North Korea joins the nuclear club
North Korea is somewhat of an informational black hole. But apparently even black holes may give off a few emissions now and then. Yesterday was one of those times for North Korea, which claims to have successfully accomplished an underground test of a nuclear weapon.
The interpretation of the event is a challenge (was it actually nuclear? how large was it?), not to mention the even greater and crucially important question of how to deal with it, and what it signifies for the future.
The UN leaped to the offense in its usual way–although with a rare unanimity of opinion–and voted to condemn the act. President Bush said, in a sentence that seems loaded with irony to me, “Once again, North Korea has defied the will of the international community and the international community will respond.”
If verbal disapproval were enough to affect North Korean policy, we’d be sitting pretty right now, because everyone who matters–including main North Korean ally and supporter China–has issued some sort of reprimand to the rogue state. But even diplomats are not naive enough to think that mere words will accomplish much; the question is what sort of teeth will go along with the tongue-clucking.
Speaking of diplomats–in a strange coincidence, this test occurs just as a South Korean is posed to become (on January first) the new Secretary-General of the UN. And in another coincidence (although a meaningless one) the new Secretary-General’s name is “Ban.” Would that he could. But he can’t; the cat is long out of that particular bag.
No one quite knows what to do to be effective, which is probably one of the reasons North Korea has done what it’s done (there’s a good roundup of a variety of opinions and articles on North Korea and the bomb test here at Pajamas Media).
Economic sanctions are possible, but they impact heavily on an already-suffering population held hostage by dictator Kim Jong-il. The EU has no plans to stop its aid (which only amounts to about twelve million dollars anyway), but South Korea is pondering an end to its engagement policy with the North, according to President Roh. Japan is considering unspecified “harsh measures,” although a statement was issued that the country is not planning to go nuclear. The US is considering some version of a naval blockade, although not to the point that it would constitute an act of war.
And China, key player as the main support of North Korea and vital to its continued existence as a minimally functioning economy, is somewhat of an enigma itself. Here’s an attempt by Joe Katzman at Winds of Change to solve the riddle of the Chinese sphinx. It’s well worth reading, although very sobering. The main thrust is the thought that, even though there are some drawbacks for China to a nuclear North Korea, there are many possible advantages that would lessen China’s motivation to really stop them:
…friction with the USA, paralysis that keeps their North Korean client safe from retaliation, and positioning Korea psychologically to be responsible for the North later (but not, for instance, for starving North Korean refugees now)… all are exactly what China’s doctor ordered from a geo-political perspective.
If Katzman’s analysis is correct (and it seems as good a one as any other I’ve read so far), perhaps the best thing to come out of the North’s nuclear test would be if South Korea drops its seeming naivete regarding its other half.
How did it come to this? Clinton played for time and helped create the monster through his own naive policies; the Bush administration was left holding the bag but never could figure out what to do with it. And the international community’s response to the lack of proof of weapons of mass destruction post-Iraqi war has shifted the burden of proof in a way that’s singularly unhelpful.
Of course, North Korea–unlike Saddam prior to the war (although it may be that his pose was just bravado), or Iran’s behavior now–isn’t trying to hide anything. On the contrary, the North is flaunting its newfound toys. But one thing is certain: the whole world is watching to see what will happen next, because how the world deals with this threat will set a tone for future threats. And future threats are bound to come in the age we appear to have entered now, that of relatively easy nuclear proliferation.
One thing surely needs to be done – enchance efforts to create functioning anti-missile defence. Provide all possible cooperation in this with Japan and South Korea.
Here is what Bush did with the “bag” he held from Clinton’s “naive” policy:
In 2002, three months after the “Axis of Evil” speech, Bush declared:
“…it is Vital to the national security interests of the United States to furnish Up to $95 million in funds” to North Korea for the construction of a light water reactor, at the same time waving the requirements that:
(1) the parties to the Agreed Framework have taken and continue to take demonstrable steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;
(2) North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework; and
(3) The United States is continuing to make significant progress on eliminating the North Korean ballistic missile threat, including further missile tests and its ballistic missile exports.
So basically Bush threw the bag away and gave NK almost 100 million dollars to boot, along with all of our rights to inspections. Throw in alot of belligerent rhetoric, a refusal to negotiate, and voilé : Nuclear bomb test.
But hey, he looked tough on NK, so that’s what matters I guess.
You also write:
the international community’s response to the lack of proof of weapons of mass destruction post-Iraqi war has shifted the burden of proof in a way that’s singularly unhelpful.
But you don’t think the international community’s response was inappropriate in any way, right? I mean, we said we knew exactly where they were. And then could never produce them. What is the correct response to that?
Might not another way to put this be: “The failure to find WMD in Iraq has mean Bush has lost all credibility among the international community in thse types of situations.”
This “Dear Leader” is patently crazy, paranoid and unpredictable. No policy with such guys can give any certainty of success.
I see a poster has chanted yet again the mantra of the “International Community” and its supposed role in approving U.S. actions and policies. It seems that the international community, if measured by volume of rhetoric, is composed mostly of France, Russia,China, Germany, various Scandinavian countries, Iran, Hugo Chavez, Castro, North Korea, and assorted thugocracies and kleptocracies in Africa and elsewhere, which have made the UN such a resounding, effective and efficient success.
I would not want their hands, most often turned to us in a begging motion, handling any Staples–type certificates of approval anytime soon.
Unknown,
I’m getting real sick of this stuff over WMD. I clearly remember reading in a top German newspaper in the run up to the war that German intelligence thought Saddam had WMD (to say nothing of the mass murders, the rapes by Udai, etc, etc). And I clearly remember a certain German chancellor who torpedoed the multilateral pressure on Saddam. Go back to original sources instead of reading politically opportune rewrites. And why do you assume that that the international community has only selfless highly moral reasons for its positions? You need a course in street smarts.
Bush did not “throw away the bag” until October of that year. The memorandum cited above was a continuation of Clinton’s policy through a agreement that Carter had negotiated. You may want to review exactly what Clinton did with respect to North Korea. You may also want to review exactly what a light water reactor is – note the fuel material is nearly impossible to enrich to weapons grade material.
In October of that year is when we learned that North Korea had, in fact, violated the 1994 agreed framework and used the agreement by Clinton to build a program. The aid mentioned immediately stopped and we became (once again after the brief 1994 framework) enemies. Up until that time there was a large argument within the Whitehouse as to which side to follow – the newer Hawk’s plan or the older Clintonian plan.
The real moral of the story is that after March 03, NK and Iran (and Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela too) are left with no other option: it’s go “nukular” quick, or face the prospect of a unilateral American aggression!
It’s the self-preservation instinct thing.
What Saint Augustine called the “Law of Nature”.
Waving a key provision of Clinton’s Agreed Framework, that North Korea must comply with all provisions of the Framework, is a continuation of Clinton’s policy?
Dr Victorino….
It appears you bounce from one blog to another with the exact same comment. That is known in some circles as laziness. I prefer to call it shallowness.
Chuck
I’ve said it before, what possible favorable outcome can be had by rejecting direct talks with anyone?
How stupid do you have to be?
(Answer: pretty stupid.)
We don’t even know exactly what NK wanted. We may have got one on the cheap for all we know. Now we have to pay a lot, no matter how you look at it. Already we have to go and beg the UN to impose sanctions because God knows we can’t do anything effectual ourselves.
What’s that, you say? We can take them out militarily? Like I said, we might have got it on the cheap if we just talked.
What a bunch of idiots we have in Washington.
I bet the people in Southern Lebanon, whose houses and fields were ruthlessly and cynically bombed by thousands of cluster bombs by Israel in the last days of the war this past summer (those cluster bombs are still causing casualties), consider nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel to be much more dangerous than nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea.
Out-of-control nuclear powers like Israel need to be disarmed first, before we get too worried about North Korea.
Keith Ackermann:
Like I said, we might have got it on the cheap if we just talked.
Well, talk is cheap.
The provision was never remotely enforced – so I wouldn’t call it a “key provision”. This moved it from the de facto state to a de jure one. If you want it to be a Key Provision then nearly all of you complaints should be leveled at Clinton, the UN, and the IEAE as they were the ones that set the standard that it didn’t matter. In fact, they did their normal thing – talk tough and not follow through.
It also paved the way for us to confirm that North Korea was still persuing heavy water reactors and using the spent fuel to produce weapons grade fissionable material – them stopping that was they key provision (thus the light water reactors – they still got the power plants that they claimed were their only interest but no weapons grade material).
This Presidential command was only in effect for ~7 months of the previous 8 years of the agreement. So I also doubt it was much of a contributor to the state of their nuclear weapons program. That would have to of been a VERY busy 7 months. So, once more, the majority of blame should rest on the UN, Clinton, and the IEAE who was brokered the deal and was in power during most of that time
Inspections were simply one of the possible ways to confirm the key provision, not the key provision.
“I’ve said it before, what possible favorable outcome can be had by rejecting direct talks with anyone?”
Who has rejected direct talks with them? If both sides are acting in good faith much can be accomplished.
Ever hear of the 1994 Agreed Framework (I referenced it once in this thread)? North Korea claimed they wanted clean, cheap, and effecient power plants for their people, thus they built heavy water nuclear power plants. Unfortunately the fuel for those plants can be dual purpose and made into weapons.
So several countries entered into direct negotiations with them. They arrived at an agreement that we provide them (at our expense) with two light water nuclear power plants. In return they allow UN nuclear inspectors to monitor them so they do not produce nuclear weapons (which they, directly, stated they didn’t want anyway). They agreed but never followed up with their end of the bargain. In fact, we later showed – and they admitted – that it was subterfuge to give them the room to progress a nuclear weapons program to completion (we gave them over 8 years where we did nothing but direct talks).
So, what your rhetorical question ignores is what bad can come from direct talks? When one side is faithful and the other side is using that faithfulness to give them enough space to conduct weapons research you get what we see today. A nuclear North Korea that no longer feels the need to even bother with the pretense of talks. Had we, instead, done more than simply talk about it, wring our hands about it, or at the very least payed attention to what they were doing instead of the obvious lies they told us every time for over 8 years they may not have made it to this point. This is what happens when you have a country like North Korea and your solution is “Lets wait a little while longer, talk some more, maybe we can get out cheap” – it gets WAY more expensive.
China is a mercantile Empire, it is interested in money, money, and more money. So is South Korea.
Make it unprofitable for China and South Korea to bribe the North and to use the North as a counter to the US, and you will have achieved a major portion of your goals.
What the US should do is convince Japan, using whatever leverage we have with them (which is a lot more than we have with SK, NK, and China), to go nuclear. We will ship them nukes, provide them with nuclear submarines that may be contacted for fire support missions directly from the Prime Minister of Japan. In return, China will freak out and start making bombastic anti-Japanese and anti-American and anti-Taiwanaese speeches. The US will then make a deal, saying that if China stops using North Korea as a front to mess with the US, we will stop using Japan as a front to mess with China. Quid pro quo, something a merchant always understands.
The Chinese hate Japan, getting Japan armed with US weapons, is one way to push China’s buttons and force China to react.
You may also leverage South Korea, by pulling out troops and sending them to Iraq. Perfect solution for two problems. More troops for Iraq, and you also intimidate the South Korean idjits into doing what is good.
Neo sees things in too direct a way, in my view. You don’t get results by attempting to directly pressure North Korean with sanctions, non-serious blockade games, or any other retarded games like. If you aren’t serious about stopping North Korea with American power alone, on American command authority alone, then get your proxies to do your dirty work instead of playing pattie cake at the UN.
Bush with his UN buddies, looks more and more like some Good old boy club where nothing ever changes and the status quo is always upheld against the uppity reformers.
How do you get an iced snow vehicle out from the frozen ground? Do you pull directly on it in the direction you want it to go or do you go with an indirect method that actually works and is more efficient?
If diplomats had half the common sense of an idiot, they might actually get part of the way to global peace.
I don’t think China really likes NK having nukes either. It’s not in their interest either.
They are content to use them against us (and South Korea and Japan), however they know they do not really control North Korea and they border each other. There is a large difference between a crazy North Korea with conventional weapons and a crazy North Korea with Nuclear weapons.
One large difference in their pressure VS our is the North Koreans know we will mostly just talk, the only way we will do anything is if they attack. China, however, has no such compulsion – a threat of preemptively wiping them off the face of the earth is a real one.
Though if none of us can not get North Korea to stop being nuclear I suspect that some major parts of you plan will happen (specifically with regards to Japan).
China’s interest is predicated on China’s needs. They need a Nuclear Armed North Korean peninsula, and they do not need a unified North Korean peninsula. If you recall, the Chinese intervened back in the K War precisely because they didn’t want the US to get North Korea with South Korea, into a US ally, allied against Chinese strategic interests in the region.
Since the Chinese cannot intervene directly on the NK’s behalf without inciting war with the US or US allies, the Chinese must promote North Korea’s self-defense. What better way than to provide them with the resources, tools, and motivation to acquire a nuclear shield. It works wonders for Iran, and they don’t even have a working nuke.
Nuclear weapons work as a way to prevent American nosiness and destabilization interventions, because of the weakness of American political leaders. They know this, they would have to be blind not to. Just the threat is enough to make America back off. An actual test and demonstration, is enough to get America entirely off NK’s back. This is in China’s interest because it stabilizes the region, it just stabilizes the region for the side of evil, but China doesn’t care about that. So long as China is making money off the poor classes, and nobody is fighting near their borders, everything is okay.
Exploiting the enemy’s weakness is something the Chinese almost invented, via Sun Tzu. They know Bush’s weaknesses, so they must know how to best utilize their North Korean buffer zone proxies to effect.
If North Korea does not have nukes, China will have to deal with the situation directly. Merchants don’t like dealing in the hands on jobs, that is for their employees to do, their proxies.
North Korea acts as a buffer. China is not interested in controlling them. Buffers control things by themselves.
There is a large difference between a crazy North Korea with conventional weapons and a crazy North Korea with Nuclear weapons.
it is not as if China is worried that North Korea might blow China up with nukes. North Korea knows what would happen then. Crazy people, that seek nukes in order to preserve their lives against US invasion, are not all that crazy when you think about it. Their logic makes sense. If China thought the US would blow the pock of the North Korean peninsula WITH nukes, if NK GETS nukes, then that is another thing. But China knows Bush, knows Bush’s weaknesses, and knows how Bush loves dilly dallying at the UN. So long as North Korea uses the nuclear shield to prevent American and South Korean “reunification”, China doesn’t care what NK does.
Plausible deniability also allows the Chinese to distance themselves from the North Koreans and say “we didn’t do anything, it is your problem, and Kim is the source”.
That way, the Chinese sit back, and watch the river. When Bush acts out of character and uses a nuke on North Korea, the Chinese will back the strong horse that they think will win, which would
That way, the Chinese sit back, and watch the river. When Bush acts out of character and uses a nuke on North Korea, the Chinese will back the strong horse that they think will win, which would be America. If Bush does nothing but talk at the UN, the Chinese will continue helping North Korea, because the Chinese want to be on the winning side for their interests, which is North Korea.
Every plan that you have, your opponents have a counter to it. That is why the direct approach almost never works.
Well, now we know where the WMD’s are, and they are in North Korea apparently. Where will they go from here? A N. Korea short on cash and, well, any semblance of an economy meets a third world market starving for nukes. What to do, what to do (besides point fingers)?
All of that assumes that North Korea is a Chinese puppet.
Unfortunately they are not. There are many scenarios where a nuclear North Korea is a threat to China. None where a conventional North Korea is a threat.
For one thing China is still industrially growing and they are well within North Korea’s sphere of ability to attack. One nuclear bomb in Beijing and China is in a world of hurt.
Having nuclear capability also gives North Korea the ability to say “screw you” to China in a way that they never could before. That’s as bad as anything else to the Chinese.
Lets face it – the fact that China and Japan met in Beijing for the first time in 5 years and issue a *joint* statement ought to tell how little China cares for North Korea to do this (for one thing they it makes them have already joined a side in your scenario). That had to hurt for both sides as much as they dislike each other.
I am sure they do not want a unified Korea (in fact, I doubt almost anyone does – makes them too powerful for Japan, ruins the souths economy, China likes the buffer, and the north wants to rule itself without Kim Jong Il).
“I’ve said it before, what possible favorable outcome can be had by rejecting direct talks with anyone?
How stupid do you have to be?
(Answer: pretty stupid.)”
Keith Ackerman
You have to be extremely stupid to not see the drawbacks of going solo, too.
Your vague Mantra makes you feel good and gratify yourself with hate and assigning blame, that’s all it does. It bears no relationship to solving real problems.
Gee, haven’t visited here in awhile. Same old stuff; it’s all Clinton’s fault, the Foley scandal is all the fault of the Democrats in congress, Katrina was a local problem for the locals to solve, nobody could have forseen terrorists using planes as missles, yada yada. What uncritical and self-serving horsesh*t. The fact is 9/11 happened on Bush’s watch, as did Iraq, Katrina, Abramoff, Mandatesboygate, and on and on and on. This blog should really be renamed “Blogging for the Braindead” but that would be an insult to braindead people everywhere.
All of that assumes that North Korea is a Chinese puppet.
No, all of that derives things from a strict deductive methodology. I didn’t even the Winds of Change article, and I came to the same conclusions more or less. Because I started through reducing it to the fundamental deductive principles and premises.
The only way you can assume that China is not backing North Korea, is to believe that North Korea is hurting China’s strategic and economic interest. That is not a belief a person can justify considering what is going on now, in this century.
You fight so hard to separate China and North Korea, for the weakest of reasons. Which is that you believe that you know China’s interests better than the Chinese. That is not apparent nor is it something you’ve debated. It is simply assumed, erroneously in my view.
There are many scenarios where a nuclear North Korea is a threat to China. None where a conventional North Korea is a threat.
It’s not about North Korea. A nation’s interests are calculated using the sum total of events, not just one country isolated.
You’re looking at it in the short term, of what immediate things, the direct method. When there are other factors for how North Korea’s armament status affects the Chinese.
For one thing China is still industrially growing and they are well within North Korea’s sphere of ability to attack. One nuclear bomb in Beijing and China is in a world of hurt.
And the reason why North Korea would do this is because….
Kim got the nuke so he could survive, not so he could committ suicide by China.
There’s no inherent motivations in your scenarios other than arbitrary ones. It’s not clear why people would act the way you describe them as acting. Where from my side, it derives from deductive principles on human self-interest, how China and North Korea will act. That is how my position is constructed. But yours are constructed a little bit differently.
Having nuclear capability also gives North Korea the ability to say “screw you” to China in a way that they never could before.
No reason for them to do that either, and a lot of reasons for them not to do it given that the US, Japan, and South Korea are like a missile’s flight away from Kim’s palace.
Lets face it – the fact that China and Japan met in Beijing for the first time in 5 years and issue a *joint* statement ought to tell how little China cares for North Korea to do this (for one thing they it makes them have already joined a side in your scenario).
It is plausible deniability. They talk the talk, but don’t walk the walk. As Sun Tzu taught them, war is deception.
The fact that someone “talks” doesn’t mean they’ll do what they said they would. Your presumption of this rather uncertain conclusion, is inconsistent with the history of diplomatic games even back a few years with Clinton with China and Clinton with NK.
The foundation of your argu
The foundation of your arguments don’t make sense, and it isn’t internally consistent in any logical fashion that I see.
At one moment you refer to China using North Korea as a buffer, at another moment you talk about how China fears a North Korea with nuclear arsenals because they would blow up Beijing. Given that a non-nuclear armed North Korea is a very weak buffer, it makes the Chinese look like Bush giving speeches at the UN. Both beholden to and defiant of the policies he advocates. China is either killing their own interests by destabilizing their own country by aiding North Korea, or China is not aiding North Korea enough for them to act as a buffer. This kind of conflict deprecates China’s diplomatic stratagems and underestimates their ability at manipulation and long term probability calculations.
The Chinese look at things in the long view. They have great pride in their long lasting civilization. They honestly believe that they will simply outlast all competitors. They have no need, as with Bush, to hurry onwards with wars or what not. The status quo is what the Chinese prefers, because the status quo is profitable. The best way to accomplish a status quo is a nuclear armed North Korea dependent upon Chinese shipment of logistical supplies and political support.
China knows what happened in Iraq, so they cannot be truly sure that after Bush some other President may not wish to start a Short and Victorious War in order to gain public support. It is what the Chinese themselves would do after all, to satisfy public outrage, if they could. So the best way for China to ensure that Bush the UN specialist paves the way for a satisfactory end goal for China, is to get Bush talking to the Un while China prepares for the next US President.
Former President and ex-Clinton envoy to North Korea Jimmy Carter, on CNN, June 22, 1994 (shortly after his dealings with North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung):
CARTER: What the North Koreans were waiting for was some treatment of their exalted leader with respect and a direct communication. I didn’t have to argue with him. When I outlined the specific points that were the Clinton administration’s position, I presented them to him. And with very little equivocation, he agreed. I think it’s all roses now. I’ve known that there were people in Washington who were sceptical about any direct dealing with the North Koreans. They were already condemned as outlaws. Kim Il-sung was already condemned a criminal.
Question: Are you absolutely convinced that the North Koreans are going to honour this agreement, that while talks are going on that it’s not just a matter of buying time on the part of the North Koreans, that they will not secretly pursue the nuclear program they were pushing earlier?
Carter: I’m convinced. But I said this when I got back from North Korea, and people said that I was naive or gullible and so forth. I don’t think I was. In my opinion, this was one of those perfect agreements where both sides won. We should not ever avoid direct talks, direct conversations, direct discussions and negotiations with the main person in a despised or misunderstood or condemned society who can actually resolve the issue.
I think, just as in Iraq, that the top scientists set off a big conventional blast to convince the Maximum Leader that they met their goals and save their own skins.
Now, just like Saddam, Kim Jong Il thinks he has nukes; announced to the world he has nukes; and has plans to use them, but really he’s got nothing: his scientists spoofed him to save their own families’ necks.
Now what the hell does the US do? We’ve got data that it wasn’t nuclear, and an announcement from Kim Jong Il that it was. He’s not going to believe our data that it was conventional, and his scientists are going to do everything to convince him, and the top leaders, it was real.
I believe this to be the case. Think about it.
(Yes, I was a former Military Intelligence Officer…)
…author Mark Bowden on al-Qaeda involvement in the Mogadishu battle. I believe his estimate of the degree of that involvement is accurate, though the appraisal of the impact – on that specific battle and subsequent events – may be incalculable. (Small ripples that expand with time…)
Likewise I’m sure that involvement was unknown to American intel (and any other) agencies at the time. I recall being utterly baffled by the hostility expressed by the apparent beneficiaries of our attempts to bring food to the starving. In hindsight it’s perfectly clear, of course, and by 1998 the pieces to the puzzle were all available – but as much as we’d like to we can’t use even the best information to change events in the past.
http://www.mudvillegazette.com/archives/006678.html
One could also drop hints about and then refuse to deny to the Chinese that back-channel discussions have begun with South Korea and Japan that involve America offering them a set number of working nuclear weapons from US stocks as a counterweight.
I came to more or less the same conclusions, independent of the Winds of Change article or their previous analysis.
So I have two validations, compared to strcpy’s single personal re-iteration.
I cannot honestly go with strcpy’s analysis, because it is not as strong.
I get the feeling that strcpy didn’t read the link to Winds of Change in neo’s post.
If the GOP has 2 brain cells left, they’ll hit that point with everything they have. Which means, of course, even odds at best.
Undoubtedly.
An analysis only grows stronger the more variables it takes into consideration, and the more models it is compared to. That means reading as much as you can about the Chinese and how they work, who they are. Only through true understanding of a nation’s character could anyone accurately predict where their interests lie.
Give everyone nuclear power: State Department
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/61808.htm
“At one moment you refer to China using North Korea as a buffer, at another moment you talk about how China fears a North Korea with nuclear arsenals because they would blow up Beijing. Given that a non-nuclear armed North Korea is a very weak buffer, it makes the Chinese look like Bush giving speeches at the UN. Both beholden to and defiant of the policies he advocates. China is either killing their own interests by destabilizing their own country by aiding North Korea, or China is not aiding North Korea enough for them to act as a buffer. ”
North Korea acts as a buffer because anything we do, South Korea is wiped off the map and/or Japan severely hurt. That’s a pretty damn strong buffer and is why we (including South Korea and Japan) have not gotten rid of it.
Also a conventional North Korea must do mostly as China states – they can not harm China and China doesn’t care what happens to South Korea. So not only do they get a modest physical buffer (we would pretty much have to go through North Korea to get to Beijing which would write off South Korea or Japan in the process) but they get a political buffer as well.
A nuclear North Korea *can* defy china all it wants. It changes things when the person you are trying to control goes from you lap dog to suddenly being able to kill you (and willing to do so).
Look at it this way – your neighbor has a fairly mean dog. People do not really want within it’s possible sphere of influence so they will not bother you. As long as the dog can not harm you that is useful – once that dog can also harm you it suddenly becomes a problem you do not want.
There is nothing internally inconsistent with that idea. North Korea is that rabid dog. China wants it powerful enough to worry it’s neighbors (and our allies) but not powerful enough to harm them.
That is the general view of how China treats North Korea – it’s not really my own idea. I know of few people who think otherwise. It also fits the facts on the ground for the last few decades perfectly, there is no need to ignore anything that disagrees with your assessment (such as claiming that the joint statement with Japan and China’s subsequent actions being really really elaborate subterfuge).
“This kind of conflict deprecates China’s diplomatic stratagems and underestimates their ability at manipulation and long term probability calculations.”
What I wrote doesn’t at all. However your whole argument is tied to the idea that China controls Kim Jong Il – and that’s pretty much a big no.
Here is what Bush did with the “bag” he held from Clinton’s “naive” policy: In 2002, three months after the “Axis of Evil” speech, Bush declared: “…it is Vital to the national security interests of the United States to furnish Up to $95 million in funds” to North Korea for the construction of a light water reactor, at the same time waving the requirements that: (1) the parties to the Agreed Framework have taken and continue to take demonstrable steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; (2) North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework; and
(3) The United States is continuing to make significant progress on eliminating the North Korean ballistic missile threat, including further missile tests and its ballistic missile exports.
So basically Bush threw the bag away and gave NK almost 100 million dollars to boot, along with all of our rights to inspections. Throw in alot of belligerent rhetoric, a refusal to negotiate, and voilé : Nuclear bomb test. But hey, he looked tough on NK, so that’s what matters I guess.
UB is usually factual but misses the boat with the above post. The memorandum he cites has to do with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, a joint initiative of the US and 7 other nations to provide North Korea with a non-weapons grade reactor for electrical power.
It was an attempt by those nations to provide a carrot – a non-weapons grade nuclear plant for North Korea – as part of the Clinton Administration’s hapless bilateral attempt(a treaty called ‘the Agreed Framework’) to keep North Korea nuke-free.
How this made Bush look “tough,” providing agreed upon funds for a program agreed upon by an administration years before his own administration, is unclear to me. It was similar to the initiative proposed not long ago to Iran – to have a non-weapons grade reactor built for them, with the non-weapons grade fuel to have been provided by some nation in Europe(France?).
Iran turned it down for the same reason it didn’t work with North Korea: Neither of these countries has any real interest in using nuclear energy for generating electricity. They want nukes, not electricity.