Why we fight: how change can happen in Iraq
When I began my blog, I knew I wanted to specialize in trying to explain how change of mind—especially in the political sense—happens. I’ve written here how therapy involves change on three dimensions—mind, emotions, and action—and how intervention on any of these axes can have a ripple effect to engender change on any or both of the others. Political change is no different.
But change of this sort is not easy. This is true for individuals, and perhaps to an even greater extent for societies. The human psyche is resistant to change and struggles mightily to preserve the status quo. Therapists even have terms for this: resistance, homeostasis, denial.
But change can occur, and when it does it can even be of a fundamental nature. Therapists must believe this or abandon the field.
And the same is true, strangely enough, for our effort in Iraq. If you eliminate those war critics in this country who are motivated by a hate-America agenda, and simply look at those who have bona fide objections to the war in Iraq, you might summarize the difference between those who still support our effort there and those who think we must get out now as, “the former believe fundamental change for the better is possible and is actually happening, while the latter believe it cannot and is not.”
I say “war critics” because almost all of us are war critics, including me. And there’s lots to criticize, which is true in most wars. As I’ve written many times, mistakes have been made and the costliest one was the failure to establish order there at the outset.
It’s not that the task ought to have been easy; it never was going to be that. But its obvious difficulty seems not to have been appreciated by those Americans in charge in Iraq at the time—be they primarily State, Defense, or both. Resources and efforts were spared that should have been concentrated mightily in that endeavor. And I fault President Bush for not recognizing this, and for letting it go on way too long—-whether through misplaced loyalty to his appointees, misplaced optimism, or stubbornness.
My position is somewhat similar to that stated by Thomas Sowell in his piece appearing today in Real Clear Politics. In it he makes the point that, despite earlier miscalculations that cost us and the Iraqi people dearly, we seem to finally be getting it right there.
And in this Sowell is backed up by an extraordinary dispatch from Iraq written by the intrepid Michael Totten. If there’s a journalist in Iraq doing better work, I’ve yet to locate him/her.
Totten has spent some time in Ramadi in Anbar Province. There’ve been some changes there, to say the least. Ramadi has gone from a city of siege and horror to one in which soldiers—and Totten—feel so safe they take their helmets off, the better to schmooze with the locals, and don’t even realize they’re doing it. The change in the attitude of the populace is obviously sincere, says Totten, and the Americans have become the heroes of the day.
What happened? Not only did al Qaeda overplay its deadly hand, but in the process of uniting to root al Qaeda out, the residents and the Americans got to know each other and to trust each other. The change went both ways, as Totten writes:
…sustained contact with the American military ”“ even in an explosively violent combat zone ”“convinced these Iraqis that Americans are very different people from what they had been led to believe. They finally figured out that the Americans truly want to help and are not there to oppress them or steal from them. And the Americans slowly learned how Iraqi culture works and how to blend in rather than barge in.
Totten reports that Ramadi now is too boring for MSM journalists to visit; apparently, it doesn’t bleed enough, so how can it lede?
The mosques are sending pro-American messages. The Iraqi military and the US forces are working together well and with mutual respect. Cell phone stores are opening.
These are changes on the behavioral, the cognitive, and the emotional level. Which came first? It seems to have been the behavioral: securing the city through military means, talking together about the task. This then affected the cognitive: observing, noticing, coming to new and different conclusions about American and Iraqi will, methods, ability, and motives. This then affected the emotional: joy, trust, relief, hope.
All three dimensions are important and necessary, but the cognitive level seems to have been a special turning point in Ramadi (cognitive therapists would be so pleased to hear this!). This is because previous thought about Americans was heavily influenced not only by errors the Americans themselves had made but by misconceptions, propaganda, false conspiracy theories, and earlier experience with other occupiers. Such belief systems can be fairly fragile if challenged, because all that is necessary is to undergo enough direct personal experience or observations to the contrary. Then the false beliefs break down because they are not supported by the evidence.
The amount of contradictory evidence necessary varies with the individual, but many people will change perceptions—and then, emotions—if enough is amassed. This causes a positive spiral: emotions improve, events are re-interpreted in a better light, and new and more cooperative actions follow.
Here’s a good example of the sort of cognitive change I mean. Totten quotes US Captain McGee as saying [emphasis mine]:
When we tell [Iraqis in Ramadi] that some of these [care] packages aren’t from the military or the government, that they were donated by average American citizens in places like Kansas, people choke up and sometimes even cry. They just can’t comprehend it. It is so different from the lies they were told about us and how we’re supposed to be evil.”
And McGee later adds:
…personal contact with Iraqis over time has disproved the conspiracy theories about how we’re supposedly here to steal oil and women.”
Apparently, these concepts were based partly on propaganda, partly on fear of the outsider, and partly on history—specifically, the behavior of the Mongols during an invasion of Iraq that took place during the 13th century, but has not been forgotten. Once challenged by direct experience of something different, it may be hard for those who’ve changed to go back to their previous ideas without new cause.
Is fundamental change what’s really happening in Ramadi? How stable are the new perceptions? Can they be repeated throughout Iraq? I certainly don’t know, but what Totten writes is encouraging. One thing I do know: if most of the Democrats in Congress were to get their way, we would never have a chance to find out.
But US Lieutenant Welch, who is stationed in Ramadi, certainly thinks the change has a good chance of sticking. I’ll let him have the last word [emphasis added]:
I did not want to come here. I was supposed to have an easy deployment in Karbala. Most guys coming out here were looking forward to combat. Not me. I had already done it. If you told me a few months ago what it would be like now I wouldn’t believe it. A little while ago we went to a soccer game. Lieutenant Tierney put it together. They have sixteen soccer teams now. We bought them uniforms, balls, water for the field, everything. They had a huge opening ceremony. Hundreds of people were there. It was incredible. Just incredible. It was a real storybook turnaround. This is why we fight. This is why what we do is worth doing.
So why can the Iraqis in Ramadi overcome millennia of tradition, centuries of history, and decades of propaganda in order to trust and respect the American military — but American liberals can’t?
Thank you, Neo – that last sentance made me cry.
Neo,
Excellent post, as always.
I’d like to emphasize one slightly peripheral point that is, I think, implicit in Totten’s comment about: ” . . . sustained contact with the American military — . . .” and also in McGee’s ” . . . personal contact with Iraqis over time . . . ” Namely, that we all need to recognize that some of these developments simply take time and consistent long-term effort.
I don’t, by this, mean to suggest that mistakes haev not been made, but I think that we should all be aware that the effort in Iraq is a complex one, and while we KNOW about the problems we’ve had going along the path we’ve chosen, we don’t really KNOW what the cost would have been had we made any of the alternate choices that are often suggested as being preferrable.
It’s easy to assume that had we made “Alternate Choice X” things would have been much better, but we don’t really KNOW that.
For example, it does seem reasonable that we should have “restored order” much earlier in the process, BUT exactly how were we supposed to do that?
We could have reached a higher level of “restored order” by deploying many more troops, and imposing tighter travel controls, etc; BUT remember that counter-insurgency is very much a “war for the hearts and minds.” If we were just a litte too ham-handed in our efforts, we might well have reinforced the impression that we were occupying conquerors and stiffened the resistance against us. That might very well have led to things being worse now than they are.
While greater numbers of troops have often been advocated, I THINK that it’s significant that we’ve never lost a fight due to lack of firepower, our problem was always locating the targets. That took intelligence, that that takes time to develop. A major reason tha tthe current surge is proving to be effective is that we’ve had the time to develop those intelligence networks.
Of course there are some critics who will say that just proves that we weren’t ready, we should have had many more troops trained in the intricacies of Iraqi culture, and many more Arabic speakers. Such criticisms are naive. It is IMIPOSSIBLE to be perfectly prepared for a task such as this one simply because we can’t possibly have enough information on hand in advance, and even if our whole army spoke Arabic, and had been “school trained” in Iraqi culture, it would still take TIME for them to be accepted.
The other point related to time, is that it’s also taken time for the Iraqis to appreciate the true nature of Al-Qaeda. When we first hesitated to “reduce” Falluja after the four contractors were killed, I thought it was a mistake, but after seeing what happened when we finally went in, I’ve changed my mind. By waiting, we allowed the Iraqis in Fallujah become fully exposed to the nature of Al-Qaeda. When we came in finally, the locals welcomed us as liberators. It was a painful lesson for the Iraqis to learn, but had they not learned it, we would still be fighting in Fallujah.
It’s only by the continual wearing down of Al-Qaeda, forcing them to become desperate and resort to attacks on Muslim women and children that the nature of Al-Qaeda has really “become apparent” to the bulk of Iraqis.
At the same time, the “sustained contact” has allowed them to get a better picture of what we’re really like.
I really don’t think that the lesson could have been learned much faster.
When the Iraq War started I didn’t find any credible expert thinking that it would be less than a 5-10 year effort (Personally, I thought it was probably a 10-20 year effort). Think about that. If it was going to take 5 years at an absolute minimum, why should we be surprised that we’re having “problems” (and that’s all that the low casualties we’ve experienced really are) after only four years.
Perhaps IF things had been done perfectly, we might have reached the present, well into the surge, conditions as much as a year ago, but I’m far from CERTAIN of that.
Every alternate approach I’ve heard suggested has its own share of uncertainties that MIGHT have developed into a worse situation than we had at the start of this year.
While I fear that I’ve rambled too much, my basic pointis that we all need to recognize that COMPLEX situations take time to solve, even in the most ideal circumstances.
Thanks again to you and your commenters for an always thought-provoking blog.
Ralph,
I think you make a good point. After years of Saddam terror, Iraqis needed time to decide for themselves what kind of country they want. The utopian macho solutions offered by Al Qaeda and insurgent leaders would be attractive to traumatized people in the short run, but they lose appeal when the thuggery becomes apparent. A slowly built foundation of recognized common goals is a more significant achievement than castles in the sky.
There is a figure about how many cops are necessary to keep order in a US city. That doesn’t include private security, which is probably an equal number. I believe the NYPD has about 44,000 cops. Not sure, but if so, it’s about 1 cop for 180 citizens. Since Iraq has three times the population, roughly, as NYC, they’d need about three times the cops, which is about the number of soldiers. But NYC was not full of heavily armed, trained groups wanting to take on the cops, and a substantial number of the population either passively nostile or at least passive.
“Restoring order” would have had the US being the bad guys directly. By not restoring order, the Iraqi looters and criminals were the ones “interacting” with the Iraqi people directly. The US was one degree of separation back. We were not as bad as if we’d been running around arresting looters by the truckload and shooting those who wouldn’t come quietly.
If you really want to know about what’s happening in Iraq why not try reading the blogs of Iraqis? Duh. That’ll tell you all you need to know. The one’s living the American occupation, as they call it. They know more about us than we know about them. They live the consequences of US policies. They can tell you more about your government’s intentions than you can tell them. They will also tell you that for every Arab Muslim place the west thinks they have “fixed” for themselves, for American interests, there are 2 billion Muslims coming from behind to burn down anything that smells like western colonization. Iraq, my friends, will never be “Won” by the West. We will give up after depleting our resources that could have and should have gone to the care of our own country which is falling down around us. Your precious administration has wasted your talents.
Wouldn’t it be nice if we could have the Marines patrol Code Pink Headquarters. Maybe the resulting peace there would calm those people’s fevered minds and allow them to change their view. (And yes, to any who might think otherwise, I am kidding about having the military shut down or intimidate political action in America.)
OK, Bonnie, you asked for it:
http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/
http://iraqimojo.blogspot.com/
http://messopotamian.blogspot.com/
Feel free to add to the list, Bonnie.
neo: excellent and understandable analysis of the factors in change. I esp. liked this part:
Such belief systems can be fairly fragile if challenged, because all that is necessary is to undergo enough direct personal experience or observations to the contrary. Then the false beliefs break down because they are not supported by the evidence.
Ralph: excellent comment. I’ve been thinking about this: In parts of Iraq, we sort of lost to Al Qaeda before we began defeating Al Qaeda. Had we never lost to Al Qaeda – thus allowing Iraqis to experience life with the true Al Qaeda – would we now be worse off? Would more Iraqis be still tempted by a siren song being sung by Al Qaeda?
I don’t know the answer. However, we might’ve gotten a fortuitous break: “losing” might allow us to “win” more effectively in the long run.
Its been an amazing 10 months:
things looked almost hopless – both in Iraq and in D.C.
Bush and Petraeus radically altered an entire military strategy and configuration
the Heartland basically forced D.C. to “wait until September”
in Iraq: the center held. Now: Phoenix rising.
Amazing.
Teflon Don over at Acute Politics has two especially relevant posts about things in Anbar. They’re about six months old, but they tell the story: http://acutepolitics.blogspot.com/2007/03/frago.html and http://acutepolitics.blogspot.com/2007/03/updates.html. There’s another one, one that he may have been forced to pull a while ago, but it’s back now: http://acutepolitics.blogspot.com/2007/03/welcome-to-coin.html.
(I used to post as Mark, but there are others using that name so I’ll stick with njcommuter.)
Hi Neo, Very good summary of the the process of changing. I switched political identification in 1998. I was a liberal but some things were starting to disturb my beliefs. A big one was perceptions of Reagan and how vilified he was. I kept reading about how highly regarded he was by many very smart people who were obviously not kooks. At the same time other views of the Vietnam era and the fall of communism and their effects were becoming more varied and nuanced as opposed to the previous cliched and sloganized ones. As I struggled with these facts my attitudes slowly changed. What pushed me over the edge was the time when Jackson and Sharpton were so feted by the Democratic party I realized that that Democrats had changed from being the party of giving a person a “hand up” to a party of cultivating victim groups. I find these attitudes regressive and cannot abide them anymore. This is also not saying that Republicans are all that great but more in line with my current beliefs. Again, very good blurb. Thanks.
“resources that could have and should have gone to the care of our own country which is falling down around us”
Bonnie, what country do you live in? Cuba, Albania, Haiti?? Last I checked there was a construction boom in my country.
I’ve been reading (and enjoying) your blog for the last little while and just had to make a comment: My son was in the 101st with Gen. Petraeus in Mosul in ’03, and he has said basically the same thing as Thomas Sowell. I also follow Totten and Yon and IraqtheModel faithfully, and it seems like we’re FINALLY getting it right. It makes me proud to be the mother of a US Soldier (and Sailor)!
Great post!
While we were piecing together an analysis of what we saw as a pattern of denial involved in Senator Clinton’s take on the testimony of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, we came across your post.
So, we’ve taken some liberties — we think legitimately — with your fundamental premise, and pressed the issue a bit.
Great piece Neo, and the comments concerning it are equally enlightening. It is shocking to come to a place where people (even the critics) seem to actually apply reason to their arguments, rather than the “You Nazi Necon murders!” criticisms you find elsewhere.
I truly hope that things are turning in our favor in Iraq. I am always a little spectacle of overly positive reports, simply because it seems that piece in a region can be quickly nullified by a few murderous individuals. God willing, that won’t happen in these places again.
Neo says:
“I say “war critics” because almost all of us are war critics, including me. And there’s lots to criticize, which is true in most wars. As I’ve written many times, mistakes have been made and the costliest one was the failure to establish order there at the outset. ”
This is very true Neo. Additionally, the definition of the mission changed drastically and too often, leading to skepticism. Confusion over all of the messages, and mission objectives from the start and the list of talking points to back it up will make your head spin:
“Augmentation”
“Wait Til September”
“New Way Forward”
“Adapting to Win”
“Stay the Course”
“Turning the Corner”
“Fresh Eyes”
“Last Throes”
“Purple Fingers”
“Rewriting History (is Irresponsible)”
“(Saddad Was) An Ally of Al Qaeda”
9/11 Link: “Pretty Well Confirmed (Atta Went to Prague)”
“Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism”
“Uranium in Africa”
“Pay for Itself”
“Mission Accomplished”
“Imminent Threat”
“Gathering Threat”
“Greeted as Liberators”
“Smoking Gun, Mushroom Cloud”
“Weapons of Mass Destruction”
“Axis of Evil”
Return on Success”
“We’re Making Progress”
“”(Debate is a) Political Stunt”
“(Even Discussing Withdrawal Contingency Plans) Reinforces Enemy Propaganda”
“The Surge Has Just Started”
“Precipitous Withdrawal”
“Support Our Troops”
“Surrender Date”
“White Flag”
“Micromanage the War”
“Embolden the Enemy”
“How Can Congress Confirm General Petraeus But Oppose His Mission?”
“Don’t Tell the Generals How to Run the War”
“Handcuffing Our Generals”
“Follow Us Home”
“Islamofascists”
“Mixed Messages (to Syria)”
“Mixed Messages (to the Troops)”
“Mixed Messages (to Iraq)”
“Slow Bleed”
“Surge”
“The World is Safer Without Saddam”
“Saddam Killed His Own People”
“Pre-9/11 Worldview/Mindset”
“Cut and Run”
“As They Stand up, We’ll Stand Down”
“Govern Itself, Defend Itself and Sustain Itself”
“Better to Fight Them There Than Here”
“It’s Hard Work”
“Slam Dunk”
Al Qaeda Link: “Al Qaeda was Present in Iraq”
“Freedom is God’s Gift to Humanity”
“Iraq is the Central Front in the Global War on Terror”
The war is a serious issue and one that divides many of us. But, I do sincerely hope for this to turn around and to finally make it right so that we can start bringing them home.
Well, at least the administration is creative enough to vary the answers to the same tired old question coming from the babies like Laura in the back seat:
Are we there yet?
Are we there yet?
Are we there yet?
Are we there yet?……
……………………………………………………………….
neo-neocon, yet another post for the ages. Let me add some thoughts.
“Failing to establish order at the outset” was a brilliant strategy. The Iraqis were given no chance to become dependent on Coalition forces, as South Vietnam became dependent on the USA in the late 1960s. The Iraqis learned they can rely on no one but themselves. They also learned that the USA was not an imperialist power, determined to annex Iraq.
There was no other way for the Iraqis to learn these lessons.
The actions of al Qaeda, in such sharp contrast to the Coalition troops, have convinced both the Arab street and followers of Islam to cooperate with the Greater Satan that is the United States of America.
This is a miracle on par with the situation in Afghanistan. So, of course, it has been criticized as premature, taking too long, ill-advised, too costly, and not properly carried out. It’s like criticizing someone walking on water for stumbling over a wave.
Looking Glass.
It’s been suggested that the chaos might have been deliberate, if not merely fortunate.
It takes a good deal to get through to some people, and to the Sunnis, only being ruled by the psychos of al Q was a sufficient lesson. Certainly one not teachable by showing pictures of non-Sunnis ravaged by terror.
The process is logically expanded to all Muslims who are notably uninterested in terror happening to non-Muslims, or, for that matter, Muslims of a different tradition. To make the lesson plain took additional severity, provided by their own people.
There’s another interesting thing overlooked somehow in all of this. The left does not seem to understand the purpose of having a military. I guess they think that they are to do charitable works or something. Time and time again, history shows us that it is important to have troops who have been in battle, to provide leadership for future wars. While I would prefer to have our military folks back home, it really would leave our country terribly vunerable. And I really hate that the left claims to support the troops when they really despise anyone who would serve. After all, they feel that the US is the cause of all the world’s problems. Why would anyone want to risk their life to serve that same country?