and do like them. Operating as A/C they are very efficient and keep the house cool, even have to turn them down otherwise get too cold. I have 6 units.
RTF and Mike Plaiss: What’s even better than the Finnish transgender figure skater? A lesbian mayor of color dancing to a drumline during a Lunar New Year parade in Chicago:
https://nypost.com/2023/01/30/chicago-mayor-ripped-for-dancing-at-parade-as-crime-surges/
Light-in-the-loafers, “who is seeking re-election next month, was captured on video busting moves while surrounded by a drumline at Sunday’s parade. Her carefree dancing prompted one Chicago news outlet to blast her as ‘detached from reality.'”
Her white “wife” is nowhere to be seen in the video.
Got nothing on pineapples and Europe, except to note that there’s a great scene involving a pineapple in Peter Greenaway’s 1982 movie “The Draughtsman’s Contract”, which is set in England in 1694.
I’ve been staying out of the back-and-forth about Ukraine, Russia, and NATO. Until now. This piece in Foreign Affairs on George F. Kennan’s warnings about Ukraine, Russia, and NATO is relevant and revealing:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/george-kennan-warning-on-ukraine
Read especially the full texts of the 1997 letters from Kennan to Strobe Talbott and from Talbott to Kennan (you have to scroll down a bit):
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sites/default/files/public_file/2023/Costigliola_Kennan_Talbott.pdf
By the way, Kennan and Talbott use the terms “expansion”, “extension”, and “enlargement” with regard to NATO.
Kennan was famously unsympathetic to the plight of minority populations and the aspirations of small countries. Reading the section of his memoirs that deals with the Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939–well, let’s just say that empathy for the persecuted does not seem to have been in Kennan’s repertory. He lived up to his middle name: Frost. Still, he usually called things accurately.
After the Uvalde, TX shooting, I asserted that a NE cop would have acted. Some people here gave me grief.
Today at noon, a guy walked into a Target in Omaha with an AR-15 and started shooting.
An Omaha cop shot him dead within 6 minutes of the first call.
About 3 years ago, a convicted felon was going for his gun in his pants. The Omaha cop got his hand on the felon’s gun and shot him dead.
So, hooray for the Omaha police.
https://www.3newsnow.com/news/local-news/breaking-large-police-presence-at-target-on-178th-and-west-center-road-avoid-the-area
Real politic, see Thucidides and the Melian Dialog. Kennan would fit right in as an Athenian? Sucks to be anywhere near Roosia.
Cornhead:
Nothing against the Omaha police. But that’s a very poor comparison to the situation the police faced in Uvalde, which was extremely different in most of its details. I have been distracted from putting out my further posts on Uvalde, but they are about 50% finished in draft form and I do intend to publish them at some point in the not-too-distant future.
Funny how being unsympathetic to the Czecks and the Sudatenland worked out. Poland, France, all the rest of western Europe, and then the roadshow went further east. Real politic left a lot of cold (Frosty) dead little people.
Intellectuals without humanity?
@Hubert
Ah, a classic.
A good contribution all the same, though I disagree with it in a few key ways I'll describe. But on the whole Kennan was a brilliant man and far sighted indeed, but I do think he had a fair few flaws. Starting with the fact that he mostly saw Russia and the Soviet Union from the perspective of Moscow, the (relatively) rich and (absolutely) powerful Imperial Center for something like 500 years. This would be the equivalent of being "inside the Beltway Bubble" but on Crack Cocaine, and to further Kennan's own analogy would be a bit like writing eloquently about the Corn Belt, its interests, and its wants without ever having left DC. Some – even many – people can do it, but there will be something lost.
And indeed, something was lost. The most acute example I can think of is in the decades between the Mexican-American War and the Election of 1860, when the generally Free Soil if not outright Abolitionist popular sentiment in the Midwest clashed with and seethed at the generally more pro-Slavery parties dominating DC and things like the Fugitive Slave Acts.
This I think underlines one of Kennan's main problems with his analysis, as you point out.
In short, he seriously underestimates the kind of justified, hateful contempt that people in “Flyover Country” might get for their “betters” in an imperial capital if they feel they are not given due respect and consideration. But as hateful as DC has been, the closest thing it has done to territories in the US as Moscow did during the Holodomors and the earlier “Southern Wrath” of Pyotr the Great around the time of Poltava was the Grant/Sherman Total War in the Confederacy, and maybe some dashes of the brutality of the “Indian Wars”. And that was rare.
This was a fair idea, but the problem is that Kennan does not seem to have any good answers for what happens if one side or the other rejects such ideas of a “reasonable federalism.” Nor should this have been a novel concept; calls for a Reasonable Federalism started early in modern Russian History and reached a climax in 1917, only to then collapse in the next year or two due to violence, polarization, and ultimately Bolshevik invasion.
This is particularly notable because Putin is frankly not interested in a “reasonable federalism” or even a case where Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine are autonomous. We know this for a couple reasons I’ve detailed before.
Firstly: While he didn’t start the Transnistrian, Abkhazian, or South Ossetian conflicts he did inherit them, and he has demonstrated a fairly consistent policy (if one revealed through inconsistent and two faced diplomacy). He has repeatedly played Lucy-with-the-Football in relations with Georgia and especially Moldova, on one hand promising his “Good offices” to help reintegrate Transnistria to Moldova in exchange for concessions only to them do an about face and defend any actions of the Transnistrian government and even propose expanding a similar separatist scheme to Gaguzia, with the idea of ultimately giving dominance over Moldovan politics as a whole.
Secondly because Zelenskyy actually proposed a plebiscite to try and divide the territory of Donbas so long as it was conducted freely, with international observation and with both sides keeping their troops away. This was controversial at the time and got Zelenskyy a lot of flak among domestic Ukrainian politics (as you can see in the linked article at an English-language Ukrainian-focused Soros mouthpiece), but it was something Putin simply rejected.
https://euromaidanpress.com/2019/05/29/zelenskyi-team-proposes-referendum-on-peace-deal-with-russia-heres-why-thats-a-problem/
If Putin ever articulated a response to this offer, I have never seen it in years of looking. Which admittedly is quite possible given my limited language faculties, but still shows how he did not take it seriously. And I think this is for a few reasons, which I articulated here.
https://www.thenewneo.com/2023/01/26/open-thread-1-26-23/#comment-2663618
This also dovetails with something Kennan wrote about the difficulties drawing a line to separate” Russia” and “Ukraine”, but from another angle. I do think that Putin has little interest in any definitive resolution to Ukraine (at least until he can obtain total victory) Precisely because that would involve drawing a line down on Russian gains and the rest of the water going under the bridge, permitting things such as a now-eager Ukraine to join NATO, which of course Putin (and most Russian governments) would not like.
So in short, we can’t really push for a “reasonable federalism” even if we want to because there’s no serious market for it. The Ukrainians (including I’d guess at least a plurality if not an outright majority of Russo-Ukrainians) flatly want the Kremlin out of their country and the return of sovereignty over all of Ukraine’s acknowledged 1994 borders territory. The Kremlin on the other hand is loathe to not only accept the Ukrainian stance but also the idea of “autonomy” in a settled way precisely because it would deprive them of their ability to play politics within a united Ukraine.
See above. Putin – and I think many Russian leaders -are fundamentally not interested in coexistence, or even in some kind of stable peace settlement that would consolidate many of their gains in the wars so far at the expense of ruling out or undermining the possibility for future gains. I think this does dovetail with what Kennan wrote about how Russians see Ukraine and how loathe they are to accept Ukrainian separation and independent existence, but Kennan and Costigliola I think do not follow this train of thought to its logical destination, and one handily borne out by examination of previous Ukrainian history (especially its most contentious eras from the late 1400s through to the early 1700s, and in the first half century of the 20th century).
A good example of how Moscow will likely seek to abuse and undermine “reasonable Federalism” in Ukraine can be seen from the Pereyaslav Agreements of the 1650s, which shocked Khmelnitsky (who himself was a thoroughly ruthless warlord and pogromer as well as a seasoned soldier), who was disgusted and alarmed by the high-handed authoritarian attitude of the “Servitors” of Moscow tasked to be assigned as emissaries and distressed by the extremely onesided terms of the agreement for vassalage to the Tsar, which he feared (Correctly as it turned out) could be “altered”, Darth Vader style. He ultimately agreed in the face of the threat of continued war with Poland-Lithuania and the possibility of Ottoman and Crimean ravaging, but came to regret it and died seeking some way out, only for what remained of Cossack unity to collapse following his death into what is charmingly titled “The Ruin”, which saw a bunch of great powers meddle in affairs on the “Wild Plains” and assorted Cossack factions try to manipulate them, and saw Russia’s Tsars win most of this. They would then go on to steadily suffocate what remained of Cossack privileges and independence in the coning century or so.
Kennan does not offer much if anything in the way of how Ukrainian nationalism or interests might be safeguarded even in a compromise with the Kremlin, and as you note that was far from his main concern. Fair enough, but even a realpolitker should note that those are the main concerns of Some people (a failure that helped lead to Metternich’s comprehensive defeat in the Greek War of Independence, to name just a few).
Moreover, as a fellow history nerd there are a few cases where I feel Kennan gets the situation staggeringly wrong on an objective level or sees things with double standards, in a very “Inside the Moscow Beltway” style.
To quote:
Emphasis added by me.
Now a few things.
Firstly: the reference to “The Ukraine”, which had fallen out of favor even in Soviet sources during the 1930s, which would be very impolitic and seen as inaccurate, sort of akin to using the term “Negro” to refer to Black People. This I think helps establish the lens Kennan is looking at this from, as a particularly old fashioned kind of Muscovite POV.
But secondly and of far more substance: it’s really, REALLY odd to see Kennan claim that there has never been any economic separation” between the core of Russia and “the Ukraine”, considering how such is testified abundantly by our sources. Including Russian literary ones, such as Nikolai Gogol, a collection of whose short stories I include at this link as well as a telling introduction..
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1197/1197-h/1197-h.htm#link2H_INTR
Gogol is best known as a writer of extremely dark, morbid, and surreal stories. And rightfully so. But not as many know him as an amateur historian, ethnographer, folklorist, and Greater Russian Absolutist, albeit one with close ties to “Southern Russia”/”Ukraine.”
So it’s worth reading what he wrote, interspaced with the commentary of another noted English language expert of Russia and Russian literature, John Cournos.
Again, I want to emphasize this. Gogol was a proud Russian nationalist and even a hardline absolutist. He consistently identified this region as “Southern Russia”, “South Russia”, or otherwise as a part of Russia. His Taras Bulba was meant to be a paean to incorporate the Cossack struggles for independence and privlege into the greater mythology of Tsarist ideology. He would never have thought for a second that what we call Ukraine should be separate from or independent of Russia.
AND YET this most fervent of Russian Nationalist folklorists happily admits that there was an ACUTE separation in almost all matters – including economic- by a mixture of the Mongol Ordas and the Lithuanian eviction of them and the ensuing development of Polish-Lithuanian Noble culture (and the Cossack reaction to it) on the “Wild Fields.”
And while Cournas takes pains to point out Gogol’s limitations as a scholar and historian (especially in terms of whatever we can call objectivity) these talks of cultural, political, and economic separation have since been borne out in the nearly 200 years since he worked.
In particular I would recommend Gordon Linda’s “Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the 16th Century Ukraine” (which is notable because it focuses on affairs before the most famous outbreak of Cossack Violence with Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s Uprising) and Christopher Witzenrath’s “Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598–1725” since they help put affairs into perspective on opposite sides of this divide and also show how these regions and peoples fit into the grander stage.
https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/113/4/1265/44892
https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Gordon_Linda/Cossack_Rebellions__Social_Turmoil_in_the_Sixteenth_Century_Ukraine_anhl.pdf?PHPSESSID=m18888ufa99ciib0885udcmff6
Suffice it to say, while economic connections between the centralizing “Russian” state around Moscow in the North and the “Wild Fields” of “The Ukraine” in the South were never ENTIRELY disconnected, they did function very independently and up until the end of the 16th century had limited contact between them due to various things such as a decline in river transport to and from Moscow.
On the subject of “Sea Breeze” the Naval exercise between Ukraine and various NATO nations that Russia was invited to…
A few things.
Firstly: i cannot for whatever reason on Earth explain why Kennan found it “curiously” that the Turks would be participating in naval exercises in the Black Sea. It IS after all one of their major areas of maritime interest and has been for centuries, much longer than a united, modern Russian state has been from the rise of Moscow. Even people who OPPOSED the Turkish participation in these exercises and were worried (as I am) about Turkish power in the Black Sea should absolutely have not been surprised about them having an interest or found it “curious” any more than we should find it “curious” that North Korea is trying to exert influence on South Korea.
Secondly: This letter was written in 1997. Kennan and the Russians should have full known there was no shortage of turmoil on the Black Sea littoral, including ongoing ethnic wars in Georgia, tension in Moldova, an international dispute in Snake Island, and the Armenian-Azerbaijiani War just further in. If Kennan and the Russian Command could not envision the exercise as having anything but an anti-Russian purpose, they lacked imagination.
Thirdly: was an excellent quote from the biting satire “The Ambassador” by the brilliant Mads Bruegger, which repeated the line (regarding international diplomacy) “if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.” I’m not sure where Bruegger got this line or if it is original to him, but it is very trenchant and fits with diplomacy through the centuries.
I think it also holds there. By outright rejecting participation in Sea Breeze and condemning those taking part in it, Russia missed a chance to get “at the table” (and thus make the exercise in part about cooperation between the Russian Navy and the other participants) and made it take on a more distinctly anti-Russian hue. It also meant giving up on all possible ways of influencing the exercise and its participants from the inside.
Now, I have a low opinion on the historical knowledge of most people, including my fellow Americans, but I do know history more than most. So a few things stood out to me.
Firstly: It’s queer that Kennan is going on about the bitter memories Russians have of British and French navies entering the Black Sea and ravaging Russian naval posts on its coast (which leaves the open question of how the Russians got such stations on the Black Sea in the first place, which is an interesting series of stories in its own right that Kennan is curiously mute on)…..
…. and yet Kennan *DOES NOT* so much as allude to WHY the British and French navies wound up entering the Black Sea and attacking Russian naval positions.
Namely, the Russian government sending armies into the “Danubian Principalities” under Ottoman overlordship after a diplomatic crisis in 1853, resulting in Ottoman resistance…
https://kafkadesk.org/2021/07/02/on-this-day-in-1853-the-crimean-war-broke-out-in-the-lower-danubian-principalities
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Olteni%C8%9Ba
… to which the Russian Navy responded by launching a Quasi-Pearl Harbor naval strike against the Ottoman Navy at the Battle of Sinope.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sinop
https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/3713990
And like Pearl Harbor, this proved to be simultaneously one of the most strategically disastrous naval engagements in Russian history as well as an almost-complete victory for them. Because while it established that the Turkish navy could not hope to compete with the Russian one in the Black Sea, it ALSO provided every possible motive and opportunity for the Turks to call in Western navies that COULD. Namely Britain and France (with Piedmont-Sardinia showing up later as an honorable mention). And their far larger, better trained, and increasingly ironclad and rifled warships and marine detachments stormed into the Black Sea (and elsewhere) with the full blessing of the Ottoman Sultan and public support. The Crimean War is known as the Crimean War because this broke the back of Russian logistics for their army in the Danubian Principalities and forced them to withdraw, while allowing the Allies to bombard, blockade, and land at a host of Russian targets, most notably in Crimea but along essentially ALL of Russia’s coastlines from the Pacific to the Baltic, and show that the British, French, and even Italians could maintain more effective supply lines going all the way back to their metropolitan homelands (if not always WELL USED ones) than the Russians could to the Dnieper River less than a fifth of the distance away.
The result was a shattering defeat and saw the Russian Black Sea Fleet be forcibly disbanded and the water turned into an Ottoman Lake for about 20 years, until sea changes and Ottoman overreach allowed Russia to engage in the war of 1877-1878.
B: It’s interesting and understandable that Kennan brings up the specific issue of Russian concern about foreign warships in the Black Sea, because it was the core of the Montreux Conference to renegotiate international convention and law regarding use of the Dardanelles/Hellespont, and the later Straits Crisis. The Soviets and Turkey formed a united front at Montreux to push for greater Turkish control over the Straits in the face of resistance from the likes of the British, Greeks, French, and to a lesser degree Italians and largely won….
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2022/06/akshat-goyal-montreux-convention-russia-ukraine/
… only for the Soviets to then start pushing for control of the straits by THEMSELVES, or at least “joint” Turkish-Soviet control over them.
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/236119033.pdf
https://moneyweek.com/332694/7-august-1946-turkish-straits-crisis-reaches-its-climax
This unsurprisingly did NOT sit well with the Turks, who started detaching themselves from the Soviets and looking for somebody- ANYBODY – who would support them against the Kremlin. This culminated in Turkey almost siding with the Axis in WWII, and ultimately saw them reach out to the US and UK to oppose the Soviets in the “Great” Straits Crisis of 1945-46.
So Montreux (which I’ve seen unironically cited as an example of Russian-Turkish cooperation, and to be fair it kind of is but quickly went sour) and Soviet obsession with controlling the Straits to dictate what ships could and couldn’t go through over the concerns of other stakeholders nearly led Turkey to join the “Hitlerite” invasion and certainly led them to take a benevolent neutrality towards the Reich and its friends in the Black Sea War, and ultimately led to Turkey siding with and joining NATO.
I’ll also note that this became the “New Normal” and something Russia accepts with some grumbling only AFTER firm, united, and decisive action by the West and other stakeholders to tell the Soviets to F*** off.
Thirdly: It’s worth noting that the first mentions of “Russians” or at least the peoples that would BECOME Russians in a MILITARY context (there were some mentions earlier socially and politically) came in the 800s AD/CE, and specifically about the 860 raid and siege on Constantinople by what was basically a composite Viking-led fleet. This would be a bit akin to if the Tuareg suddenly showed up with a massive war fleet off the coast of New York City and proceeded to try and pillage it. So obviously, Russian conduct on the Black Sea hasn’t always been defensive.
And yet Kennan brings up none of these.
The reason why I mention all of this is that I might acidly conclude that there are some common themes to these stories. Namely that diplomacy and concern for what warships are around on the Black Sea are a two-way street, that Russia cannot simply ignore the rights and interests of the rest of the planet in regards to them and expect to be successful diplomatically, and that Russian aggression against its neighbors on the Black Sea has CATALYZED further international involvement in the Black Sea.
One might accuse my particular observations of being shaped by my status as a Westerner who is not fond of the Kremlin, and I can’t say that isn’t true, but I can also say that doesn’t invalidate the points. In particular Montreux and the Straits Crisis is notable precisely because it shows how the Kremlin overplaying its hand in an overbearing and thuggish manner undermined its long term goals and led to a backlash that forced it to concede the point.
And frankly I do think that Strobe ultimately gets the correct point: that by engaging with both Russia and the nations on its border, NATO is offering Russia the chance for a chance on peaceful relations on its Western frontier, and that NATO involvement with Ukraine would not preclude attempts to cooperate with Russia. Apparently (as Kennan admits) it was ultimately Russian leadership that rejected this deal and helped poison that cooperation.
I agree with this to some degree, and I think that while the war is deeply personal it isn’t PRIMARILY personal, and that while Putin is important as a man he is even more important as a front man and leader of various interest groups in the Russian “Deep State” among bureaucrats, “Security Services”, and the military (as shown by his inheritance of many of the policies that came about before he took power re: Transnistria).
But that raises the question of how we can engage with such a strong Russian leader, especially if one proves to be unwilling to engage in good faith.
This I cannot be so sure about. Russia remains a titan of the region, it is true, but demographically it is in a state of collapse as ethnic Russians break down while Muslim birth rates skyrocket. This and the bloodletting of the wars risks Russia’s eclipse.
I absolutely agree. The issue I have with Kennan is that his excessively Russian and “Muscovite” orientation lead him to ignore that part of such a hardheaded, clear-eyed empathy involves being willing to tell the Kremlin to “Get on its Bike” (to borrow a British saying) and knowing when to do so. ESPECIALLY in regards to former diplomatic settlements made with Russia and others, like Budapest 1994 and Astana 2012 (both of which the Kremlin violated).
Montreux and the Straits Crisis is a clear example of this. Ultimately, diplomacy is a two way street and nowhere has Russia’s governments failed more egregiously than with engaging with the countries on their “Near Abroad’ and making themselves DESIRABLE partners.
That’s on them.
Ultimately I find Kennan to have gotten too entrenched in Moscow’s “Beltway” perspective for his analysis, and to have also subscribed to the kind of over-emphasis on fetishizing stability and united governments versus separatist ones, as well as “Great Power Diplomacy” at the expense of local actors.
This also reminds me of the foreign policy of the US and much of the West towards Yugoslavia and Milosevic’s Serbian-dominated government in Belgrade for much of this period. Where contrary to a lot of the memes, the US, Germany, and others worked hard to try and PREVENT the breakup of Yugoslavia by doing things like inking the Brioni Agreement (getting Croatia to put a moratorium on its own democratic declaration of independence), which allowed the JNA to invade Slovenia (only to get repulsed).
It took a long time for the West to recognize that a united Yugoslavia with one head that it could deal with was not coming back, and that Milosevic etc. al.’s atrocities and foreign relations were not in their interests.
I see shades of this here.
And further on being sucky to be next to Roosia; Canada must bless its lucky stars for Seward’s Folly. They could have had much worse neighbors?
@om
I would not go that far. If anything Canada might rue Seward’s purchase depriving them of more territory. The Russians knew they could not hold the region against British, American, or French dedication and it is a miracle it was not grabbed during the Crimean War. At the time the US was the country relevant that they had the best relations with (how times have changed!) so they sold it.
Turtler:
History doesn’t seem to show much territorial enchroachment of the US into Canada since Russia sold Alaska to the USA. Funny that.
But Brain E might enjoy this Frontline interview with Julia Iolof, especially around 11 minutes where she speaks about Gorbachev and NATO eastern “expansion.”
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=qEu0oRajJxE&pp=QAFIAQ%3D%3D
The heads of the U.S. Marine Corps, aka the heads of the US Marines, want to change the US Marines, to look like this:
–less infantry,
–less helicopters,
–more rockets,
And the USMC will give up all of its tanks.
This change is designed to help- put smaller units of Marines into lots of places, and for the Marines to use very powerful rockets…in those places.
Please tell me, military people, + people who study the military- will that work?
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-64294915
The Frontline interview is with Julia Ioffe. Grain of salt its PBS.
Smartphone doesn’t let me edit comments in a timely way.
The Marines gave up their tanks a year ago IIRC. Can’t afford to keep the and can’t deploy them?
@TR
I am not a military person (though I am friends with many) and my research and expertise are informal at best, but I cannot see this boding well.
Rockets are nice tools to have and the US has long lagged in them on many counts, but they cannot do everything. The last time the USMC “worked” as an almost purely light infantry force was the lead up to WWI. It may ultimately be light infantry at heart but it needs a lot more teeth and combined arms to carry out its mandate.
@om
I generally do not trust PBS further than I can reach them. A better piece of evidence is simply that the documents in question rarely fi ever actually say what Putin and co claim they do, which is why they generally have to be selectively quoted and distorted.
I went over this to a large degree here.
https://www.thenewneo.com/2023/01/26/open-thread-1-26-23/#comment-2664022
As I mentioned before, Putin is nakedly lying about what Baker said and did. Leaving aside the question of WTF “military jurisdiction” (which is what Baker talked about not moving an inch East) is, THE KEY FACT IS THAT BAKER WAS NEVER POSITIONING THIS AS A PROMISE, BUT HIS OWN THOUGHTS AND PREFERENCES.
WHICH WOULD NEED RATIFICATION BY OTHER PLAYERS.
So by claiming this was a promise when it so obviously was not, Putin can be shown to be lying and many of those highlighting this as important can be held as not having read the fairly clear document.
Turtler:
She reinforced your point, and I don’t need all caps to say that. 🙂
om,
Why did you suggest I watch the Julia Ioffe interview? Do you think it accurately reflects the inner workings of how Putin views the world?
Also, a couple of days ago you linked to a Perun video describing Russia’s military strengths. Do you agree with their assessment? What does that bode for the war in the next six months?
Turtler, I had a comment in the 1/30 open thread, that I’ll repeat here.
The transcript you linked to had this exchange between Baker and Gorbachev:
“Baker: I want to ask you a question, and you need not answer it right now. Supposing unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisprudence or troops will not spread east of the present boundary?
Gorbachev: We will think everything over. We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable.
Baker: We agree with that.“
Brian E:
Because at 11 minutes or so she also relates that Gorbachev did not get promises that NATO would not expand in Eastern Europe, and that Vlad’s claims about that are bogus. She agrees with Turtler and not with your assertions. In fact she speaks directly about Gorbachev and what he said about NATO.
Regarding Perun’s warning about the underlying strengths of the Russian military, it is sobering but a longer term threat than in the next six months. The Roosians have been incompetent, extravagant in killing Russian soldiers, and brutal in their attacks on Ukraine. They just don’t care. But they can learn and do have advantages as yet in manpower, arty, long range fires, air to air missile systems, and airpower. Ukraine won’t be conquering Russia, but Vlad may loose his war on Ukraine. Roosia has done the genocide thing before to Ukraine; that tends to focus one’s attention.
Perun has many other analyses of the weaknesses of Vlad’s military. It is fortunate for Ukraine that Europe and the west in general are not underestimating the threat of Roosian imperial aggression. If and when the Kerch Bridge is taken out that will change Vlad’s position in Crimea in a very bad way.
Perun has been posting weekly analyses mostly about the war on Ukraine, but also about defense economics and such since March 2022. If you want to look at them, they are available on YouTube. I’ve been linking to them since March 2022.
om, so you think she is accurate on this point. How about the rest of the hour-long interview?
@Brian E
Apologies for the delay, I was out getting dinner (and fielding some questions from the people at Victory Girls Blog).
Indeed, this is true.
However, this goes in to a few things.
Starting with – to redub Clinton – what the meaning of “we” is, as well as the question of how far Baker saying “We agree with that” could have gone or been reasonably interpreted (which – spoiler alert – is definitely not the same as Putin is claiming).
Anyway, now for a supremely long copypaste:
Rough Code:
Italics = the excerpt you quoted.
Bold = Parts I find worth emphasizing.
Underline: Parts within the Bold I find worth particular emphasis.
@Brian E Part 2
Right. Sorry for the long Bakerse post. Now to actually get to talking about it.
But a few things stand out when we place the punchy little quote in its full context (link here: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16117-document-06-record-conversation-between ) or even just the context of a wider excerpt, as I did.
Chief among them is how much both parties obsess about the actions of others outside the US and USSR, their different opinions and policies, and fear that some (especially the Germans but also third parties) will do things neither the US or USSR wish to varying degrees (ranging from going full Nazi again to simply telling the Four Allied Powers of WWII that German Reunification is not subject to them). Baker and Gorbachev repeatedly commiserate on this issue and in fact repeatedly discuss attempts to try and manipulate the policies towards their desired outcomes.
What stands out here is twofold.
Firstly: the need for sensitivity to the public opinion of other nations and their publics, as well as (later) American public opinion.
Secondly: How starkly Baker and Gorbachev implicitly reject the claim by the article authors that the Soviets have the right to veto German Reunificaiton, or at least feel they cannot push the point.
These points are worth noting because they bring things back to my central points. Namely the changing policies of parties in constitutional democracies (be they republics, constitutional monarchies, or so forth), and the opinions of the Central and Eastern European former Pact countries and societies. Aka the exact things that Putin etc. al. focus so hard on ignoring or arguing should not count.
This is further reinforced by the final paragraph of the document.
A few takeaways.
Firstly: How depressing it is to see an H. W. Bush appointee speak of “American Conservatives” as an outside entity.
Secondly: That Baker brings up domestic pressure from the US (specifically the US Right) and criticism regarding the Bush Admin’s policies.
So with these points in mind, let us bring us back to the point. What does “we” mean, in this context, when Baker said “We agree with that”?
The first interpretation is the Schizophrenic/Royalty explanation, that by “We” Baker meant him personally.
The second interpretation is that by “we” Baker meant himself and the members of the delegation, or at least in their official stance (regardless of the private context).
The Third is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, and likeminded individuals in NATO.
The Fourth is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, and the Bush Administration’s Executive.
The Fifth is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, the Bush Admin’s Executive, and likeminded NATO individuals.
The Sixth is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, the Bush Admin’s Executive, and the US Government as a whole.
The Seventh – the Putin interpretation – is that Baker meant himself, his delegation, the Bush Admin’s executive, the US Government, and NATO as a whole (presumably including the US).
The first is obviously false. Baker is quite willing to specify “I” when he is making a statement about his personal assessment.
But at the same time so are interpretations Six and Seven. We know this because Baker makes clear allusions to dissent within NATO and contrary opinions showing that no such NATO unity of opinion was forthcoming. This goes double for the idea that this represents the US government as a whole, given how Congress is in charge of making and approving treaties and this “assurance” never went through the Treaty approval process (for obvious reasons).
For the benefit of the argument, I will be interpreting the “we” Baker mentions in the broadest possible sense: that of meaning Five, where Baker talks for himself, his delegation, and the Bush Executive and likeminded figures in NATO.
The problem with this, however, is simple. And it is something Baker is at pains to note. These people are not dictators. Nobody elected them President of NATO. They are greatly uncertain about whether they will even be able to make policies on these matters, and if they will that these policies will withstand domestic criticism and not be overturned in election. This is why Baker and Gorbachev spend so much time on matters like German politics.
It also clarifies the limit of this assurance. That while it reflected the stance of the Bush Administration at the time (and I think well into the future, given things like the fiasco of the Chicken Kyiv Speech), it isn’t legally binding even to them, let alone to the US government and nation as a whole, let alone to all the member states of NATO.
Which helps explain why when situations changed (as they did drastically and violently – often literally violently – ) those assurances broke down. Especially after Bush was turfed out by Clinton, and in an ycase under the criticism and scrutiny that emerged following the Soviet Hardline coup, the outlying areas of the USSR exploding into violence, and Yugoslavia during the turn of the decade.
Now, this is important because of the context it puts on Putin’s claims. Especially the idea that Baker etc. al. lied to “Russia”/the USSR.
I frankly think Baker was sincere, and this is borne out by evidence. But sincerity by some political/bureaucratic appointees by one President is not all consuming or all binding. Moreover, while I have a fairly low opinion of Putin (especially as of late), let’s make it clear.
He’s not THIS ignorant or stupid. He is a stellar example of Dunning-Kruger in Action, but this does not mean he is that dumb. He’s nowhere near as intelligent as he thinks he is or as he’s made himself out to be, but he’s also not UNIntelligent. You don’t become a “Chekist” Logistics Officer and Administrator (even at a mid rank) if you’re Ben Crumb tier stupid. You also don’t pull off the numerous plans Putin made on his way to power that way.
And while it is clear he has been caught in his own bubble of Yes Men for too long who have told him what he has wanted to hear, I REALLY don’t think that applies legally, given how astute he has been at exploiting the literal letter of the law and treaties.
So I think he has had reasonably competent lawyers who have gone over this and painstakingly pointed out to him what these documents are, what they *aren’t*, what he can use them to try and delay NATO expansion or smear his enemies, and how he can’t use them.
And in any case trying to put the intentionally-cautious statements of a James Baker who is painfully aware of his limits and those of his government (and has these acknowledged by Gorbachev) as some kind of binding assurance on all of NATO does not wash. I’m also very sure Putin knows they don’t wash. Which is why – after eliminating the impossible or the astronomically unlikely – I conclude he is simply lying, knowing most people will not look as deeply into this or realize the limits Baker has to make assurances (especially without an official agreement approved by Congress).
@Brian E Part 3
More complete reply to your comment on the previous side here.
https://www.thenewneo.com/2023/01/30/open-thread-1-30-23/#comment-2664346
Hubert, thanks much for that fascinating Kennan link.
Extraordinary prescience and powers of analysis.
Nonetheless, I’m not sure how such wisdom might help to resolve the current war peacefully (i.e., his idea of “Federation”)…
…unless Russians stop being Russians and Ukrainians stop being Ukrainians…
i.e., at the leadership level…which doesn’t seem very likely to occur.
That is, there has to be some level of trust (i.e., willingness to trust) by the Russians and/or willingness to give up certain levels of sovereignty (whatever that might mean) by the Ukrainians, neither of which possibilities seems terribly realistic.
And so alas, war…until either total victory/defeat…or total exhaustion.
The WTF, though, might have the answer with its uber-goal of Global Reset(TM)!
…where “Reset” means reducing the standard of living globally (except for the elites, of course), which means global food and energy shortages…which may lead to the “total exhaustion” option above.
But this may take time…though probably not as much as one might assume.
(After all, the world is in a mess and Schwab is in a hurry…so how many more egg production facilities have to be burnt down? Or other food-processing plants? How many more pipelines have to be sabotaged or otherwise shut?)
All of which “peace” (and “humanity” and “Globe-Saving”) “initiatives” may feed the fires of the “Eat Bugs, Go Electric, Save the Planet” warriors…leading to peace in Ukraine??…
And from the “Day Late, Dollar Short” Files…even if it IS extraordinarily damning:
“Prestigious Liberal Watchdog Condemns New York Times’ Russiagate Coverage”—
https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/prestigious-liberal-watchdog-condemns-new-york-times-russiagate-coverage
Just one more thing the NYT (and friends) have to “smother with a pillow”…
(Shouldn’t be much of a problem for ’em….)
Brian E:
I listened to the first 15 minutes only and found a few minutes pertinent up this topic; “even a blind squirrel finds an acorn from time to time.” You can call me and she squirrels, but it was Frontline on PBS and I had already had enough progressive spin by then (and better thing to listen to) so stopped there and posted the comment. I didn’t suggest that any other parts of the interview were significant.
Feel free to comment on the rest (45 minutes or so) of the interview.
Turtler has done a thorough fisking of Putin’s spin (lying) about NATO IMO, again. Time to go to work.
Baker swears this was a legit election even though he warned against motor voter rules and lobbies for iranian interests so hes reliable
Yeltsin warned against nato expansion well in his sober moments phillip short has remembered that history didnt begin yesterday as much as we pretend it did
To make a parallel with the control faction, sanctioning indonesian oil would lead to japanese reaction
Jan. 6, REDUX…
The [CORRUPT] Empire Strikes Back…
“Ariz. secretary of state refers Kari Lake for criminal prosecution over tweeting voter signatures;
“The Arizona secretary of state referred Kari Lake for a class 6 felony.”—
https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/ariz-secretary-state-refers-kari-lake-criminal-prosecution-over-tweeting
+ Bonus:
Has Manchin suddenly regrown a pair?
“All GOP senators, Manchin challenge Biden’s ESG climate investment rule ‘politicizing’ Americans’ 401(k)s;
“Sen. Braun and Rep. Barr are introducing a bipartisan disapproval resolution to challenge a new Biden admin rule”—
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/gop-senators-manchin-challenge-bidens-esg-climate-investment-rule-politicizing-americans-401ks
(For that matter, has Sinema?…)
Opening grafs:
‘…Every Republican senator and Democrat Joe Manchin are introducing legislation that they hope will terminate the Biden administration’s new environment, social and governance (ESG) rule, which they say “politicizes” the retirement savings for 152 million Americans.
‘The Biden administration’s Department of Labor unveiled a rule in November, set to go into effect on Jan. 30, that allows retirement plan managers to factor environmental and social issues into investment decisions….’
Turtler: thanks for your detailed gloss on Kennan and for the history seminar. Please be assured that I mean that seriously, not sarcastically. I don’t know what you do for a living, but I suspect you may have missed your calling. Have you considered teaching history (at a private school)?
Speaking of doing things for a living: that’s what I have to do now. Will try to respond to a few of your and other commenters’ (Om, Barry, Miguel…) points in more detail later today or this evening.
@miguel Cervantes
I have no great love or fondness for James Baker and these documents do a good job of illustrating how and why. However, in the context of these discussions I do believe he was being sincere and while part of this is borne out by examining the actions, I think it is otherwise supported by how blunt many of the points are. Baker makes his personal preferences clear (and willingly makes distinctions between them and admin policy when they diverge). It also paints him as incredibly manipulative, lamenting criticism by “American Conservatives” while openly discussing German (and other) willfulness and the need to manipulate them in concert with Gorbachev.
Had it been as simple as “Baker promises on behalf of NATO or The US” then I would not have written the past several posts because I would need to conclude Putin had a point. The issue, of course, is that it was never this simple. And Baker points this out explicitly and Gorbachev accepts this. Baker isn’t President of NATO and cannot make binding commitments on its behalf when he cannot even guarantee he can make binding commitments on behalf of his administration or the US because that is not how US politics works.
And unless Putin or whoever he had read this through on his behalf managed to miss the obvious context of Baker and Gorbachev hashing out the differences in NATO and the limitations – which would make them idiots – I can safely conclude Putin did not honestly consider this a binding assurance (because again, the Kremlin KNOWS the importance of Congress and how fickle US Presidential Administrations can be, or at least how short lived their stances are).
Sure, but that also means I can dredge up
More than half a millennium of Soviet and Russian imperialism and brutality in these countries going back to at least Aleksandr Nevaskoy’s terror tactics against Baltic peoples who he accused of “rebelling” against Novgorod for the crime or being levied by the Teutonic Order.
Which also shows how history is a two way street.
And the talking heads consistently pointed out the importance.
Except sanctions on oil to Japan were Western reactions to Japanese actions. Namely the systematic violation of prior agreements regarding China and later French Indochina. The Japanese junta has nobody to blame but itself for playing rope a dope one round too long so that the West got sick of trusting their words and decided to neuter their military capacity.
@Hubert
Thank you kindly.
I have, but other obligations distract me.
As for what I do for a living, very very odd jobs. I am mostly tied to the home and working from there, so I do a lot of stuff. Have been studying to get accredited as a Legal Transcriber though, which I think fits, as well as doing work as a game beta and alpha tester.
Nice. I hope it fits.
No worries, take your time.
Turtler,
I think it’s reasonable to conclude Baker was speaking for the administration. In negotiations, no one cares what the SoS’s personal opinion is. And if he were advancing a personal opinion, he would say he needed to go back to the President.
I agree it was a commitment that the Bush administration was making that could only be enforced while Bush was in power.
Gorbachev at that point had few bargaining chips, except blowing up the world, so I imagine Baker was seeking to reassure Gorbachev about NATO expansion. It was unacceptable to the Russians.
And yes, American foreign policy in the last few decades must seem like one drunken sailor after another wandering down the street.
The default American view regarding Russia over the last few decades, is the Monroe Doctrine for me, but not for thee.
I believe Putin was sincere about NATO expansion to Ukraine being a red line, and I think he sincerely believes Ukraine is rightfully Russian. Like Kennen, he doesn’t think Ukraine is a country.
While it may be posturing about the Baker guarantee about NATO expansion eastward, there were other events, including the coup overthrowing Yanukovich. After the overthrow, no doubt Putin was concerned that the next pro-Western President (and likely even more nationalistic/fascistic (since I can’t use the word nazi)) would renege on the Sevastopol lease. And Ukraine was seeking NATO membership after its EU associate membership.
While I think the Ioffe interview I watched was suspect, she did make the point that Putin hated Khrushchev for gifting Crimea to Ukraine (even as part of the SU) and Gorbachev for being weak.
What was the final trigger to the invasion? Did Putin think Biden was in Ukraine’s pocket and wanted to get ahead of an American response? Remember in Dec. 2021 Biden kept warning Ukraine publicly that Russia was going to attack? I thought that was odd at the time. Is it more likely Biden was provoking Russia to attack?
Ioffe had nothing good to say about Trump– except she acknowledged that the Javelins Trump had sent to Ukraine was a key reason the original assault on Kiev failed.
om, re: the Ioffe interview. I wasn’t sure whether I was listening to a journalist or Putin’s psychiatrist, based on her speculation what is going on inside Putin’s head. Here analysis is pretty standard fare.
Why is the fact she was born in Russia and her family left when she was seven relevant? She has a BA in history, with an emphasis on Russia.
She said she initially was worried the war would last several years, but now thinks “this war will be over soon.” We’ll see how good her predictive powers are.
“…unless Russians stop being Russians …”
Guy Sorman on a heroic Russian whom, with everything going on in and around the world, it is easy to forget….
“Navalny in Hell;
“Today’s Russia, seen through its political prisons, shows itself to be even crueler than previous regimes.”—
https://www.city-journal.org/navalny-in-hell
Opening grafs:
H/T Powerline blog.
‘His cell measures two meters by three meters. It is made of concrete, freezing in winter and torrid in summer. Is there a window? I doubt it, but his lawyer doesn’t tell us. The prisoner, with back problems and a cough, receives no medical treatment. Thanks to international pressure, he has gained one privilege: a tea kettle. For ten hours a day, he must stand, under the observation of sadistic guards. Occasionally, the prisoner is taken out and subjected to forced labor—sewing while seated on a chair that is too low for his large, emaciated body. And so his condition worsens.
‘The prisoner is Alexei Navalny, an opponent of Vladimir Putin, seemingly the only remaining one well-known outside Russia. Putin tried to poison him, a method he is fond of, but without success. Navalny, who had gone to Germany for medical care, returned voluntarily to be judged by a puppet court and condemned to decades in prison. Why did he return?….’
@Brian E
Back at you.
Agreed, and this was the conclusion I came to from analyzing the document in question here, https://www.thenewneo.com/2023/01/31/open-thread-1-31-23/#comment-2664344 , where I argued that Baker was stating the opinion of himself, the Bush Admin, and likeminded officials in NATO rather than anyone more or less.
Which is no small feat since it indicates a major US Administration – and the one that saw the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union – was at least claiming to be uninterested in expanding NATO. But it’s a far cry from Putin’s claims.
Well, there were ways to get that commitment to be enforceable beyond Bush’s administration. But that would require getting it in writing so to speak, and preferably passed through the Congress. And even that would only militate against it in the intermediate period rather than stop it entirely since Congress could simply void the treaty again.
This I think loops back to the point that Baker, Gorbachev, and others (including one of Gorbachev’s chief lieutenants, Shevardnadze), pointed out. That a diplomatic settlement that was acceptable to the Soviet Union/Russia could only be reached by intensive consideration of the former Pact and SR members as well as public opinion. Which is precisely the stuff that Putin and others have used these assurances (real or false) to try to ignore.
Agreed, but he also pointed out the limitations of his power and even that of the US and the importance of taking into consideration the nations there. It also implicitly talks on the risks of political pressures changing tides.
It also leaves something important unsaid. What happens if stopping short of NATO membership was unacceptable for say the Poles or Hungarians or the Baltics?
It’s actually worth noting that Ukraine was one of the relatively few nations in Europe that actually showed little interest in NATO membership (it WAS interested in cooperation with the US and NATO but not on the whole at the expense of Russia) and pursued a policy of either constitutional or quasi-statuary neutrality… Until the invasions of 2014. Which brings us back to the issues of perverse incentives.
I’d argue for much longer than that – don’t even get me started on Kissinger – but it has had iits points. Moreover, I’ll note one of the frequent features was attempts to reach out to Moscow to come to a modus vivendi (sometimes at the direct expense of the nations in Russia’s “Near Abroad”, see Reset). Mark Steyn – who is thankfully much better now – pointed out the problems with this policy as far as it extended to Putin and Russia’s current political class not long after 9/11, and it seems like we have been slow there.
I completely disagree and I hate this argument with the passion of ten thousand suns precisely because it’s mangling what the Monroe Doctrine is, both in theory and in how it has been executed for decades. And while sure one can say that part of my irritation is nationalist prejudice as an American and that might not be completely untrue, it’s still an attempt to draw a false equivalence.
How do I know this?
Well, let’s go back to what Baker said.
The entire decades old existence of Castro’s Island Dystopia just off Florida’s shores and his continued bad behavior is one of the greatest testaments to both how the “Russia’s actions in its near abroad are comparable to the Monroe Doctrine” argument falls flat and to the limitations of American power and resolve, as well as its (often misguided in my opinion) tolerance. And while you might be able to argue that Baker admitted Cuba was not a threat to the US but to “democratic nations” in Hispanic America while Putin can claim Ukraine is a threat to Russia, there’s something to be said about the fact that the Castro Regime is the only one on planet Earth to have knowingly tried to spark a nuclear WWIII, first by (understandably enough) lobbying for Soviet transfer of nuclear weapons of both tactical (ie defensive, only able to land in its littoral) and strategic (ie able to strike the US), and then proceeded to try and pressure, manipulate, and lie to its Soviet patrons to try and trigger a nuclear first strike. Which only fell through due to a combination of Soviet frustrations breaking the blockade and fear of reports from Soviet missile crews that the Cuban military was acting weirdly on their perimeter and might be trying to seize the sites.
It is certainly true that the US’s relations with the Castros are not WARM (and in light of the nature of the Cuban regime I think this is absolutely appropriate) but they are also nowhere near as adversarial from the US’s POV as is often noted (and why I note that a vast majority of the alleged CIA Assassination Attempts on Castro are known only through the allegations of a book…. published by Fidel’s personal bodyguard… who has proven to have the moral character of a Himmler and also a willingness to lie to support the party line).
And that’s all the more acute since 1990 when this meeting was held Castro has indeed had horrifying great success exporting the revolution, such as helping the Sandinistas retake Nicaragua after being voted out and helping manage a nightmarish Chavista dictatorship in Venezuela, as well as many of the Bolivarians. These are threats at are at least in the same ballpark as that Ukraine supposedly presents, but which the US has responded to in a decidedly muted fashion
Simply put, Putin’s actions towards his neighbors would be AT BEST comparable to US enforcement of Monroe during its broadest and most violent term, from around the 1890s to FDR’s “Good Neighbor” Policy turn. And even then they likely go well beyond that.
Which is also why I note that Monroe was and is originally and primarily about foreign colonial expansion in the Western Hemisphere (at least without the acceptance of the US), and while several US administrations interpreted it more broadly and its implications might go beyond that it does not explicitly rule out US tolerance of home-grown, indigenous hostile regimes like Fidel and Raul, Hugo and Nicholas, etc.
The US has co-existed in an uneasy peace with a regime that tried to start a nuclear war for half a century. Putin invaded Ukraine because of an EU Association Agreement that turned violent, where his local vassal committed such crimes that his own party got sick of him (or at least distressed) and kicked him out of office following a failure to appear before the Legislature. That would’ve been a really extreme action for the US even during the Cold War and the “Banana Wars” in its “near abroad.”
I agree, but I believe that Putin’s talk about NATO expansion to Ukraine being a red line is ultimately a red herring. He invaded Ukraine not because of talk of NATO expansion into it (which had been going around for years to little effect) but because of Euromaidan and the constitutional crisis there. Ironically pushing Ukraine towards considering joining NATO in a way it never really had (at least without Russian approval and co-joining).
Which is probably one reason why commentary on this – especially from the Kremlin – works to play up the NATO angle and even the idea of a “Biological Cuban Missile Crisis” (because apparently Kremlin simps think that probably-unethical offshored biological research equals Certain Biological WMD and that no Ukrainian administration – even the pro-Putin Yanukovych one- had any issue with this for years). Because it touches on legitimately deep strands of Russian political and cultural beliefs and is a lot easier to justify than “Yeah we invaded a country and lied about it because our Literal Mob Boss Client President got in trouble with his own Parliament for trying to massacre protestors about him going back on a campaign promise to negotiate a trade agreement iwth the EU.”
Agreed with the caveat that I’m not sure I’d go so far as to say Kennan doesn’t believe Ukraine is a country, though he acknowledges many in Russia do not. I have accused him of having an overly “Muscovite” view but he did not dismiss or deny the existence of Ukrainian nationalism.
There was no coup overthrowing Yanukovych.
Yanukovych (and his cabinet) was confronted about his abuses of power and the Constitution by the Ukrainian Legislature that was on the whole Democratically Elected at the same time he was… and which by and large was dominated by *his own coalition.* And constitutionally they had every right to demand he and his members of cabinet appear before them to answer questions on conduct like most parliamentary systems.
Yanukovych (probably recognizing that even if he and his ministers could safely go to Kyiv to attest, that they had no legal or ethical answers to justify his conduct) instead decided to flee the country, making him incapable of carrying out the duties of Ukrainian President. Which led the Rada to backdoor a removal of power by essentially declaring him incapable.
It’d be a bit like if a US Presidential Cabinet initiated Article 25 not because the President was physically indisposed, but because they had abandoned their position and the like to flee to a country without an extradition treaty to avoid facing charges. That isn’t a perfect parallel (since Article 25 is instigated by the Cabinet and targets only the President while the Ukrainian case was instigated by Parliament/The Legislature/The Verknovna Rada and targeted the Cabinet as a whole), but it’s close enough to be illustrative. That it was a non-impeachment way of removing the President on the grounds that they were incapable of carrying out their duties. Which Yanukovych taking shelter in Russia obviously wasn’t, and whose prior conduct had caused plenty of… let’s just say “Doubt’ that he would actually abide by his legal duties anyway.
So the Rada essentially dismissed the Yanukovych Cabinet and began cobbling together a caretaker cabinet while preparing for general elections and holding hearings and trials about the atrocities Yanukovych and his co had committed during the crisis. And they were midway through doing this when the first Russian Fed Spetznaz hit.
Now, is there more to this story including in the forms of foreign involvement from scum like Nuland and other foreign actors? Absolutely. But that doesn’t make it a “coup.” It also wasn’t an overthrow of the Government but the dismissal of the Executive Branch by the Legislature.
This is also pretty important to understand things like what went on and how Ukraine was faring.
Which they would legally have EVERY RIGHT to do, as Putin admitted. Which is also why Putin and co have tried to play up the false “Coup” angle (because apparently a legislature removing a corrupt, tyrannical President from power legally is a “coup”… huh, where have I heard this rhetoric before? Gavin Newsom call your office) as well as the “Crimean and Donbas Self-Determination!*”
Because even he cannot deny the fact that a legitimate Ukrainian Government would have EVERY RIGHT to back out of the Kharkhiv Lease Agreement so long as it was done by its proper method. And why the invasions have been justified by faux-humanitarian and self-determination concerns rather than “OMG We might lose Sevastopol in a few years!”
Not really. Even “Yats” (he of the infamous mention on Nuland’s phone) was at best lukewarm about NATO membership and pretty much until the first Russian troops seized Crimea there was limited appetite for joining NATO.
But in any case, even if I granted this assertion, the fact is that Ukraine had every right to seek NATO membership and the Russian Government acknowledged this no later than the Astana Declaration of 2012. Which is again why Putin is so reliant on “Nazi Baiting” and insisting that Yanukovych was overthrown in a “coup.” Because otherwise he has even less of a legal leg to stand on than he otherwise did.
Agreed, and why I do not use her.
I agree this is true, but I also think this points to the limitations and prejudices Putin had.
The reassignment of Ukraine from the Russian SR to the Ukrainian SR by Khruschev is often remembered as a frivolous, pointless case of megalomania personally attributable to Khruschev. And that actually makes some degree of sense given the host of OTHER cases where Khruschev’s megalomania and whimsy played out… but it doesn’t fit here. The reassignment was an intensely studied thing that might have been spearheaded by Khruschev but dug in essentially the rest of the Central Committee/Presidium and many experts (real or so-called) and debate, and was floated around during Stalin’s last years.
And it had a brutally unsentimental reason. That the Russian SR’s administration had thoroughly botched its administration of Crimea, failing to properly develop it prior to the war and to help modernize its naval facilities and fortifications (thus helping to pave the way for the Nazi/Romanian Conquest of it), and screwing up the recovery.
Khruschev viewed this as an administrative reform, not a national statement. But acknowledging this would puncture some very notable holes in the predominantly nationalistic narratives about Crimea (and moreso in the Russian ones than the Ukrainian ones), which also touch on some of the problems Putin is facing trying to sustain the occupation now.
While Gorbachev was weak (though likely nowhere near as saintly as he’s portrayed), but he was also in charge of a fundamentally weak system and tried to save it.
I guess it’d depend on which invasion. I’m assuming we are talking about the open one early last year.
I don’t know, but it is ultimately not very relevant IMHO. The exact reasons Putin invaded will probably not be known until the Kremlin’s archives get opened (if that), and at least some of them were probably on false grounds (since it is very clear Putin got REALLY bad intelligence analysis, worse than even my gut feelings on the matter after watching the ugly fighting in the Donbas for 8 years or so) and many were opportunistic.
What I think matters more is how this dovetailed with Putin’s wider political habits and the opportunities. Suffice it to say, Putin has been quite able to dance around an issue until he finds an opportune moment (or what he thinks is) and then to jam a justification in. As someone who watched Georgia 2008 play out in real life I can attest to that.
Agreed, and I’m glad for that at least. Trump was hideously smeared as a puppet of Putin in spite of being willign to risk far more.
Agreed. And while I might fall into some of that personally I try to minimize it to what I think can be demonstrated from his actions and some of his rhetoric.
For what it is worth – and I am by no means a flawless man (I thought Putin would not openly invade) – I think this will last at least another year. Likely more. This has been nasty attritional fighting and even if public support for one side or the other starts collapsing rapidly it’ll probably take a while to play out.
And all the fighting we have seen in this war so far and in many of its kin (like Georgia and Nagorno-Karabach) points to long, bitter fighting.
Thanks for the responses to my questions about the US Marines, everyone. 🙂