More on Obama’s nuclear posture
Charles Krauthammer lambasts Obama’s recent declaration of a new nuclear posture, repeating some of the main points from this already-discussed video. But in print Krauthammer adds the following illustration of how the policy of no-nukes for signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty even if they attack us biologically or chemically is an absurdity:
This is quite insane. It’s like saying that if a terrorist deliberately uses his car to mow down a hundred people waiting at a bus stop, the decision as to whether he gets (a) hanged or (b) 100 hours of community service hinges entirely on whether his car had passed emissions inspections.
My first thought on reading this was: don’t give the administration any ideas. They’ll do that next.
But my second, and more serious thought was that it’s an odd way to try to discourage nuclear proliferation—by reducing the penalty for other types of insidious and illegal warfare, therefore probably making them more likely to occur. What a bizarre tradeoff!
The actual wording of the Obama document gives us a better idea of what is being attempted here [emphasis mine]:
Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW [chemical and biological warfare], the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks ”“”“ conventional, biological, or chemical ”“”“ has declined significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.
To that end, the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
It’s hard to envision what sort of reasoning is behind this. The peacetime value that nearly everyone can agree that nuclear weapons have had throughout the sixty-five years of their existence has been as deterrence, both to nuclear and other types of attacks (as Obama knows, since his document clearly states this by saying that until now the United States has “reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons to deter CBW attack on the United States and its allies and partners”).
So, what would be the point of giving up that deterrent power? The implicit quid pro quo seems to be to get more countries in comply with the NPT. But even were that to happen, would the policy not at the same time encourage these other sorts of attacks, either on the US or its allies (if it has any left after Obama is through)?
Conventional weapons are fine and dandy, I suppose. But they hardly represent the sort of deterrence afforded by at least the threat of using a nuclear weapon. Of course, as is his tendency, Obama hedges even this new policy of non-nuclear-deterrence by saying (read the small print):
Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.
So basically Obama is saying “I didn’t really mean it. I’ll use those nuclear weapons if I feel like it, whenever I feel like it.” And although that’s somewhat reassuring (if you believe it) in placing back a certain uncertainty about the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore a small amount of the deterrent power previously provided by such a threat, it leaves one scratching one’s head. If there’s an escape clause like that, what’s the whole thing about, anyway? “Posturing” is really the best word for it; Obama puts forth a promise and reneges on it, within the very same document.
It’s really not known how believable the US’s nuclear threat has been in recent years. Were other nations really convinced that this country would retaliate so powerfully and aggressively? As the only country that has ever actually used nuclear weapons in combat, we did have some credibility on that score. But the point was that, although no one knew for sure, we presented a credible enough threat to at least give other nations pause.
However, this recent document of Obama’s is so confusing that I’m not sure what other nations will make of it. But it seems to me that it removes some of that previous deterrent threat while at the same time providing little that would convince a nation that joining the NPT would be in its best interests—which, after all, appears to be the main goal of the paper in the first place.
And it doesn’t even begin to address the fact that rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, which laugh at the NPT and its signatories, will go their merry way and are very likely to continue on their present nuclear paths. Obama’s new posture is less likely to reassure other, non-nuclear nations that he will keep his word to protect them, not more.
The document also contains a mind-boggling passage addressed to North Korea and Iran, although not by name [emphasis mine]:
In the case of countries not covered by this assurance ”“”“ states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations ”“”“ there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners…
Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear weapons against countries not covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
What could be the purpose of adding this restrained language? Remember, it is addressed to rogue enemy states such as North Korea and Iran that are out of compliance with non-proliferation and clearly pursuing nuclear weaponry ends, and who might even use such weapons in first strikes against either the US or its allies. It projects conciliatory weakness at the same time it claims to offer a threat of strength.
Why not instead use language that goes something like this: “Our commitment to use every means available to defend ourselves and our allies against attack by countries not covered by the new assurance has remained as firm as ever”? As written, the document seems to be saying instead: “Don’t worry; you can get away with quite a bit before we’ll even consider striking.”
Posturing” is really the best word for it; Obama puts forth a promise and reneges on it…
…that describes his SOP for his presidency to date.
I noticed in the Stephanopolis interview in which he dissed Palin that Obama said Gates and the Chairman of the Joint Chiehs were “comfortable” with this policy. He didn’t say they recommended it or initiated the change. This makes me wonder whether there was some heavy editing of what Obama originally wanted to say. I know Gates gets some criticism for giving Obama cover, but I wonder whether he isn’t the only person between us and totally insane policy.
Excellent analysis. The document language which is implicitly addressed to N Korea and to Iran is an attempt to preempt future assertions of U.S. nuclear belligerence.
The language is yet another sign of the weakness of the Obama Administration. Re nuclear policy: the U.S. has never acted rashly. Why would any U.S. Administration care about any fools who accused the U.S. of nuclear belligerence? It makes no sense, given the clear record of carefully measured U.S. actions. It either means Obama somehow believes past U.S. policy opens the U.S. to criticism, and/or it means Obama is so weak as to be moved to action by even the wackiest of criticism. Either way: weak, weak, weak. Obama is weak, weak, weak.
expat: if this NY Times article is to be believed, Gates initially opposed the decision.
I am surprised that few if any in the media have picked up on Obama’s hedging on this in his interview with Stephanopolous. It is an important point.
Perhaps I’ll write a post on it.
I agree, Adrian. President Obama has a long history of contradicting himself in the same speech, often just a sentence or two later.
It’s a classic way of being all things to all people; everyone can find something to like, and the natural tendency is to latch onto that. And it’s a very convenient way to avoid making enemies… so long as you don’t actually have to do anything.
Let me just add: there is no benefit, in re international diplomacy, to making a confused, self-contradictory policy statement. Enemies of the United States will feel no wiser than they were before, and as such will feel they can continue with their plans; and friends of the United States, in need of a strong statement of support, will go away confused and less convinced than ever that the United States can be relied upon. (As someone ot other said, summing up the Obama approach to diplomacy: if you’re an enemy, we’re sorry. If you’re a friend, you’re sorry.)
President Obama is still in campaign mode… which many of us expected, given that that’s all he’s ever done, really. He doesn’t seem to understand, first, that it’s a President’s job to govern, not to campaign… and second, that the American people have little patience for a politician who’s all talk and no action. (Remember all the early criticisms of George W. Bush being “all hat and no cattle”?)
respectfully,
Daniel in Brookline
The easy bits of nuclear reduction were done years ago. Back when battlefield missiles were less accurate the military used lots of small nukes to make sure the Soviet preponderance in conventional weapons could be countered (remember the ol’ Warsaw Pact outnumbered the West by a large margin). Similarly a lowering of the need to compensate for Soviet first strike (partially politics, partially missile defence) reduced the need for as many strategic missles.
Now however It’s the US contending with many potential nuclear foes (N Korea, Iran, China ) with an understanding that the Japans of the world will not go nuclear. We need more capability than the Russians.
The passages you quoted read like something out of a faculty committee report where everyone has to have their own little bit in to cover all possible minor exceptions. When it comes to nuclear policy the last people I want to make such policy are those that think like college faculty.
In the ’60’s, we were stuck with the “best and the brightest” who mucked up the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam…today, G*d help us, we’re saddled with the “worst and the dumbest”.
This is particularly noteworthy, as it encapsulates the rationale for making these changes to the NPR:
“Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. …continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW [chemical and biological warfare], the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks —— conventional, biological, or chemical —— has declined significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.”
First, US missile defenses are insufficient to be depended upon. Currently, their main value is in introducing uncertainty, into a potential enemy’s calculations, as to the potential effectiveness of a first strike.
US missile defenses would be entirely ineffective against close-in attacks, such as from a submarine, bombers which managed to penetrate US radar defenses, a high altitude EMP attack or a nuclear terrorist attack.
Since terrorist groups lack the ability to make a nuclear bomb, obtaining one from a nuclear capable country is their only available method of getting their hands on a nuke. Thus, to deter that possibility, nuclear capable nations must be convinced that they will be held responsible and suffer the same fate… if they allow one of their nukes to get into the hands of terrorists. Obama has recently admitted that the foremost danger that the US faces is from nukes in the hands of terrorists.
As for the “continued improvements in U.S…capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW”
How so? There are NO such capabilities. What, a more responsive Fed. CDC and FEMA is going to deter Chemical and Biological attacks?
How well did we do in preventing the anthrax scare, which had it been real we would have been entirely ineffective at preventing its spread.
In a nation of 350 million how do you stop the spread od a weaponized Ebola virus? How do you ‘clean up’ contaminated water supplies?
This is pure BS and Obama knows it.
“the United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”
So, Al Qaeda manages to steal a nuke from Pakistan. There’s an investigation, and solid intel confirms that rogue elements facilitated the theft. The government appears not to have been involved or have approved the theft. Al Qaeda manages to detonate the bomb which they concealed in a shipping container, placed onboard a cargo ship unloading at a major US city’s harbor.
By this policy, Pakistan need fear no retaliation. So, what incentive do they have to guard their nukes carefully?
Then, there’s another element to this new policy: U.N. NUCLEAR CONTROL
“The Obama administration is placing a key element of its nuclear deterrence strategy in the hands of the United Nations…”
Rhetorical question: Is this a ‘back-door’ approach to incremental place more and more US decision making in the hands of the UN? I suspect so.
Geoffrey Britain Says:
April 9th, 2010 at 3:21 pm
Every time I think I need to tone down my rhetoric I come across a comment like that, and then I think I haven’t ramped it up enough.
Obama’s nuclear posture, BOHICA.
Adrian wrote”Posturing” is really the best word for it; Obama puts forth a promise and reneges on it…
…that describes his SOP for his presidency to date.”
Like sending extra troops to win in Afghanistan but 5,000 less than the minimum required for victory, saying they will be there only 18 months unless there is still a war, permitting offshore drilling but not now and not ever, spending like crazy and then complaining about the debts someone else must have caused.
Everyone was wrong about Obama; he is neither fool nor knave, actually he is a magician, he can do two opposing things and the same time.
Adrian is right, but his time interval is somewhat off. Obama does not make and then break a promise, he breaks them as he is making them.
Back in 1957 when I first attended Atomic Biological and Chemical (ABC) School, we were told that Bio/Chem was far more dangerous than Atomic. Things had not changed much when I went to the school again in 1963. As Geoffrey Britain explains in his comment, things have not changed that much in the intervening 47 years. Fortunately, Bio/Chem requires some scientific sophistication. Not that terrorists can’t get and deliver same – it is just much more difficult. The most plausible nuclear threat is from a ship borne weapon brought into a port or from a short range atomic armed missile fired a short distance off our coast.
To make strategic statements like Obama has done is, as Krauthammer maintains, INSANE!
G. B asks, “Is this a ‘back-door’ approach to incremental place more and more US decision making in the hands of the UN?” Yep! That follows the liberal blueprint to make the U.S. a more “cooperative and benign” member of the world.
Was our strategic deterrent effective in the past? It has unquestionably prevented a third world war, and considering Libya’s voluntary, unbidden surrender of its nuclear program after America (under President Bush) showed sufficient military resolve and effectiveness, one might reasonably believe that it has been compelling. But now?
What sort of resolve has Obama shown in dealing with Iran, for example? He has set multiple deadline, and after Iran ignored them, set another, essentially saying, “OK, we’re really serious this time! C’mon, I mean it! No kidding!” When Iran slaughtered its protesting citizens, Obama ominously swore that we would “bear witness.” And we’ve promised serious sanctions, and sanctions that have bite, and sanctions soon and sanctions within weeks… And now, after Obama’s triumph of arms control, Russia has announced that it won’t support any sanctions that, in effect, have any effect. Our allies are surely disgusted and shocked, understanding that Obama is not only unbelievably weak, but stupid as well. Our enemies are surely surprised and delighted, understanding that under Obama, America will not bother to defend itself, let alone anyone else.
And now we consider weapons of mass destruction. Under Obama’s announced policy, things would look something like this: A biological attack has been simultaneously unleashed in five American cities. Within a week, the death toll has surpassed one million and the contagion has spread outside the initial infections sites. Thousands continue to die each day, including many of the medical professionals desperately trying to contain the outbreaks. Civil order is breaking down throughout the nation, and mass starvation will be a serious threat within days.
Let’s assume for the sake of this example that the Obama administration will actually admit to the public the source of the attack: Syria (Iran provided the materials, training, and support, but Obama won’t let the public know that so as to keep his outreached hand to Iran open). The Obama Administration will swing into action, deploying a platoon of White House lawyers and diplomats to engage the UN, to encourage the IAEA to verify Syria’s adherence to non-proliferation standards. The IAEA assures us that as soon as Syria allows inspectors into the country, it will take “months, not years” to issue a report. In the meantime, State Department officials announce an “aggressive effort” to encourage a “firm” resolution in the Security Council, which is expected to bear fruit in “weeks, not months,” if the Chinese and Russians can be convinced to attend a meeting.
President Obama delivers speeches to the nation, every night, at least twice, during which he explains that without Obamacare, things would be much worse, and Janet Napolitano issues a news release swearing to get to the bottom of the “alleged man-caused, allegedly contagious discomfort episode.”
Sounds like The Onion, doesn’t it? What is most tragic is that this is likely exactly the way that the Obama administration would respond, and it is, in fact, exactly their announced policy.
Insane? Of course. As I’ve said before, if an enemy of American had seized control of the White House and was determined to destroy America (without using military means so as to preserve the infrastructure), how would we be able to tell the difference between what they would do and what Obama is doing?
Neo-neocon wrote: “So, what would be the point of giving up that power?”
Because Obama and his ilk don’t like U.S. power. The don’t think it’s just that we are the primary power in the world. They think in terms of moral relativism; “why should Iran not have nukes since the U.S. does?” and all that.