Home » Neo-neocon’s handy guide to neos, paleos, and cons

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Neo-neocon’s handy guide to neos, paleos, and cons — 10 Comments

  1. This is still, very very hilarious neo. I don’t think Bush changed all that much, however. His beliefs in the Constitution, and in compassionate conservatism, was the same before 9/11 as it was after.

  2. how do you come with so many ideas. i am trying to write on my payday loans , but can get much out of it .
    hope this helps me out. thanxs

  3. Anonymous:
    Hello? Same nomenclature but: different century, different country, different history, different culture, different issues and, most importantly, different people. It is no more reasonable to paint conservatives as neo-Hitlers than it is to paint liberals as neo-Stalins.

  4. “In general the conservatives revolutionaries-or neo-conservatives-were anti-Western, anti-Liberal, and anti-Semitic. Hence they often found themselves en rapport with the National Socialist, though for the most part the conservative revolutionaries were not Nazis in the strict sense. Nonetheless, as the 1920’s progressed, the movements represented by the two groups became more closely entwined.”

    I don’t understand you. You know these facts but you still support the neo-cons?

  5. Michael Harrington is usually credited with coining the phrase. He was the first person to use it to describe ex-Socialist, working on The Right, in the United States. These “neoconservatives” maintained many of their leftist presuppositions concerning the role of The State, but striped most of the liberal/progressive/pluralistic beliefs, from the foundation replacing it with right-wing theories. (This is why, I suspect, libertarians called them Right-Wing Socialist). Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, accepted the label with glee.

    As I did further research, I discovered that there was a Neo-Conservative movement in Germany, after WW1 to about 1933. And I think this was Harrington’s motivation for using the word. (Harrington and Kristol, being the committed leftist they were and was, would have certainly been familiar with latest stuff in sociology and all things anti-fascist).

    “In the decade and a half between the close of World War I and the assumption of Adolf Hitler the German people faced the imposing tasks of absorbing defeat in the war, of adjusting to a peace settlement universally regarded in Germany as unjust, and of coping with armed insurrection, runaway inflation, reparations payments and the depression. In response to this series crises there arose among the nationalist-minded intellectuals of the Right an ideological movement referred to by some of its participants as the “conservative revolution.” These intellectuals were “conservative” in the sense of wanting to retain or revitalize certain traditional political, economic, and cultural forms and values which they felt were more in keeping with pristine Germanic character than were the “alien” forms associated with the Weimer democracy; they were “revolutionary” because they felt that only by embracing these traditional forms and values to revolutionary extent could Germany rejuvenate her national life and restore her political power. In general the conservatives revolutionaries-or neo-conservatives-were anti-Western, anti-Liberal, and anti-Semitic. Hence they often found themselves en rapport with the National Socialist, though for the most part the conservative revolutionaries were not Nazis in the strict sense. Nonetheless, as the 1920’s progressed, the movements represented by the two groups became more closely entwined. The Nazis allowed the largely congenial writings of the conservative revolutionaries to complement their own intellectually barren ideology, while the conservative revolutionaries viewed the dynamism of the Nazi movement as the necessary practical engine for dislodging the Weimer system and opening the way to true volkisch state. Yet once the National Socialist had seized power in 1933, they quickly lost patience with the independent-minded conservative revolutionaries, while the latter soon grew dismayed by the crudeness and fanaticism of the de facto Nazi regime. As a group, the conservative revolutionaries remained true to themselves and after the mid-1930’s played no positive role in the Hitler regime.

    The Fichte Society: A Chapter in Germany’s Conservative Revolution
    Nelson Edmondson
    The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Jun., 1966), pp. 161-180.

    But the damage had been done. I have other articles from the late fifties and early sixties, which describe a movement of Germans desperate to establish German exceptionalism and preeminence within Europe. Many thought the Nazis were just crazy…but they were better than liberals and leftists, this is clear in all the writings. The Nazis were first and foremost Good Germans, who would never betray the homeland.

    I don’t know if it was Harrington or Irving Howe, but one of them, jokingly commented that Leo Strauss would have appreciated the Nazis more, if they were not so anti-Semitic. (It certainly drew lots of laughter) The Nazis were radical because they saw biology and culture were one-and-the-same. I’m assuming Harrington or Howe was also suggesting that Strauss would have no problems chucking the racial purity and striving, instead for cultural purity.

  6. For a good summary of what neo-conservatism is about, see the contributions from John Thacker in the comments to this post on the libertarian blog Samizdata.

    It might be worth adding the term “reactionary” to your list, defined as those who desperately want to avoid any change, anywhere, ever. Reactionaries may describe themselves as conservative or liberal but are in fact neither, because their political outlook is defined by fear rather than adherence to any set of principles. A lot of the people justagal refers to would fall into this category.

  7. Good stuff! Sorry I didn’t see it before, my email account has been on the fritz.

  8. Just dropping a note to tell you how pleased I am to have found your blog. While I would classify myself as an Independent, I have been appalled at much of what has been coming out the of the supposedly moderate, left-of-center types (to say nothing of the hard left).
    I think the hardest thing for me to get my head around has been their utter contempt of the common man and the blatant disdain shown for our country’s democratic process .

  9. Saddam lied; people died (including Saddam). Apparently, he was more afraid of Iran than the United States. His calculation failed him, but it was probably correct. Why should decades of feckless US dealings with thugs have intimidated anyone? Sure, sanctions were a nuissance but it’s not like they were hard to work around, especially when our allies could be counted on by our adversaries. We even demonstrated that we would not necessarily finish off an enemy just because we made war on them. Saddam validly applied lessons from our prior behavior to his situation in 2003. Maybe it was Qadaffi who made a mistake by applying the lessons of 2003 to his WMD programs without giving our long-term record the weight it deserved. Iran wasn’t so naive.

    Was the wishful forward strategy of freedom supposed to help countries become democratic (involuntarily in some cases), thereby transforming dangerous countries into grateful friends? Why not apply the policy to Iran, the original death-to-America country–especially if its menace contributed to Saddam’s recalcitrance? The golden age of the Bush Doctrine did not last long before it became apparent that the twin mistresses of pragmatism and appeasement were not to be forsaken. Did the forward strategy of freedom (let us help you) discredit or distract from the Bush Doctrine (don’t mess with us)? Helping others is nice; self defense is imperative.

    The contradiction of taking out the Baathists in Iraq while avoiding the theocrats in Iran makes me wonder about the nature of Bush’s policies. If there is a meaninful difference between the Bush Doctrine and the forward strategy of freedom, then the Iraq War seems to belong to the latter. The Bush Doctrine is dead because its namesake no longer can or will apply it, but its justification is still as simple as self defense. The forward strategy of freedom, however, is more idealistic and its justification is not as simple. Pragmatically, it could be regarded as a domino theory in which the collapse of the dominos benefits us. In principle, it is a form of altruism since imposing democracy in hope of discouraging hostility by improving some other country’s condition is considered a nobler policy than discouraging hostility by just dropping bombs on a belligerent country’s WMDs, terrorist training camps, or counterfeiting operations. Was the forward strategy of freedom, an application of neoconservatism?

    Pondering that question necessitates a definition. I understand neoconservatism to refer to the advocation of liberal values, begun by former liberals and leftists who broke from the left (and the Democrats) because they believed 60s counterculture threatened modern liberalism. Although allowing for more welfare statism than the individualistic classical liberalism favored by conservatives, neocons still uphold the free market–a stark contrast to the left’s anti-capitalism. In foreign affairs, neocons advocate promoting freedom and democracy as a valuable goal, related to conservatives’ more basic self defense orientation but regarded as more obligatory–and exactly opposite the left’s desire to reduce US influence.

    Inserting a democracy in Iraq for the purpose of making the region friendlier and less troublesome sounds very neoconservative as I understand it. Seeing the US prioritize promoting democracy above defending against Iran’s war against us, leads me to wonder if neoconservative foreign policy has caused more damage than benefit in the last few years. Our true, imperative interest of defending ourselves in the present was harmed for the sake of pursuing a romantic idea of the future. Maybe we should concern ourselves not with bringing democracy to unfree countries but with convincing them that harming the US is not a safe thing to do. The gift of goodwill is morally superior to the obligation of altruism because it is made possible by the wealth and amity that results from respecting and protecting individual rights. Our example is a more meaningful gift than material aid or the imposition of a revolution.

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