Does Schumer’s opposition to Obama on Iran mean the override will fail?
I believe it does, but I sincerely hope I’m wrong, wrong, wrong.
A few days ago I wrote some predictions about what I thought Schumer might do:
Prediction: Schumer will cave to Obama. Or he will take the weaselly option mentioned here, voting to override Obama’s veto of a Congressional bill to continue sanctions and block the Iran deal’s lifting of them, but being careful to not bring along enough people with him to make an override stick.
I still go with that “weaselly” prediction, if the Senate is voting under Corker-Menendez, that is. However, having read the text of Schumer’s declaration of intent about this, I note something that makes me think he is talking about something else: voting with the forces that disapprove of the Iran deal. He doesn’t limit his discussion to one about sanctions (which is the topic of Corker-Menendez); he speaks of a resolution of disapproval.
Would this be a vote on the Iran deal as a treaty—something I’ve said several times is a course that the Senate did not rule out by passing Corker-Menendez? It’s unclear. If I’m reading Schumer correctly, he seems be anticipating that there will be a vote on the issue of disapproval of the deal, although he also speaks of sanctions. But he does not mention the vote being a vote on a treaty and in fact carefully doesn’t mention the word “treaty” at all.
From Schumer [emphasis mine]:
Ultimately, in my view, whether one supports or opposes the resolution of disapproval depends on how one thinks Iran will behave under this agreement…
But if one feels that Iranian leaders will not moderate and their unstated but very real goal is to get relief from the onerous sanctions, while still retaining their nuclear ambitions and their ability to increase belligerent activities in the Middle East and elsewhere, then one should conclude that it would be better not to approve this agreement…
Therefore, I will vote to disapprove the agreement, not because I believe war is a viable or desirable option, nor to challenge the path of diplomacy. It is because I believe Iran will not change, and under this agreement it will be able to achieve its dual goals of eliminating sanctions while ultimately retaining its nuclear and non-nuclear power. Better to keep U.S. sanctions in place, strengthen them, enforce secondary sanctions on other nations, and pursue the hard-trodden path of diplomacy once more, difficult as it may be.
For all of these reasons, I believe the vote to disapprove is the right one.
Why am I emphasizing this “vote to disapprove” business? A vote to continue sanctions under Corder-Menendez needs 2/3 approval in order to override a presidential veto that is inevitable, and that’s a very high bar. A vote to disapprove, however—well, what is that? Is it the same as voting on the Iran deal as a treaty, and failing to approve it? I’m having trouble finding out exactly how it would go. This article seems to think that a vote to disapprove would be subject to a presidential veto, and would need 2/3 to ultimately pass. It’s also speaking about a vote of disapproval in the House, however, and the House can’t vote initially on the Iran deal as a treaty because the House doesn’t have the treaty approval power under the Constitution anyway; that’s the Senate. And Chuck Schumer is a member of the Senate.
All the articles I’ve been able to find in a quick Googling that talk about a Congressional approval or disapproval vote for the Iran deal have to do with a vote in the House, and they assume that the president could veto it (see this, for example). So I haven’t been able to find an answer to the question of whether this is the same sort of bill Schumer is talking about in the Senate, in which case his vote wouldn’t matter so much unless a large number of Democrats come along with him and succeed in overriding an Obama veto. It he’s talking about a treaty approval vote in the Senate, however, a 2/3 override would not be necessary and his vote against would be far more meaningful.
More here:
The likely next leader of Senate Democrats, Schumer (N.Y.) said his three-week reading of the proposal left him unconvinced. “There is a strong case that we are better off without an agreement than with one,” he said, referring to the nuclear pact…
While his opposition is significant, Schumer did not signal whether he would actively rally undecided Democrats to also oppose the deal.
Even if an override is needed and that override fails, though, it’s possible that this still was somewhat of an act of courage by Schumer in that it may have made it more difficult for him to take over Harry Reid’s position, as he had long planned:
Schumer’s decision brought condemnation from some Obama allies who are still upset with his proclamations that the timing for pushing the president’s health-care law through Congress in 2010 was wrong politically.
“The base won’t support a leader who thought Obamacare was a mistake and wants War with Iran,” Dan Pfeiffer, the former Obama adviser, wrote on Twitter late Thursday, embracing the president’s line that the only way to otherwise curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions was war.
It really depends on whether Schumer has already cleared his position with the leadership and with Obama and already knows an override would be necessary and that it would fail. In that case, he would be allowed to vote against the deal and the word would get out that he did it knowing his vote was not fatal, which could preserve his chances to take on Reid’s role. Personally I don’t care whether Schumer or some other Democrat becomes the head of the Democrats in the Senate, but I’m rather sure that he cares.
By the way, note that the new way for the left (including, of course, Obama) to refer to a vote of disapproval of the deal is that it’s a vote for war, by those who want to go to war with Iran.
[ADDENDUM: One more thing—Schumer could vote to disapprove but then vote not to override. I think that’s a less likely course of action, however, than a consistent vote to disapprove and to override along with an override failure.]
[ADDENDUM II: Ace reacts to the White House’s Dan Pfeiffer’s tweet putting Schumer down: “Well, according to White House henchman, [Schumer is] just a dual-loyalty Jew who wants War with Iran.”
Pfeiffer’s tweet was as follows: “The base won’t support a leader who thought Obamacare was a mistake and wants War with Iran.” By the way, although it’s somewhat irrelevant to the matter at hand, Schumer never said Obamacare was a mistake; he said that the timing of its passage was a mistake. But misrepresenting what Schumer said is typical White House mendacity in dealing with someone it wants to discredit.
And Ace quotes Fred Fleitz as writing, about Schumer and the Iran deal and the White House:
The reason the Schumer defection matters is because it puts the lie to the Obama administration’s shameful claim that opponents of the Iran deal are partisan extremists who want war with Iran. Schumer’s announcement is a powerful indication that opposition to this terrible agreement is in fact principled and bipartisan.
True, but it won’t matter, because the leftist and liberal LIV troops will pick up the White House meme and run with it. Note, also, that Obama doesn’t just indicate that those who oppose him will inadvertently cause war with Iran, it’s that they want war with Iran and seek war with Iran. And he and his lackeys are just as willing and eager to say this about a member of their own party who might deign to cross or criticize them. The Menendez thing is an indication of what they are willing to do to a true opponent who is a Democrat. Democratic opponents are actually more dangerous to them than Republican ones, in many instances, for exactly the reason that Fleitz points out.
Dan Pfeiffer’s rhetoric and what appears perhaps to be the Liebermanization of Schumer is starting to make me wonder whether Schumer has been cleared by the leadership for what he’s doing, or whether it might actually be what I doubt it is, a shot across the bow by Democrats against Obama. Dare I hope?]
Schumer is riding in the cat seat knowing this is a terrible deal. Most of the Dems know this is a terrible deal. He also believes down the road this will be confirmed BUT don’t expect him to buck O on anything else. In fact i doubt he’s even bucking O but more working with O.
No doubt the Dems are looking at each seat individually and calculating who can and who cannot oppose this Iran deal, keep their seats in house/senate and still jam it down the American voters throat!
I judge Schumer to be a snake and once a snake, always a snake. His ‘disapproval’ is political cover, nothing more. A snake like cunning enables him to see that stating the actual reasons to withhold support of this ‘deal’ is, by far the most protective political coloration for him. He will only vote to override a veto if he is sure that the votes to override are simply not there.
“By the way, note that the new way for the left (including, of course, Obama) to refer to a vote of disapproval of the deal is that it’s a vote for war, by those who want to go to war with Iran.”
My wife, super lib, tried this line on me. I started yelling, Death to America, death to the great Satan, Death to Israel, death to the little Satan, Israel must be exterminated. Next I asked just who is threatening war? It didn’t change a thing, she still believes in Obama’s characterization of the deal as do the members of her Department of local, national, global, and intergalctic Do Goodery.
Paul in Boston:
Once a person buys into the leftist line—especially if that person isn’t all that politically oriented or interested (and lives in Boston!)—it can be a tough job to get them out from under the influence of propaganda and peer pressure.
“Intergalactic Do Goodery” will double the defict. 🙂
I would not bet against your take on Schumer, he has to go along with the pressure he must feel from his Jewish constituents, and he knows there will not be 66 votes to override a bho veto. You got his number.
Paul in Boston,
That’s step one with your wife.
Take step two.
Once you’ve explained the threatening nature of Iran, explain to her that the threat of military enforcement is not a goal or purpose but rather a source of leverage working together with other sources of leverage such as sanctions that are contingent on Iran’s compliance with categorical disarmament. The goal and purpose is to resolve the primary threat of a nuclear/WMD-armed Iran in light of its spectrum of illicit activity, such as “Death to America” policy and terrorism.
As such, any disarmament framework with Iran must be judged according to the goal and purpose of a categorically disarmed Iran. The proper way to switch off the sources of leverage, including military enforcement, is Iran’s proof of compliance with categorical disarmament.
With that premise established, share with her Charles Duelfer’s assessment of Obama’s deal with Iran:
http://www.charlesduelfer.com/blog/
Duelfer, of course, was the UNSCOM chairman and inspector who headed the Iraq Survey Group.
According to Duelfer, President Obama’s deal with Iran does not disarm Iran. It fails to resolve the primary threat of a nuclear/WMD-armed Iran. If anything, Obama’s deal facilitates the opposite.
Duelfer says, “Maybe they [Secretary Kerry and his team] did well considering the hand they were dealt. Clearly Iran has done well.”
It would be a segue, but you can mention to your wife that Obama came into office having inherited the leverage of stabilizing Iraq as an American ally, supporting civil reform in Iran (Green Movement), the implicit threat of military enforcement, and sanctions pressure, working in concert.
Under President Obama, the 1st 2 pillars of leverage were removed and the 3rd pillar stigmatized in the “the hand they were dealt” preconditions for the Iran negotiation. The 4th pillar was simply given away.
Obama’s deal with Iran is an appeasement. In contrast, it’s useful for you to know, whether or not you choose to raise this point with your wife, that Operation Iraqi Freedom achieved the ceasefire-mandated disarmament of Iraq:
http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10118.doc.htm
There’s also the not-so-subtle line of attack that he’s-just-doing-the-Jewish-thing — like the NY Times, which starts its announcement of his opposition this way: “Senator Chuck Schumer, the most influential Jewish voice in Congress, said Thursday night that he would oppose President Obama’s deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program”.
I’m thinking maybe Schumer’s the real deal on this.
On a slightly different topic, we are now learning that Gen Suleimani traveled to Moscow (presumably at Putin’s invitation) before the ban on his travel was lifted. So this is a giant FU from Putin and Iran to Obama. Oh, and while there, he asked for an advanced type of missile that will be a lot harder for us to defend against. I’ll bet Moscow will come through with that. It is looking to me as if Putin wants to embarrass Obama and Kerry. And he’s succeeding.
Eric, be honest, have you ever convinced a single leftist or independent over to the right side with your “activist stragety”. Waiting, waiting,waiting……..
parker:
Actually, Eric has discussed one example many many times, in some detail, for years in the comments section of this blog. He is not really trying to “convince” a leftist over to the right side with his “activist strategy.” He is focusing on changing policy.
Here is the example he gives. He has discussed it in greater detail in other comments, but I don’t have the time to find the longer comments right now.
parker,
The purpose is not winning the hearts and minds of Left activists. Their role in the contest is to be defeated.
The general will of We The People is a function of activism. The goal is reforming the zeitgeist and controlling its social nodes.
Neo,
On the subject of counter-Left activism at Columbia, Tonawanda has mentioned his successes as a Columbia undergrad countering campus radicals during the 1960s’ creative destructive paradigm shift.
If he’s willing, I suggest you interview him about those experiences in order to showcase his real-world example of counter-Left activism and maybe tease out some strategic principles.
Activist changers like Beren and Horowitz offer important insight and guidance. But it seems to me they don’t highlight enough actual examples of counter-Left activism.
Columbia-based examples are particularly poignant given that Columbia is renowned as a leading incubator of Left activism then and today. It’s home turf for them. If counter-Left activism can work on that campus, it ought to work elsewhere.
The analogy is the Petraeus-led counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq.
Before COIN was instituted as the over-all strategy in Iraq, some individual commanders on their own initiative had successfully implemented pockets of ad hoc COIN tactics of varying quality. But because their efforts were desultory and not woven together in a cohesive way under an over-all strategy, their successes were isolated footnotes in the larger scheme of events rather than combined progressively as game-changing building blocks.
However, General Petraeus and his team recognized the local successes could scale up if strategized and finally convinced the President during the nadir of OIF.
At the same time, as Petraeus, Kilcullen, and other COIN formulators have noted, there wasn’t much that was innovative about COIN. Like the activism applied recently by the civil-military advocates at Columbia, COIN was based on time-tested principles. The game change of COIN was mainly a matter of adapting COIN for the over-all strategy, eg, FM 3-24.
The same strategic evolution needs to happen for Right activism.
Notably, the main obstacle to making COIN the over-all strategy in Iraq was overcoming internal resistance in the US military, similar to the internal resistance by many on the Right to a strategic paradigm shift of adapting Marxist-method activism.
Keep in mind adapting is not cargo culting. It’s not about copying Left activists by rote. Activism is a method with a workshop of tools. Columbia civil-military advocates didn’t blindly copy the campus radicals they defeated. I doubt Tonawanda and his friends blindly copied the campus radicals they countered at Columbia. Instead, they chose to compete honestly for what they believed in the only social cultural/political game there is.
Ok, I read the link to your post Eric. It makes sense to compete, but that means competing for the 10 percent who are not firmly brainwashed. A tought road to hoe.
parker,
Brains are washed regardless. The key is seeing the washing process and understanding that it’s universal. Activism is just sociology weaponized. When the washing process is mastered and the zeitgeist is seized in the activist game, brains washed one way can be washed another way by the victor.
As for it being a tough road to hoe, of course – it’s competition.
It makes sense to compete, but that means competing for the 10 percent who are not firmly brainwashed.
Maybe if you follow their rules, but is Planned Profit, Project Veritas, and Breitbart ACORn sting, competing for merely 10%? I think more than 10% are affected by such gray ops.
Which don’t necessarily follow the “rules” the Left demands of us as they slaughter humans.
A military operation may be a success if the goals are accomplished, and the goals would be to either shore up defense and morale, or destroy enemy assets and morale.
A competition seen as a tug of war, with rules, may not necessarily go anywhere. Even after sunset.