Iran’s deadly demonstrations
An autocratic state willing to be brutal can often withstand large anti-regime demonstrations by its people as long as (1) the demonstrations are not overwhelmingly large, and (2) the police and/or armed forces remain loyal to the government and willing to kill on its behalf.
Iran’s leaders are certainly willing to be brutal:
As many as 200 demonstrators have been killed so far and more than 4,000 arrested, dissident Iranian groups said. Besides police, the regime deployed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Shi’a Basij militia against unarmed protesters. Forces loyal to the regime were using live ammunition against unarmed demonstrators, several video footage show.
So far the loyal forces have remained loyal. But there’s also this:
There are signs that Tehran might be losing hold over the population, and finding it difficult to find loyal recruits to bolster the ranks of its armed forces. The regime has heavily depended on IRGC, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, to crush the uprising.
IRGC, one of the prime targets of the recent sanctions imposed by Washington, has stretched its manpower and assets by wading into conflicts in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The IRGC leadership is urging its women militia members to have higher birth rates and raise the next generation of jihadi recruits. An IRGC commander on Saturday told the women members of its Basij paramilitary force to have “at least five children.”
“The women’s Basij should be pioneers in this matter,” IRGC commander Ali Fadavi said. “We should have at least five children in the families of the IRGC and Basij members.” The Tehran regime needs “jihad makers, guards and defenders to maintain its existence, identity and investments,” he added.
However, it doesn’t sound to me as though the situation the IRGC faces is all that dire.
It’s instructive to look at the history of the 1979 Iranian Revolution to understand some of the dynamics that can occur. For example, there was an event known as “Black Friday,” in which troops fired on demonstrators who defied martial law that had been declared. After that:
The deaths shocked the country, and damaged any attempt at reconciliation between the Shah and the opposition. Khomeini immediately declared that “4,000 innocent protesters were massacred by Zionists”, and gave him a pretext to reject any further compromise with the government.
The Shah himself was horrified by the events of Black Friday, and harshly criticized the events, though this did little to sway public perception of him as being responsible for the shooting. While martial law officially remained in effect, the government decided not to break up any more demonstrations or strikes (in effect “martial law without there exactly being martial law”, according to Sharif-Emami), instead continuing to negotiate with protest leaders. Consequently, protest gatherings often took place without any serious intervention by soldiers.
In other words, after a brief foray into brutality, the government retreated and gave the demonstrators free reign. In addition, Khomeini was a shrewd and ruthless leader himself, who not only had millions of devoted followers but who knew how to exploit the less-ruthless nature of the Shah. The demonstrations grew very very large:
By late October, a nationwide general strike was declared, with workers in virtually all major industries walking off their jobs, most damagingly in the oil industry and the print media. Special “strike committees” were set up throughout major industries to organize and coordinate the activities.
The Shah did not attempt to crack down on strikers, but instead gave them generous wage increases, and allowed strikers who lived in government housing to remain in their homes
Not only that, but the Western media picked up on Khomeini and praised him, increasing his fame and support, another development that Khomeini cannily exploited.
Things reached a fever pitch [emphasis mine]:
Street demonstrations continued at full force with little response from the military; by late October, government officials effectively even ceded the University of Tehran to student protesters. Worse, the opposition was increasingly becoming armed with weapons, firing at soldiers and attacking banks and government buildings in an attempt to destabilize the country.
On 5 November, demonstrations at University of Tehran became deadly after a fight broke out with armed soldiers. Within hours, Tehran broke out into a full-scale riot. Block after block of Western symbols such as movie theaters and department stores, as well as government and police buildings, were seized, looted, and burned…
Many of the rioters were young teenage boys, often organized by the mosques in southern Tehran, and encouraged by their mullahs to attack and destroy western and secular symbols. The army and police, confused about their orders and under pressure from the Shah not to risk initiating violence, effectively gave up and did not intervene.
So in the case of the 1979 revolution, determined and well-organized rioters in huge numbers, led by a fanatical and brutal leadership, were fighting against a demoralized and confused police force led by a demoralized and confused monarch. Is it any wonder the revolutionaries succeeded?
Ultimately, the demonstrations became enormous, reported at nine million participants or ten percent of the population. The police and military were now overwhelmed not just by their own confusion but by sheer numbers:
The military leadership was increasingly paralyzed by indecision, and rank-and-file soldiers were demoralized, having been forced to confront demonstrators while prohibited from using their own weapons (and being condemned by the Shah if they did). Increasingly, Khomeini called on the soldiers of the armed forces to defect to the opposition. Revolutionaries gave flowers and civilian clothes to deserters, while threatening retribution to those who stayed. On 11 December, a dozen officers were shot dead by their own troops at Tehran’s Lavizan barracks. Fearing further mutinies, many soldiers were returned to their barracks. Mashhad (the second largest city in Iran) was abandoned to the protesters, and in many provincial towns demonstrators were effectively in control
You know how it all ended. But I don’t think it’s likely to end that way now, with victory by the protestors and the collapse of the regime. The government is much more determined to do what it takes to quell the disturbances than the Shah ever was, the number of demonstrators seems considerably smaller than in 1979, the rebels don’t seem to have a charismatic leader of Khomeini’s magnitude, and the IRGC’s problems don’t appear all that severe (although it’s very hard to tell).
The biggest problem the current Iranian government has at present, though, is economic. That’s the wild card that could make a difference. A key would be also be if the number of demonstrators grows extremely huge. And this time around, the demonstrations against Iran aren’t limited to that country, but extends to states where Iran has established a firm sphere of influence such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria:
…Iraqi, Lebanese and now Iranian Shia protesters…are tired of being instrumentalised and want a better life now not in some Khomeinist paradise.
Iran can impose its will now only by massive violence. That might still work for the moment. And the regime has revolution-proofed itself by the construction of an interlocking system of praetorian guards. But the community of true believers is shrinking. Just look at religious observance inside Iran. It’s collapsed. And any real moral authority that the revolution might once have had is gone.
“Syria was a massive turning point [says Sir John Jenkins, one of Britain’s longest-serving regional ambassadors]. Iraq is another now. And we’re beginning to see protesters talk to each other across national boundaries. It’s a process of erosion. The last true believers are probably those on the European left who think Iran is a bastion against US neo-liberal orientalist-inflected neo-colonialism. That says it all.
“Iran has become normalised – just another repressive Middle Eastern state ruled by greedy self-serving elites…
Interesting times, interesting times.
The Iraqi PM has resigned today. Najaf and Karbala Iranian consulates both put to the torch. These are Iraqi Shia strongholds. “Iran go home” is their battle cry.
Obama chose his “ally” poorly. But then, he’s an idiot, so little wonder.
Michel Foucault in particular was quite enamored of Khomeini, and wrote fawning articles about him in the French press. “Revolution” was such a sacred concept. Any outcome of a revolution had to be good.
I doubt the Iranian regime is of a uniform disposition anymore, or has been for the last two decades. The death of the incumbent mullah-boss (who is 80 years old and has held executive positions for 38 years) might be enough to cause the edifice to come tumbling down.
There is this: “Iran can impose its will now only by massive violence. That might still work for the moment. And the regime has revolution-proofed itself by the construction of an interlocking system of praetorian guards. But the community of true believers is shrinking. Just look at religious observance inside Iran. It’s collapsed. And any real moral authority that the revolution might once have had is gone.”
And this: “The women’s Basij should be pioneers in this matter,” IRGC commander Ali Fadavi said. “We should have at least five children in the families of the IRGC and Basij members.”
The IRGC can be sustained only if its women love the deaths of their children sufficiently, as the Palestinians seem to do. And, by the way, how does an economically collapsing society like Iran’s nurture an explosion of infants?
But I did not know the Muslim call to prayer is now going unheeded in Iran.
Iran has been a troubled place for a long time. The average citizen dislikes or even hates the Mullahs and their regime. Unfortunately, they are not fans of the West either. A new regime in Iran might not be any more friendly to the West than that of the Mullahs. They might at least pretend to not want to eradicate Israel so that they could resume selling their oil.
I used to be a fan of the book, “The Pentagon’s New Map.” Its thesis was that the West (The Core) would gradually empower the Third World (The Gap) to join the democracies of the world in peaceful prosperity. What I didn’t realize, nor did the author, Thomas P. M. Barnett, is that the Third World really is culturally quite different from the West. Those countries don’t have the institutions or the experience of private property laws backed by courts that we take for granted.
We believe everyone sees our system as superior, but that’s not true. Many Muslims see our society as irredeemably sinful. Many in Africa have no concept of the government responding to the will of the people or private property laws. Most accept the “Big Man” way of governing and don’t know how to change from that. Most South American countries accept the principle of politicians accepting bribes for favors and other corruption. But many people in South America who do have visions of change believe in Marxist principles not free market capitalism. All these facts have rendered the ideas of “The Pentagon’s New Map” as somewhat naïve. Bringing the Gap into the Core is going to be mission impossible for the foreseeable future.
Any hope of near term peace and stability in the ME is a fool’s errand. Most ME Muslims hate us and when they aren’t hating on us, they are fighting among themselves. A fight that has been going on since the death of Mohammed. ME oil is not as important to the West as it once was. Much of our involvement there has been to keep the oil flowing. Unfortunately, the revenue from that oil has also made it possible for the Islamist Jihadis to punch above their real weight. I have always held that without money the Muslim terrorists would be nothing but a bunch of rage-aholics wandering in the deserts.
Anyhow, the demonstrations in the Muslim countries aren’t another “Arab Spring” breaking out. They are people tired of being screwed by their tyrannical rulers. If these tyrants are deposed, they will be replaced by new tyrants. The best we can hope for is that they might be friendly to the West like al Sisi in Egypt is. Best to not get our hopes up of anything positive happening in the ME.
new video game? demon stations? ask Vanna white for the missing letter..
Grim but good analysis, JJ. Agree that the best we can hope for are more like Sisi, we aren’t going to get any Switzerlands in the ME. We don’t have good and bad choices there, just bad and worse. At least we are less dependent on them for oil now with the advent of fracking. I don’t think we can ignore the ME altogether but we need to be very skeptical about risking blood and treasure there in a hopeless attempt to arrange things to our liking.
J.J.: Very well put. When I was learning Spanish I was dismayed to learn that the expression they use for the Inauguration of a politician in office is “Toma de Posesión” or “Taking of Possession”. The very phrase implies ownership of the institution, not stewardship. Of course, such an attitude encourages corruption. A new mayor will immediately plaster their own name and face over every building and vehicle owned by the city. I found it grotesque. The Latinos found it normal.
There are many places that even admire and appreciate the U.S… but without wishing to emulate it. Different priorities…
Artfldgr:
Oops! Thanks. Will fix.
Cicero:
IGRG leaders are quite aware of the drop in Iran’s birth rate. The fall in the fertility rate of over 4 births per woman,in only 15 years (1982-1997), is possibly the most drastic fall ever in a country’s fertility rate. China took 24 years to reduce its fertility rate by four children per woman-from 6.384 to 2.309 (1966 to 1990). Colombia, a country whose government didn’t use the coercion inherent in China’s government, took 37 years to similarly reduce its fertility rate from 6.712 to 2.683 (1961 to 1998. For 2017: 1.825).
Perhaps the Iran-Iraq War convinced Iran’s women they didn’t want to breed cannon fodder for the Mullahs. Or, Iran’s women voted with their wombs. Though I believe that initially the Mullahs encouraged birth control, realizing that a fertility rate of 6 children per woman wasn’t economically sustainable.
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)
1982 6.523
1987 5.748
1992 3.923
1997 2.489
2002 1.922
2007 1.807
2012 1.901
2017 2.116
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN
The IRGC et al. were insituted to protect the regime since the national military was not trusted. The IRGC has gotten big enough and important enough to be almost beyond control by the mullahs. If there are mass riots, there is no question that the IRGC could handle that situation, but then the mullahs would effectively be employees or hostages of the IRGC that was selected for brutality, not governance. The mullahs may have noticed that the Papal Offices are well appointed and safe. The mullahs may have to “choose sides” for the upcoming storm.
Gringo: Second the demographics.
Next to oil wealth, the other reason the Middle East has been troublesome was a bumper crop of young, angry ME males. However, as birthrates drop, ME males age overall and become less dangerous.
I believe I read that ten or so years ago from Daniel Goldman when he wrote under the pseud, Spengler.
Huxley,
For humans, war has always been the solution for an excess of angry young males.
Roy Nathanson: And war we’ve had in the Middle East.