Comments

The importance of training the Iraqi army — 31 Comments

1. I have long wondered if the real reason for the liberation of Iraq was to pre-position the United States Army on Iran’s doorstep.

   Yes! It suddenly dawned on my strategy-challenged mind a while back that by validly going into Iraq on other grounds, we also had Iran virtually surrounded, as well as having Syria cut off from Iran and kind-of boxed in by Israel to the Southwest. Etc..

   Iraq could end up with an army that would have been Saddam’s dream and given its new found ally, it would become the regional powerhouse.

   Yes, and thanks! All I had previously realized was that the pre-invasion Iraq Army was pathetic, even though it fought Iran to a standstill in the 1980’s – in a kind of 1860’s-like Military encounter. What does that say about Iran’s Army? By now Iran must be quite shaken by this usually necessary aspect of diplomacy when dealing with the Evil which at this point in history is Ahmadinejad and his merry band of Islamofascists.

2. “I have long wondered if the real reason for the liberation of Iraq was to pre-position the United States Army on Iran’s doorstep.”

   I’ve said that was a reason since the first month of the war… back when everyone except for the hard left was for it (war for oil / haliburton crowd)…

3. Perhaps we should wait until the eggs are hatched, to expect the “American-trained” Iraqis army will be any more effective than other Arab armies.

   A Colonel Norvell B. de Atkine wrote, in 1999, on the ineffectiveness of Arab militaries; he spoke from long term experience with them:

   “It would be difficult to exaggerate the cultural gulf separating American and Arab military cultures. In every significant area, American military advisors find students who enthusiastically take in their lessons and then resolutely fail to apply them. The culture they return to – the culture of their own armies in their own countries – defeats the intentions with which they took leave of their American instructors. Arab officers are not concerned about the welfare and safety of their men. The Arab military mind does not encourage initiative on the part of junior officers, or any officers for that matter. Responsibility is avoided and deflected, not sought and assumed. Political paranoia and operational hermeticism, rather than openness and team effort, are the rules of advancement (and survival) in the Arab military establishments. These are not issues of genetics, of course, but matters of historical and political culture.”

   “When they had an influence on certain Arab military establishments, the Soviets strongly reinforced their clients’ own cultural traits. Like that of the Arabs, the Soviets’ military culture was driven by political fears bordering on paranoia. The steps taken to control the sources (real or imagined) of these fears, such as a rigidly centralized command structure, were readily understood by Arab political and military elites. The Arabs, too, felt an affinity for the Soviet officer class’s contempt for ordinary soldiers and its distrust of a well-developed, well-appreciated, well-rewarded NCO corps.”

   “Arab political culture is based on a high degree of social stratification, very much like that of the defunct Soviet Union and very much unlike the upwardly mobile, meritocratic, democratic United States. Arab officers do not see any value in sharing information among themselves, let alone with their men. In this they follow the example of their political leaders, who not only withhold information from their own allies, but routinely deceive them. Training in Arab armies reflects this: rather than prepare as much as possible for the multitude of improvised responsibilities that are thrown up in the chaos of battle, Arab soldiers, and their officers, are bound in the narrow functions assigned them by their hierarchy. That this renders them less effective on the battlefield, let alone that it places their lives at greater risk, is scarcely of concern, whereas, of course, these two issues are dominant in the American military culture and are reflected in American military training.”

   – – – –

   Too much of the argument over errors in the Iraq war assumes the Arabs think like us, share common values. Perhaps President Bush has now worked through enough Generals to have found one who does understand the situation and has at least a partial solution to the immediate problem.

   But perhaps it’s as important that Iranians are Persian, not Arab (in large part)? Or is being Muslim more significant?

4. It was immediately obvious the fist time I looked at a map of the middle east after the war started. Though I will add that was quite some time after that Iraq II started.

   Notice that Afghanistan is the *other* side of Iran – we have them surrounded and control most of the major commerce lines from Iran now. Plus neither of those two countries are particularly friendly to them once they do become effectively independent.

   I wouldn’t be too happy were I them.

5. we have them surrounded and control most of the major commerce lines from Iran now. Plus neither of those two countries are particularly friendly

   You looks you are in deep sleep or dream?

   What Bader force and Alhakim , Da’awa party all these guys midwifed by Iran now they are in control of Iraq how you miss that? Can you give us your reasons or you trying to mess up here with doggy thoughts?

   Ozyripus

   I agree with some of the points Colonel Norvell B. de Atkine wrots but did forget that US telling the world Iraq Army was the 3rd Stronger Army!!?

   Despite all the talking about Arab armies Iraqi army was the best of them his history with conflicts that he was involved in the ME telling a lot, and its important to note here Israeli fears Iraqi Army the most of other Armies in the region.

   Sadly most of US guys when its come to talk about Arab they holding in mind the Saudi style desert living image or Kuwaitis which is far different from Iraqi society and its value, to give you examples look not far from those Gulf students who coming each year to US universities studying where are they what the did in their returnee? It’s just a juke to believe they learn any thing useful for them self or for their society simply not US university fault, it’s their attitude and personalities not further than that.

   Finally you words smear well hate toward Arabs looks your Parisian background well reflected in your words.

6. I don’t know many Iraqis.

   I do know that the greatest challenge to building a solid NCO/junior commissioned officer partnership is the prevalence of the shame culture all throughout the Arab arc.

   Nobody – NOBODY – wants to be shown, or thought to be shown, in error. Ever. For anything. Second to that failing is inability to “own” individual mistakes and learn from them.

   After five years of fighting and dying alongside the coalition, it appears to me that at least some Iraqi units have made decent starts toward that end, of being able to process inputs, make a plan, then objectively assess, reformulate, and go at it again without injecting a black hole of denial about anything that didn’t go perfectly.

   Personally, I have to believe that Iraqis probably have a much higher survival quotient than just about any other Arab population. That’s a function of living through the Baathist period and the insurgent/al Q interregnum since.

   I hope they get it together. We are going to screw them come November. An Obama win is going to be surrender, an McCain win will mean that the Democrats in Congress, now with majorities, will continue to sabotage our efforts as they have with Bush for the last seven years.

7. I’ve read quite a bit like that from Atkine, perhaps the same link, over the last few years linked from milblogs. How Arabs will go to a US military school and we’ll be expecting them to go back and train others but they will hoard the training and knowledge because it increases their status. Having everyone know what they know ruins that. “Leading from the front” is not part of the culture and certainly it would be seen as weakening one’s own position to reward initiative among those ranked below you.

   That and a combat style dubbed “spray and pray”.

   The US military foundation is the NCO. The relationship between NCO’s and officers is complex but officers expect to listen to their NCO’s and NCO’s expect to be listened to. Even a Private expects to be listened to if he or she has subject knowledge expertise. Also, unit leaders are authorized to make decisions, are trained to make decisions, in the field. And they expect to have those decisions backed up by their officers.

   On QandO the other day they/we were telling stories about low ranked enlisted, even the lowest, being rewarded for jacking up Generals or Admirals. McQ told his own story about one of his own men who was promoted on the spot by a General he had held in a “forward leaning rest” position until the old man’s arms shook and gravel stuck to his palms. I think that’s a great example of our military culture (and that was way back in Vietnam in the bad old days.)

   It would take a while to explain how that works, but that is how it works.

   Iraqi military and police have been exposed to that culture directly and in depth for several years now. Training would have some effect but I think observation likely has more.

8. While some of you put forward the words of Atkine as the guide lines for Arab although there are many truth in the view from Gulf states army mostly, but no one how US army with all The US military foundation and it’s high standard did and doing in Iraq, in fact some US army acts are shamble and looks very premature from Army who give training to low level personal with complex cultures.

9. The *Army* is a complex culture.

10. Complex?

    You are using that word to refer to Arab culture?

    It’s a hierarchy based on power and submission. It’s not complex as much as it is foreign.

    And the most foreign component to any average American would be how much crap one Arab will take from another because “that’s how things are done”.

    The greatest threat facing al Q and the Old Arab Order is the rise of a self-aware, personally responsible population in any Arab nation.

    The very threat they (Wahabbism, Islamist terror groups) were founded to fight is what may save the lives of millions of Arabs/Muslims worldwide.

    Once a slave is free, they tend to not go back.

11. “You looks you are in deep sleep or dream?”

    Nah, I just don’t have my head stuck in a reality distortion field, those of us outside it may appear to be living in a dream land because you can only see the actual truth through the haze.

    “Nobody – NOBODY – wants to be shown, or thought to be shown, in error. Ever. For anything. Second to that failing is inability to “own” individual mistakes and learn from them.”

    Very true, and it has taken quite a while to convince some of the error of those ways, however see my response to the next paragraph. Even then it is still a several year job to train enough to be effective (we are just now getting to that point with first of the real trainees).

    “After five years of fighting and dying alongside the coalition, it appears to me that at least some Iraqi units have made decent starts toward that end, of being able to process inputs, make a plan, then objectively assess, reformulate, and go at it again without injecting a black hole of denial about anything that didn’t go perfectly.”

    This will end up being a *very* effective way. They can only stick their heads in the ground for so long, after getting their asses handed to them a large number of times it slowly starts sinking in that they are loosing. Add in that once the first Iraqi’s that are using a western method of running their military start doing the same thing and you can only deny so far (well, I guess people like Truth can to their grave – after all with a name like that how can you be wrong? But they will stay in the minority and still know on some level they are wrong – hence the name to reinforce their own ideas).

    According to what the actual people fighting in Basra say it is the first major one where the Iraqi’s are the main fighting force (it is only western media or anti-Iraq controlled media that say otherwise, though even many do admit it they just say that the US is supplying “key” support that without it the mission would fail). I’ll go with the people doing the actual fighting, especially even when many of the naysayers are grudgingly admitting what the boots on the ground say and are having a tough time spinning it while still being factual.

12. I only fought against Iraq for a few hours, but I did look at what they did with beautiful weapons and systems they bought with oil money. The American Army will never need fear Iraq, and neither will the Israeli Defense Force. I wouldn’t bet on Iran beating anyone, Cyrus is long dead and the culture he led is long gone. America can’t change a culture – Germany, Japan, Mexico, Spain – just because we defeated them in combat doesn’t make them just like us while we watch them rebuild, it doesn’t work that way.

13. The reason why it is difficult for Arabs and Muslims to process information, even failure, and then learn from it and get it right is because any kind of failure is a stain on their sense of honor. That’s something very, very deep in the culture. Honor matters more than learning from your mistakes. That’s the hurdle and it’s a tough one.

    neo-neocon, being a psychotherapist, should appreciate this point. Every human being is defined, in part, by the core values which shape their sense of identity. It is very difficult to change those things. I would not say it is impossible, but many things have to happen in order to embrace the values of our meritocratic military.

    The reason why the lowly nation of Israel had been able to defeat a far more numerous enemy who was generously equipped by the Soviets I think owes to the culture of the respective armies. We value team work and individual initiative. Officers and NCO’s put the mission and the men above personal agendas (or most of the time they do or they should – it does tend to happen more than not in combat units). For the Israelis there can only be victory. Defeat entails annihilation, and that is just not an option. So victory in battle is all-consuming and anything – anything – that threatens the mission and the men will be uprooted and jettisoned.

    The Arab/Muslim culture tends to deny failure and then to deflect the blame for it on outsiders, a swirling vortex of conspiratorial thinking that avoids the truth.

    For us, truth matters more than honor. And honor serves truth. That is very much a Western way of thinking.

    I would also like to point out one more thing – and I think neo-neocon will also appreciate this, given her profession. My observation of Arab/Muslim culture is that family violence is more or less endemic. It tends to do great harm to children, turning them into sadists, masochists, and bullies. Those types of people tend not to be brave. Bullies may enjoy violence, but are completely untrustworthy in battle, as they will not lay down their lives for their brothers in arms. Also, children who have been severely traumatized by violence tend to be more susceptible to post traumatic stress disorder. Thus, they tend to make bad soldiers.

    So, for all we have to overcome to get the Iraqi military up to standards so we can scale back our troop deployments over there, we have to remember that we are still going to have to back these people up when the shit hits the fan. I think we can get the Iraqis up to standards of military effectiveness they never had. No doubt about it, but they will never be the equal of our troops. Also, in view of the menace that Iran is, only the most delusional politicians and short-sighted citizens can demand that we quit the neighborhood entirely.

    It still amazes me that there are so many people who have not a clue as to how dangerous Iran is and will be.

14. TmjUtah,
    Your right its foreign culture.

    The very threat they (Wahabbism, Islamist terror groups) were founded to fight is what may save the lives of millions of Arabs/Muslims worldwide.

    You are right, but those “Wahabbism, Islamist terror” used before and supported by CIA, thus they got trained that’s why they are dangerous because they became professional terrorists, using Islam for their self-necessities

15. Oh, but let’s just withdraw.

    Yeah, Neo, why do we need yet another warmongering army on this planet? Besides, Iran will just use that army to attack us!

    It’s like when peple argue against guns. “But the criminal will just use your gun to kill you!”

    Perhaps we should wait until the eggs are hatched, to expect the “American-trained” Iraqis army will be any more effective than other Arab armies.

    With effective American leadership, Iraqi armies are far superior to their neighbors. It has been long enough that the younger generation of Iraqi military leaders have been taught by Americans and have had tribal members rotate through deployments with Americans. I’m sure we can also get the Kurds to shame the sunnis and shia into getting things done better.

    I agree with some of the points Colonel Norvell B. de Atkine wrots but did forget that US telling the world Iraq Army was the 3rd Stronger Army!!?

    3rd largest on paper. Actual strength and strength on paper are two different things.

    There are no equals to the American military. Not even if you added up the next 11 smaller armies below us. This includes the US Navy and Air Force too.

    How Arabs will go to a US military school and we’ll be expecting them to go back and train others but they will hoard the training and knowledge because it increases their status.

    The only really efficient way to train an Arab army is to have an entire unit made up out of the same tribe. Like Al Anbar’s police. Any other way, and you have automatic compartamentalization as one person from one tribe does not trust another person from another tribe. Maybe you could make an army out of every other different tribe, which is what I guess we tried to do in the beginning, but that is far harder.

    This is not really a problem for the really young generation or the urban population that have weaker tribe connections, but taken in aggregate, you start to notice these things since a lot of the colonels and generals are old school Soviet Arabs. They can’t really adapt to Western training practices and so must be phased out.

    Petraeus figured out a way to improve the training of the Iraqi Army. And the Shia Forces have at least a reason to cooperate given that their home tribes are already cooperating politically.

    Tribal members follow strength, that’s why they tend to make a big deal out of martyrs and tribal sheiks. The best way to bolster a person’s courage is to demonstrate to them that you can do it and shame them in following you. If Arabs feel shame for having their mistakes pointed out, then they would feel quadruple the shame if foreigners saw them as cowardly and scared of the enemy if they refused to do what Americans wanted them to do. An Arab only risks death and violence for his family and thus his tribe. If you take an Arab away from his tribe and tell him to fight an enemy in an army made up out of his tribal enemies, then obviously you’re not going to get much use out of that army.

    I hear lots of stories about Americans telling Arabs how things are in America and how things should be in Iraq. But that doesn’t do anything to change people’s behavior. People only change their behavior when they actually see stuff happening, like in Al Anbar. Tribal folks don’t place much value on “talk”. Talk is for people that don’t have the strength to take what they want. Americans talked on and on to Sunnis about how we are here to help them. Didn’t really get through until the Sunnis saw what was really up.

    the US is supplying “key” support that without it the mission would fail)

    The US supplies key logistical support to every NATo and non-NATO ally in the world. Iraq is nothing special in that compartment. No other armed force, except perhaps Britain, could field an expeditionary force independent of American logistical support.

    The French tried it in Vietnam and got their ass handed to them, leaving the place for us to clean up. Which we almost succeded in doing. Almost is no good, however.

    The British at least had the Falklands War on their recent historical sheet. Although, I had never really heard much stories about the Falklands War.

16. It still amazes me that there are so many people who have not a clue as to how dangerous Iran is and will be.

    Don’t panic read this will relief your concerns

    Israel’s Tehran connection

17. You are right, but those “Wahabbism, Islamist terror” used before and supported by CIA, thus they got trained that’s why they are dangerous because they became professional terrorists, using Islam for their self-necessities

    It wasn’t the CIA that taught Wahabis how to drill holes in people, decapitate them, abuse women, and wear burkhas.

    Anyways, America needs an Iraqi army precisely because American Armies are rather casualty sensitive. What would appear to be a strength of the West, its value in the individual, is also a weakness that can be exploited for great gain by our enemies. Iraqis are not casualty sensitive. The more members of an Iraqi tribe you kill, the more that tribe has to take vengeance or else look weak and dishonorable.

    We will need that kind of fortitude and barbarian traits in the coming battles.

    Also the Iraqis are local auxiliary troops that we can make great use of if America ever decides Iran and Syria needs some punitive raids.

    Light troops with far less dependency upon technology and bulky armor will be able to move and strike fast, should the Chinese ever successfully conduct cyberwarfare on the US military.

18. It wasn’t the CIA that taught Wahabis how to drill holes in people, decapitate them, abuse women, and wear burkhas.

    YES not CAI, but these are bad guys and sick who were had sick minds and criminals from the start just look what they doing on the street of the Kingdom of Darkness, who breaded like rats on Wahabis to save those Al-Saud in power so long.

19. Ymarsakar,

    Don’t forgot the big mistake done by Paul Bremer although some will not agree but in matter of fact not all Iraqi army was loyal to the regime as much as a job for life.

    In fact the Iraqi army 70% was from southern Iraq and some Kurds also.

    But let’s hope that we got real army who defend Iraqi land and Iraqi people from those criminal and terrorist.

    Also should be taken in account the new Iraqi forces was established by emerging Bader Militia and other small groups crated and supported trained by Iran 20 years ago, how much confident these guys are loyal to Iraq or US there is doubt in that.

    Ymarsakar, is the drilling Militia are the Bader Militia and Sader one?

    Did you remember what were found in ministry of internal affaires prisons those who were rescued by US? Do you know some report saying Bayan Jabr Solag his niece is an Iranian diplomat in Baghdad?

    In particular, the main controversy centered on the individuals who would occupy the three critical security ministries, interior, defense, and national security. Given the experience, most unfavorable, with the outgoing Minister of Interior Jabr Solagh who was the commander of the Badr Militia,

20. Maliki will have an easy choice to make. Either he can try to kiss up to iran and their puppet Sadr, or Maliki can throw his fate and his nation’s fate alongside America’s.

    Nothing else matters, T. Not Bader and not the “militias”.

    I don’t see what you think you are accomplishing by bringing Bremer into things. Bremer wasn’t an agent of Iran last time I checked. Nor did he train Al Qaeda members.

    And what the CIA giving out copies of the guerrilla insurgency manual to people, when it is available free online everywhere, has to do with training Iraqi Armies, is also rather unclear.

    Did you remember what were found in ministry of internal affaires prisons those who were rescued by US?

    I don’t think anyone here has claimed that Arabs or Iraqis are cosmopolitan and respects the rule of law rather than the rule of the tribe.

21. Actually, bringing up Bremer here is a Teaching moment.

    Bremer did in fact make some egregious errors. But they were arrived at using the best data to hand, and something had to be done. They were good faith efforts.

    We (the adults, I don’t include our Democrats and the rest of the Left) learned from the mistakes, and just a few days ago the prime minister of Iraq felt enough confidence in his own office and the capabilities of his own Army and Police to initiate an assault on the number one threat facing Iraq – Iran’s surrogate, Mookie.

    Act/evaluate/plan/execute… repeat.

22. What is often poorly understood is that tribalism often means much more in ME and everywhere than religious affiliation. Arabs are inherently tribal; Persians are not, and their societal structure is better described by a traditional Asian despotic autocracy. And this is tyranny which makes Arab armies inefficient, not tribal culture: the latter in form of so-called “military democracy” is rather efficient in combat. Chechen rebels had much more initiative and inventiveness in combat, than Russian troops.

23. War in Chechnya was won by using Russia-trained and armed Chechen battalions. Their loyalty can be bought by giving them enough autonomy and power above other tribes as well as financial subsidies.
    In Old Russia there was so-called “Wild Division” consisting of volonters from Muslim and other non-Christian ethnicities structured to combat units according tribal lines. In Great War it was used for most dangerous assignments.

24. Brits also were training and arming an Hindus army. Eventually they were faced with Sepoy Mutiny. This risk is inherent in any such enterprise, but it is much less if there is a consensual aboriginal government.

25. Ymarsakar,

    I think you either been ignorant or you like to divert the talk far from the realities which is most if not all of the guys in Iraqi government (what you call them majority Shiites) are Iranians creation, supported and Iranian hearts loyalty in their chess). It’s not hard to find unless some of you made his mind by ignoring all the facts of their 20 years history and their behaviours now in Iraq.

    Well tell me what you call a guy after one month of invasion went to Tehran standing their calling Iraq to pay 100 billion to Iran in compensation while he is for 20 years crying about the Iraqi in the south and his country in carnage and need to be rebuild and “His” people in Iraq in dispirit in need for public services and food and all of that?

    Finally while you talking of rule of law in Iraq look to you men who fogot to obay rule of law.
    Read this which is by American went there inside Iraq who telling that these Police criminals brigades “Death Squads” withdraw back for re-trained!!! Imagine those you mentioned who “drill holes in people decapitate them, goes for retrained?
    Do these terrorists and criminals need more training or they should bring to the rule of law?

    BARNEY PORTER: Something is being done now, but it’s a tacit acknowledgement of that man’s claim.

    Iraq has demobilised an entire police brigade suspected of links to sectarian death squads, and moved it to a US military base for retraining.

    The announcement follows two recent mass abductions by death squads in Baghdad.General Caldwell says problems with the unit were discovered after a routine review of the Iraqi forces.

26. The delays to get proper Iraqi army not as you think due to tribalism culture.
    Before the American invasion of Iraq, you had one of the most secular, and brutal, governments of the Middle East. There was a fierce separation of religion from the running of the state. Now, after the fall of the state and resulting turmoil, If you’ll ignore that Iraq was a melting pot of many different ethnic and cultural groups, not to mention a massive gap between Iraqis living in the cities and those living in the countryside AND totally discount the Kurdish ETHNIC and CULTURAL minority, then I guess you can say tribalism culture do play their part, however, nowhere near the importance many seem to think.

    The minister of civil war:
    Bayan Jabr, Paul Bremer, and the rise of the Iraqi death squads

27. The thing about a melting pot, Truth, is that it has to *melt*. A brutal dictatorship that gasses one group and tries to wipe out another group and manages to oppress even the majority group… not a melting pot.

28. Synova,

    Although you don’t believe in freedom of speech for others,

    But go and read 5000 years of history of Iraq and how this melting pot lived for that long without problem despite the colourful and mosaic society in that land.
    Keep in mind Baghdad fallen to a brutal invaders 16 times till now.

29. Who’s definition of “freedom of speech” are you using? The one where telling you that you’re wrong is opposing freedom of speech?

30. where telling you that you’re wrong is opposing freedom of speech?

    Excuse me what make your saying right?
    I doubt you new Iraq before may be you get knew or hear about Iraq when the name of a brutal dictatorship Saddam , THEN you can complain about a brutal dictatorship you did not suffer from him. “Until then you’ve got no right.”

    What I linked it’s a realities and things that reported as it happened were is wrong in telling them? Or you still under propaganda of WMD and all those lies?

    Tell you more realities what’s the differences between a brutal dictatorship and your freedom and democracy that brought Iranian lover but without tribunes on their heads with their Iranians crated, founded and trained militia read these from a man was working with US in Iraq he is from inside Bremer administration and one:

    “The corroded and corrupt state of Saddam was replaced by the corroded, inefficient, incompetent and corrupt state of the new order,” Ali A. Allawi concludes in “The Occupation of Iraq,” newly published by Yale University Press.

    First came the “monumental ignorance” of those in Washington pushing for war in 2002 without “the faintest idea” of Iraq’s realities. “More perceptive people knew instinctively that the invasion of Iraq would open up the great fissures in Iraqi society,” he writes.

    Bremer, who wrote his own account of his time in Baghdad, contended his authority was undermined by “micromanagement” from Washington, where he thought officials in the administration tried “to set me up as a fall guy” for problems in Iraq.

    Though U.S. generals in Iraq repeatedly asked the administration to reinstate dismissed officers from Saddam’s army, Bremer recounted in his book “My Year in Iraq,” they were consistently refused at the highest levels. In the end, however, senior Defense Department officials sought to distance themselves from the decision to disband the old Iraqi army, and it became “etched into America’s consciousness” that it was Bremer who “had made a grave error in demobilizing the Iraqi forces,” he wrote.

    The author has been instrumental since 2005 in publicizing extensive corruption within Iraq’s “new order,” including an $800-million Defense Ministry scandal. Under Saddam, he writes, the secret police kept would-be plunderers in check better than the U.S. occupiers have done.

    Iraqi’s book takes on U.S. mismanagement

    Is he also wrong, and you are right setting in you comfort home or office writing your words claiming we are wrong madam.

31. Oplologiesto neo and oother friend here of going out of topic, but this for Ymarsakar

    تحقيقات: جامعة بغداد تفرض قيودا دينية على ملابس الطالبات
    http://www.iraqmc.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1552&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0

    This your friends Al-Hakim and Bader (sorry Iraqi forces) abuse women, and wear burkhas in Baghdad universities! these student talking these guys from “Islamic” parties send their dogs to the universities abuse women, and wear burkhas in Baghdad so are these “Wahabis” or terrorist guys “Not Bader and not the “militias”.”?

HTML tags allowed in your comment: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>