Egypt vs. Iran: revolutions and coups
I often agree with editorials in the Wall Street Journal. But this one seems to hit a flat note, to wit [emphasis mine]:
The result [of Morsi’s overreach in Egypt] was political polarization, with the opposition and military uniting against the Brotherhood supporters who were Mr. Morsi’s last defenders. The millions of Egyptians who took to the streets were also protesting chronic gas and food shortages and a sinking economy. The uprising shows that the worst fate for Islamists can be to take power and thus be accountable for results. Unlike Iran in 1979, Egypt retains enough competing power centers such as a secular business class and judiciary to prevent an Islamist revolution.
Well, I suppose it depends what you mean by “retain.”
Iran before the revolution of1979 was actually fairly robust and “modern” (relatively speaking) under the Shah, at least as countries in that neck of the woods go. True, those elements of society (secular business class, judiciary) did not prevent an Islamist revolution in Iran, but that Islamist revolution was accomplished (much as Morsi’s election was) by stealth and deception. In other words, prior to Khomeini’s taking power (which, by the way, was the result of a referendum—in other words, people voted) the Ayatollah had held himself out to be a far more moderate person than he actually was (just as Morsi did). Khomeini’s revolution had had widespread support from people who should have known better but did not see what was coming.
And after he came to power, it didn’t take long at all for Khomeini to play his cards, and what cards they were! Khomeini makes Morsi seem like a meek lamb in comparison. For starters, Khomeini declared “”do not use this term, ”˜democratic.’ That is the Western style…” And then on to the main course, where he followed the glorious example of late-eighteenth century France [once again, emphasis mine]:
The first to be executed were members of the old system ”“ senior generals, followed by over 200 senior civilian officials, as punishment and to eliminate the danger of coup d’é‰tat. Brief trials lacking defense attorneys, juries, transparency or opportunity for the accused to defend themselves, were held by revolutionary judges such as Sadegh Khalkhali, the Sharia judge. By January 1980 “at least 582 persons had been executed.” Among those executed was Amir Abbas Hoveida, former Prime Minister of Iran.
In mid August, shortly after the election of the constitution-writing assembly, several dozen newspapers and magazines opposing Khomeini’s idea of theocratic rule by jurists were shut down. When protests were organized by the National Democratic Front (NDF), Khomeini angrily denounced them saying, “we thought we were dealing with human beings. It is evident we are not… After each revolution several thousand of these corrupt elements are executed in public and burnt and the story is over. They are not allowed to publish newspapers.”
Between January 1980 and June 1981, when Bani-Sadr was impeached, at least 900 executions took place, for everything from drug and sexual offenses to `corruption on earth,` from plotting counter-revolution and spying for Israel to membership in opposition groups. In the 12 months following that Amnesty International documented 2,946 executions, with several thousand more killed in the next two years according to the anti-regime guerillas People’s Mujahedin of Iran.
It goes on—and on, and on—with purges of more moderate clerics and the like. But I think you get the idea. The majority of the people of Iran, and the former power structure in the country (judiciary, military) did not like what Khomeini was doing. But as Khomeini knew, ruthlessly killing the opposition tends to have the effect of making that opposition rather ineffective. What’s more, it has a tendency to scare off further opposition.
So far at least, Morsi has done nothing of the sort, so those groups in Egypt have been able to “retain” some power.
Another huge difference between 1979 Iran and current Egypt is that the Shah had become an unpopular figure with a lot of baggage himself, having been in power far far longer than Morsi, and being a monarch (rather than elected) as well. The analogy with Egypt’s long-time leader (although not monarch) Mubarak would be more accurate, rather than Morsi (another parallel: Carter withdrew support from the Shah, much as Obama did with Mubarak). And Khomeini was a revered and powerful figure with a huge following, unlike Morsi. All of that helped Khomeini solidify his hold on the country. But his willingness to be absolutely and uncompromisingly ruthless in murdering the opposition was a huge part of what happened there, which cannot be ignored when comparing the two countries.
I’ve done a lot of thinking about how often it is that popular revolutions are betrayed by the leaders who are their beneficiaries (see this for a lengthy post on the subject). It’s the norm, actually, with the United States being one of the rare exceptions.
So, why hasn’t the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt followed the path of Khomeini in simply killing the opposition? I submit that it’s for three reasons: Morsi isn’t a tower of ruthlessness like Khomeini (who was more in the mold of 20th century tyrants, although he was a religious figure and most of them were not); Morsi lacks the political support, spooky presence, and aura of sanctity that Khomeini had built up; and public relations has become more important to dictators in this digital age in which opposition can be organized through Facebook and Twitter, and the whole world is watching far more intently.
But remember, just because Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has not gone the Khomeini route so far doesn’t mean they won’t in the future.
[ADDENDUM: I see that the military in Egypt has now arrested many Brotherhood leaders. That sort of thing has been going on in Egypt since the Nasser era, although Nasser himself was more Draconian, establishing concentration camps for the Brotherhood and torturing them, although only killing a few. Sadat and Mubarak made the Brotherhood illegal, but their imprisonment waxed and waned periodically depending on circumstances, and few if any were killed. However, it was Muslim fundamentalists (although not Brotherhood members) who assassinated Sadat (for a longer post I’ve written on the Brotherhood in Egypt, please see this).
The Shah of Iran had imprisoned Khomeini, but as ruthless as the Shah was purported to be (and I think it’s unclear how ruthless he really was), he stopped short of killing him. That may have been his big error, although killing Khomeini may instead have had the effect of elevating him to martyr status and inspiring a revolution anyway. When faced with a force like that, or the Muslim Brotherhood, it sometimes seems as though there’s no good way to handle it.
I’ve written many posts in the past about the Iranian revolution. If you want to do some reading, this list includes the majority of them. And this one seems especially relevant right now.]
I think that the 14 million (?) persons demonstration in Egypt was not about religion or freedom but was about incipient starvation. Egypt must import food and energy, it has lost its tourist income, and it has no money. The only remotely likely source of financial support is Saudi Arabia, but not if Egypt is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Saudis fear the Muslim Brotherhood as a destabilizer of their society even more than they fear Iran. I think the Egyptians will choose avoiding starvation in preference to the Muslim Brotherhood.
I’m sure you know a lot more about this than I do, so feel free to correct me. But I don’t buy any of the above 3 reasons:
1) I think the Muslim Brotherhood is plenty brutal–if they feel they can get away with it. I suspect Morsi felt he didn’t have enough power to simply kill the opposition’s leaders.
2) I don’t think Facebook and Twitter mean much if you can go the Khomeini route. Given enough power, I don’t believe these folks give a rat’s ass about “public relations.”
I think the only thing preventing this from turning into an Iran-style bloodbath was that Morsi did not control the military. Clearly he did not and had something to fear:
Gary:
But I’m in agreement with you.
My reasons 1 and 2 are tied together; I thought that was clear, but perhaps I did not make it clear enough. Morsi isn’t able to be “a tower of ruthlessness” because he doesn’t have the religious clout and the popular support and the reputation that Khomeini had, at least that Khomeini had at the outset.
But my other point is that, when Khomeini began to lose some of his popular and political support, he pressed forward to simply murder the opposition. Morsi has not done that (so far) and I’m not sure he can do it now, although I have little doubt the Brotherhood would do it if they could get away with it and if they thought it necessary. I think they thought it was unnecessary because they were winning without it.
Also, Nasser and Sadat and Mubarak kept the Brotherhood in check until Mubarak was toppled. That was always the danger inherent in Mubarak’s overthrow—that the Brotherhood would take advantage. And they did, but so far they have not slaughtered the opposition as Khomeini did (again, for the reasons I state, not that they don’t have the impulse).
Khomeini did not control the military either, although he had some supporters there. Khomeini simply executed the leadership of the military. See this.
And it’s not Twitter and Facebook per se that the Brotherhood fears. It’s just that it’s harder for them to do a lot of really dirty work these days without the world knowing. Not that the world will necessarily do a whole lot about it, but it makes it somewhat harder for them to get counter-propaganda out, and to control their own people. In the end, they can’t murder everyone, although they could try.
I’ve been following fairly closely the Egyptian story since before Mubarak fell and I was 21 when the Shah of Iran was deposed. I agree with neo’s assessment of the Egyptian vs Iran comparison.
I would only add that Morsi and the Brotherhood were trying a gradual transformation of Egypt. First creating and passing a Shariah compliant constitution and then implementing an incremental replacement of top Army officials. I also suspect that some of Morsi’s apparent lack of ruthlessness may have been due to Obama sending the message not to put the lie to Obama and the media’s characterization of the ‘Arab Spring’ as democratic and essentially peaceful.
I agree with Jim above that the protests are more about looming starvation than 14 million secularists making their presence felt. Morsi had done and was doing little to nothing in addressing Egypt’s continuing economic crisis.
In addition, Egypt’s Salafists, while less in number than the Brotherhood, definitely have Khomeini’s brand of ruthlessness. If they manage to get into power it’s highly unlikely that they will fail to quickly and ruthlessly secure their power. I would put their chances at getting into power as at least 50/50. I base that assessment upon one statistic; 84% of Egyptians support the death penalty for apostasy. Egypt is a deeply Islamic country with Cairo having the most mosque’s and minarets of any Muslim country. Part of that reality is sheer population but it’s Egypt’s societal commitment to Islam that prioritized the use of those resources to that end.
Correction; I was 31 when the Shah fell, forgive my senior moment;-)
Geoffrey Britain:
Read my comment above yours for clarification.
As Gary already mentioned, the key difference between Iran then and Egypt now is that the Brothers lack the ability to impose their will on the country.
However, there’s another important difference that plays into both their ability to attract support and their willingness to commit violence. The Brothers just don’t have the vision that Khomeini did. Underneath it all they’re a sort of tribal group that provides a sense of belonging where the traditional tribes broke down. So what they really care about is helping their tribe at the expense of everyone else. They don’t have a big plan to remake Egypt.
Egypt is a chronic freakin’ disaster, worse after Mubarak’s fall. Tradewise, it produces little. It is not able to feed its people, inflation is significant, unemployment is massive, 50% of Egyptians earn $2 per day or less. It depends on foreign aid and tourism.
Its major assets are the Suez canal, which Ike was instrumental in keeping Egyptian, after Nasser seized it in 1956; and the peace accord with Israel, part of which requires chronic US subsistence payments to Egypt, currently some $2 billion or more yearly.
An international welfare ‘client’ with no economic future and lots of needy people utterly devoid of any positive future as long as they stay home.
Would Egypt be more like Iran if it could fall back on oil revenue?
I wonder what more-extreme elements will rise in Egypt in reaction to the military coup against the Morsi government.
1) The Emir of Qatar was just swapped out for his (saner) son the other day. Until that moment, Qatar was spending like crazy to support Cairo.
2) Morsi was economically/ functionally insane when he put a fanatic ‘in charge’ of the Luxor temple complex. The fanatic was, and is, directly associated with those who’d shot tourists into hamburger years ago. Tour cancellations flew in over the Internet. But Luxor is mated to Giza. So those tour Euros went bye-bye, too.
3) Promptly after 1 & 2 the public filled the square. Protest became job one. The top brass were wigg’n.
4) KSA gave the generals the nod: Riyadh has their back.
5) The generals frantically moved to protect their sole remaining cash machine: the canal.
6) The Creole Communist soaked his crying towel — and so his czars are looking over how to foul up the Egyptian economy — even more.
7) Morsi’s BFF — the mullahs of Tehran — must now cry into their turbans.
8) Expect events in Gaza.
9) BTW, Israel is in a position to sell natural gas to Egypt and Jordan — if they can bear to pay for it. The pipelines are already in place.
“Would Egypt be more like Iran if it could fall back on oil revenue?” Eric
That seems very likely. But as Don Carlos points out, Egypt is unable to support itself. Whether the new Emir of Qatar will stay is unknown but while he lasts the only regimes able to economically assist Egypt are the Saudi’s and less so, Qatar. I’ve seen estimates that 20 billion a year in direct economic assistance is needed to keep Egypt economically stable. That’s separate from the 2-3 billion in military assistance provided by the US. While neither the Saudi’s nor the new Emir of Qatar will support radical Islamic elements, which favors the Army and secular elements.
All of this is in contradiction to the factors that favor the Islamists. So, we’ll just have to wait and see how it all shakes out.
One last thought, if the extreme Salafists were to seize power and executed a Khomieni like purge of the army, they could use the Egyptian army to seize the eastern Libyan oil fields. They’re lightly defended, especially now and could easily be ‘annexed’ by Egypt’s military. Those oil fields would provide the revenue Egypt needs to assume an Iran like stance.
I’ve thought about eastern Libyan oil & gas for Egypt too. The guns there are jihadist, and might mesh with the MB.
Neo says: “But remember, just because Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has not gone the Khomeini route so far doesn’t mean they won’t in the future.”
In reading this post, the first thing that comes to mind is something along those lines. Morsi or his successor probably won’t make the same mistake again if given the opportunity, and the military was probably thinking the same thing when they decided to act.