Cronkite, opinion journalism, and a changing press: Part I (“to tell a conflicted people a higher truth”)
[NOTE: I decided it was high time for a repeat of this series (first posted in December of 2006) on how the press came to consider its function to be changing popular opinion rather than informing the public. Here’s the first of two parts.]
Cronkite’s famous post-Tet broadcast of February 27, 1968, delivered on the CBS Evening News, is widely regarded as a turning point in the Vietnam War, as well as broadcast journalism. It caused President Johnson to famously say, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost the country,” and was apparently instrumental in Johnson’s decision to drop out of the 1968 Presidential race.
Those too young to remember may find such a set of circumstances almost impossible to believe. But Walter Cronkite,”the most trusted man in America” during his 18-year tenure as the anchor for the CBS evening news, is widely regarded to have had great influence on public opinion.
Take a moment to mull that one over and contemplate how the times they have a’changed: it would not seem possible for a major network anchor to be the “most trusted man in America” today (and, by the way, that “most trusted” designation wasn’t just hyperbole; Cronkite was actually judged that in a Gallup Poll of the time. And, of course, today it would be “the most trusted person in America.” But I digress.)
The avuncular Cronkite (and it seems no piece on Cronkite can avoid that perfect description of the man: “avuncular”) held America’s trust for most of his time at the job. Was it simply a more naive era? The fact that so many Americans got their news from that TV half hour (which Cronkite was instrumental in making a full half hour rather than the 15 minutes he originally inherited) through either CBS, or NBC’s rival Huntley-Brinkley, made it seem as though the truth were being told there—after all, there were few competing stories to hear.
And do not underestimate Cronkite’s voice and demeanor, perfect for television. Never slick, not handsome, he seemed profoundly sincere, with a deep and resonant voice and a slight (at least to me) resemblance to another familiar and fatherly icon of the times with the same first name, Walt Disney. Cronkite had distinguished himself during his coverage of the Kennedy assassination, displaying controlled but moving emotion as he took off his glasses to announce the President’s death. It was a deep bonding with the US public through a traumatic time.
Cronkite earned his trust the hard way: by reporting the unvarnished news. In this 2002 radio interview (well worth listening to for insight into his thought process at the time) Cronkite describes his orientation towards his job prior to that watershed moment of the Tet offensive broadcast.
Previously the top brass at CBS, as well as the reporters there, had understood their function to be reporting “the facts, just the facts.” Editorializing was kept strictly separate; at CBS, it was a function of Eric Sevareid, and clearly labeled as such.
The president of CBS news, Dick Salant, was a man of almost fanatical devotion to the principles of non-editorializing journalism, according to Cronkite’s interview. Cronkite said that, till Tet, he “almost wouldn’t let us put an adjective in a sentence” when reporting, he’d been such a stickler for “just the facts.”
But, according to Cronkite, as the Vietnamese War had worn on, and because of the confusion of the American people about the war, reflected in letters to the station, Salant sent Cronkite on a trip to Vietnam with the idea of doing a piece of opinion journalism when he came back, in order to help the American people “understand” what was going on by explicitly editorializing and advising them.
One can speculate long and hard about why Salant decided it was time to make such a drastic change. From Cronkite’s interview, it appears that the brass at CBS was part of the turmoil of the 60s with its “question authority” ethos. If you listen to Cronkite (and he expresses not a moment’s ambivalence about his actions), you may hear, as I did, an anger at a military that seemed heedless of the difficulties of the Vietnam endeavor, and too sanguine–similar to the “cakewalk” accusation towards the present Iraq War.
Another fact that becomes apparent in the Cronkite interview is that he felt personally betrayed by the military men he’d talked to as Vietnam churned on. He’d been a war correspondent in the Second World War, and that conflict, in which the press had been heavily censored, had featured public pronouncements of public optimism but private “off the record” discussions with the press that were more realistic and often more gloomy. Cronkite had been privy to these. But during Vietnam, when there was no official censorship, the military self-censored when talking to the press—they were profoundly optimistic, because they knew everything they said would be reported. Cronkite seemed miffed that he wasn’t given the inside info, as he had been in WWII.
Cronkite is up-front about these differences in his interview. I think it’s ironic that, if there had been more censorship during the Vietnam War, war correspondents such as Cronkite might have understood better where the military was coming from and might have cut them some slack. However, that’s mere speculation. What actually happened is that Cronkite felt betrayed, and he and Salant thought the American people had been betrayed, and they felt it was important enough that they needed to break their own long-standing rule and spill the beans to the American people.
It never seems to have occurred to them, of course, that in reacting to Tet as they did they were participating in a different falsehood, the propagation of North Vietnamese propaganda about the situation.
Whatever Cronkite’s motivations may have been, it’s hard to overestimate the effect it had when he suddenly stated on air that the meaning of Tet was that the situation in Vietnam was hopelessly stalemated and the war could not be won. We’re used to this sort of thing now, and many of us have learned to brush it off. But then, to much of America, Cronkite’s was the voice of trusted authority that could not be denied—despite the fact that he had no special expertise to make such a proclamation.
Of course, we are reaping the fruit of that moment today. Journalism has changed, and not for the better, mixing opinion and facts in messy attempts to influence public opinion rather than inform. In connection with that radio interview, for example, see this statement, rather typical of the genre:
It was a bold move for Cronkite, and it was an seminal moment for journalism, to go beyond the reporting of events, to tell a conflicted people a higher truth, something beyond the cataloguing of casualties or shifting front lines.
To tell a conflicted people a higher truth. That seems to say it all, does it not?
[ADDENDUM: Here is the text of Cronkite’s Tet statement:
“Report from Vietnam,” Walter Cronkite Broadcast, February 27, 1968.
Tonight, back in more familiar surroundings in New York, we’d like to sum up our findings in Vietnam, an analysis that must be speculative, personal, subjective. Who won and who lost in the great Tet offensive against the cities? I’m not sure. The Vietcong did not win by a knockout, but neither did we. The referees of history may make it a draw. Another standoff may be coming in the big battles expected south of the Demilitarized Zone. Khesanh could well fall, with a terrible loss in American lives, prestige and morale, and this is a tragedy of our stubbornness there; but the bastion no longer is a key to the rest of the northern regions, and it is doubtful that the American forces can be defeated across the breadth of the DMZ with any substantial loss of ground. Another standoff. On the political front, past performance gives no confidence that the Vietnamese government can cope with its problems, now compounded by the attack on the cities. It may not fall, it may hold on, but it probably won’t show the dynamic qualities demanded of this young nation. Another standoff.
We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. They may be right, that Hanoi’s winter-spring offensive has been forced by the Communist realization that they could not win the longer war of attrition, and that the Communists hope that any success in the offensive will improve their position for eventual negotiations. It would improve their position, and it would also require our realization, that we should have had all along, that any negotiations must be that-negotiations, not the dictation of peace terms. For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. This summer’s almost certain standoff will either end in real give-and-take negotiations or terrible escalation; and for every means we have to escalate, the enemy can match us, and that applies to invasion of the North, the use of nuclear weapons, or the mere commitment of one hundred, or two hundred, or three hundred thousand more American troops to the battle. And with each escalation, the world comes closer to the brink of cosmic disaster.
To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the enemy’s intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could.
This is Walter Cronkite. Good night.]
[Part II is here.]
I recall reading in school about a similar battle in WWII – The Battle of the Bulge. A side knew it had based a point where it could not win a war of attrition and its only hope was a swift knock-out blow.
My textbooks through high-school stressed how close we came to loosing, how strong the push was and desperate we were, and many other similar things. At the very least they sure seemed to paint a strong picture of it. I suspect that many historians *still* push that line and will until that event is far enough in the past that they can objectively look at it instead of push a narrative.
Later, once in college, I became interested in military strategy and tactics. The Battle of the Bulge was a big battle and is often talked about. However the military strategist knew *exactly* what it was – a desperation move hoping not to win through military might but through bravado and destroying enemy morale. They knew, at the moment the German’s did that, that we had won.
Sadly people like Cronkite never knew or understood that – indeed he is *exactly* the type that strategy is aimed at. The NV were in the process of deciding what to give up in a surrender when that came over the air – they knew they had won at that point and I’m certain every military strategist we had simply hung their head down in knowledge of what just occured. They had to do nothing more than keep some pressure on us to keep it in the news (indeed, if you look at casualty figures – especially casualties as a percentage of forces – you can clearly see that as a dividing line).
We are even more populated with that type of people now, had Bush Jr not been one to simply not give a damn about what people thought of him we would have Iraq in total chaos now for much the same reason. Since then our enemies have learned that type of attack is fairly easy to win against us and they have been waging a continuous battle for decades now.
Cronkite enjoyed a certain naivete in the American public at the time he pronounced the Vietnam war to be lost. There is no other explaination for how his words had such an impact.
Every journalist since then has done their best to emulate that moment in journalism history – regardless of whether Cronkite was accurate or not.
The truth, even according to North Vietnamese records that became public over the decades after the war was over, was that Tet was an unmitigated disaster for the North Vietnamese.
They lost so many men and so much of their war making capability, that they were bled white on the battlefield and had nothing really left with which to aggressively push militarily against the South Vietnamese government.
But never fear – Cronkite managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory on behalf of the North Vietnamese communists.
And he’s never looked back nor considered that, perhaps, just perhaps, he had been wrong.
He’s never considered that perhaps, just perhaps, his words had a role in guaranteeing the widespread death and destruction that followed the collapse of South Vietnam years later when the North once again had rebuilt and launched another attack – though this time a dem congress withheld the aid promised them when the US military pulled out years earlier.
Beyond that, you are entirely correct Neo in your estimation that the current sorry state of journalism can trace it’s roots to his broadcast.
Not exactly a legacy most sane people would be proud of….
There was a very good documentry done on the Military Channel by the BBC about the Tet offensive and how the American forces won every major battle including the week long battle at Hue where the Marines took the city back block by block sometimes in hand to hand combat. The two advisors in the documentry both agreed that the US had broken the back of the North Vietnamese and if it hadn’t been for Conkite and the CBS report turning public opinion the US Military could’ve mopped up and moved on Hanoi but Johnson on advise from MacNamara told the troops to hold. Soon after that the withdrawl began. At the Paris Peace Table it was agreed the the US would withdraw all troops with the proviso that if the NV crossed into South Viet Nam the US Forces would return. The NV did cross but the Democratic Congress voted to with hold funds from the military for any action against the NV. As a result it is estimated 1,000,000 South Vietnamese were slaughtered. I often wondered how this knowledge weighed on Cronkites concscience, or if for him it was a case of “You cannot make an omlette without breaking a few eggs”
We have the messengers sculpting public opinion and elected officials pandering to that opinion.
Whose leading who and what ever happened to ELECTED LEADERSHIP?
An interesting point about censorship in WW2 compared to Vietnam, and the change in the candor of the military info given Cronkite. If you know that every word can be potentially quoted, you are going to be much less candid.
on how the press came to consider its function to be changing popular opinion rather than informing the public
The press should be not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, but also a collective organizer of the masses.
Vladimir Lenin
Print is the sharpest and the strongest weapon of our party.
Joseph Stalin
The writer is the engineer of the human soul.
Joseph Stalin
all these other explanations seek to paint the situaion as a natural movement in history, but that is only possible if your ignorant or refuse to include the manipulators in the history.
in fact, if you manipulate history, you HAVE to ahve a group of peopel whose political job is to describe whats happening in terms that excise those actions…
all one has to do is go to the source..
but no one here in the west has read the source..
here are some quotes from long ago..
and they tell you where our philosophy of actions come from..
The way to crush the bourgeoisie is to grind them between the millstones of taxation and inflation.
Vladimir Lenin
There are no morals in politics; there is only expedience. A scoundrel may be of use to us just because he is a scoundrel.
Vladimir Lenin
Our program necessarily includes the propaganda of atheism.
Vladimir Lenin
[edited for length by neo-neocon]
In listening to the (videotaped) Cronkite editorial about the Vietnam War, it always struck me how excessive some of his claims were:
“And with each escalation, the world comes closer to the brink of cosmic disaster.”
Isnt this every bit, if not more, hyperbolic than any “Mission Accomplished” sign ever was? Is it really credible that the Soviet Union or Communist China would actually launch a nuclear war in response to an American escalation in Vietnam?? It seems Brezhnev’s low-key response to Nixon’s 1972 bombing escalation would disprove Cronkite’s excessive claim. In any case, there certainly didnt seem to be any such qualms on the Soviet side when they invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, in the very same year as the Tet offensive. (Nor when they invaded Hungary in 1956, or Afghanistan in 1979.)
It seems that this fear of meeting strength with strength, the so-called “Vietnam syndrome,” was one of the detriments the opponents of the Vietnam war added to the American psyche. This “fear itself” permeated every post-Vietnam American cold war decision, such as whether to send aid to El Salvador or put missiles in Western Europe.
Another interesting point is that I was raised on these stories (the press blowing Vietnam)… I’m 38. It definitely had something to do with my turning a tin ear to reports from Iraq. I just knew they were playing the same game so I didn’t believe them. I think a lot of others are in the same boat… which is why we wouldn’t give up despite all the bad news from Iraq….
No civilian did more to lose the Viet Nam war. I have never heard of any regret on Cronkite’s part and it seems to me he’s gotten more smug about it ever since — you know, revolutionized television journalism and all that. If his name is brought up to my Viet Nam-era veteran friends, they have much to say about him, some creative and all unflattering. I’m with them. The less Cronkite has to say, the better.
What gets around goes around or something…
Walter C and his screed marked the beginning of the end for the MSM as it existed. He won a Pyrrhic Victory: a tactical victory but a strategic defeat for the Media.
This was the start of a long downhill decent for Big Media. The crack in the wall that left the water erode away support.
And so it goes…
The actual facts about the military situation from MACV’s standpoint and Hanoi’s standpoint surfaced long before Cronkite gave that 2002 interview. The facts are not in dispute, even by former North Vietnamese Communist military leaders. That Cronkite has chosen to ignore the reality and never revisit his views is very telling. Also, it has since come out – out of his own mouth – that Cronkite was and is a committed socialist. Given that fact, it is no surprise that his bias affected his decision at that moment back in 1968 and his subsequent reflections.
But, yes, Cronkite was one of the first of our “talking head” journalists to come out of the closet as against his own country.
Some even think he was a socialist early in his career. This is not at all unremarkable for those who were young people during the 1930’s and even before. The Communists had made great inroads into our society long before WWII. Their ideas and values were extremely attractive for many in the FDR generation.
Two people who were hooked into Marxism/socialism even before WWII: Obonga’s grandparents.
Twenty years ago I began to do family genealogy in earnest. I got to talk with many people my parents’ age and older, and got a real flavor of the time. In reality, you would be amazed at how many people of Cronkite’s generation, older and younger than he, were attracted to socialism. In fact, maybe the big secret someday will be exposed in all its enormity: that my generation, the Boomers, have perhaps been unfairly tainted as being overwhelmingly socialist, when in reality maybe Marxism never really had more than 30% of us at one time. But our parents’ and grandparents’ generations were far more substantially hooked into Marx than we were.
My wife has a deceased uncle who attended my alma mater (the University of New Hampshire) during the 1950’s and he always said almost all of his humanities professors were Communists. My mother-in-law, his sister, attended UNH during the forties and she said there were a lot of them too. Professors AND students.
I don’t buy the explanation that Cronkite gives of his “disillusionment” with the way the military “lied” about the war. I know vets of the war and some very smart people whom I learned a lot from. We didn’t always have very good intelligence about the Communist enemy during that war, and assessments are partly based upon intel. By the metrics of battle, we destroyed the enemy in almost every encounter. In fact, our LURPS (Long Range Recon Patrols) got better than the enemy at ambush and evade. Enemy morale was not good. Cronkite most certainly would have been privy to some of that information, but he chose a different narrative that fit his worldview.
He carried the water for the Communists. Just as his heirs do to this day.
Being just a little under ten years old when Cronkite first made this broadcast I only remember it from what I have been told about it in school; So, I am really struck by the first few lines:
“. . . we’d like to sum up our findings in Vietnam, an analysis that must be speculative, personal, subjective. Who won and who lost in the great Tet offensive against the cities? I’m not sure. . .”
Not having been aware of those three words – speculative, personal, subjective – I now change my outlook on this piece of history. I read it not as news, but more accurately an opinion piece. Clearly something that should always be approached with skepticism.
Totally blind faith in anyone is not good.
Thanks for posting this.
Great essay about Cronkite. But the story about advocacy in network journalism has to be taken back at least as far as Murrow.