“It’s going to be years before we can rebuild those inventories,” Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at CSIS who co-wrote the report, told the Journal.

The THAAD were the systems stopping the missles from hitting the carriers, they were dangerously depleted. They cost $12.6 million per missile.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terminal_High_Altitude_Area_Defense

IMHO running out of ammo is the major factor in all things Iranian.

They may have forgotten in six weeks if there’s no more Iran news, and be on to whether there’s too much bleach in the reflecting pool or who knows what.

He claims President Trump will do nothing militarily to the twelver mullahs using metric of the last 75 days, not what President Trump has done to Iran since January 2025.

CC™-R might just as well use the last 24 hours as his metric.

What a utter unabashed unashamed maroon.

I’m guessing it’s the “should have nominated DeSantis” option. It’s always that. And DeSantis would have used his superpower of Not Being Trump to make everything work out perfectly in some unspecified way, if only we’d listened.

Unless we were/are willing to kill high numbers of civilians (and look at the criticism of Israel during the Gaza war) it would/will be impossible to kill sufficient number of IRGC members to cause a capitulation without a ground component, and we’re not conducting a general invasion ala Iraq.

We have seriously degraded their conventional military capability. If anything, the obvious truth is intelligence seriously underestimated the remaining/reconstituted missile/drone numbers. Until we can come up with a reliable missile defense that can target swarm attacks of drones/multiple missile barrages, Iran has/will again have a tactical advantage.

I think the fact that killing a sufficient number of IRGC personnel would require a high civilian casualty rate is one of the reasons the President decided another round of high intensity bombing wasn’t going to topple the regime.

General Pattern: Embedded in Civilian Areas

IRGC structure: The IRGC (and its Basij paramilitary) operates a highly decentralized network with provincial/regional commands, local bases, and neighborhood-level presence across Iran’s 31 provinces. This includes ground forces dispersed in population centers for both external defense and internal security.
Many bases, missile sites, and operational hubs are located in or near cities, towns, and populated regions rather than fully isolated remote deserts or mountains. Underground “missile cities” and facilities often sit beside or beneath civilian sites like parks, industrial areas, sports complexes, and residential zones.
This integration stems from doctrine emphasizing asymmetric warfare, survivability against superior airpower, and dual military/internal security roles. Facilities are often embedded to deter attacks, complicate targeting, and enable rapid mobilization.

There is no strict “demilitarized” separation in many cases—military assets share urban spaces with civilians.

Specific to Hospitals, Schools, and Civilian Sites

Your reading is supported by multiple reports, especially from the March–April 2026 period of US/Israeli strikes on Iran:

Iran International investigation (widely cited): IRGC and security forces moved personnel, weapons, and equipment into at least 70 civilian sites across 17 provinces. Nearly half (~34) were primary/secondary schools. Others included hospitals, mosques, stadiums, universities, parks, and government offices.
Examples: Missile launchers near major hospitals (e.g., Kermanshah); forces in schools in multiple cities (Mashhad, Dezful, etc.); deployments at stadiums and near medical facilities.

Leaked IRGC documents: Directives outline systematic use of civilian infrastructure (sheds, warehouses, sports halls, industrial sites, telecoms) as cover for missile operations, storage, and launches.
Other reports: IRGC commanders held meetings in hospitals; attempts to repurpose facilities like rehabilitation centers; broader pattern of embedding in populated areas, drawing accusations of using civilians as human shields.

This mirrors tactics used by Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Under international humanitarian law, using protected civilian sites (hospitals, schools) for military purposes can strip their protected status, though attackers must still apply proportionality and precautions.
Context and Counterpoints

Some IRGC sites (e.g., certain underground complexes or border facilities) are more isolated, but urban embedding is a deliberate, documented feature for resilience.
Iranian officials and state media typically deny systematic militarization of civilian sites and accuse US/Israel of targeting civilians. Strikes on or near schools/hospitals during the conflict caused reported collateral damage, with debates over targeting intelligence vs. proximity issues.
This setup increases risks to Iranian civilians during conflicts, as military targets become harder to isolate.

In summary, there is no consistent boundary—IRGC doctrine and practice heavily integrate military assets into civilian environments, including the specific use of schools and hospitals reported during recent hostilities. This is a recurring criticism from Western, Israeli, and independent Iranian sources.

— Grok

Here’s an estimate of the number of attacks on Iran targets during the first months of the conflict:

Targets struck: Over 13,000 targets in the main campaign (e.g., ~1,000+ in the first 24 hours; 2,000 munitions on 2,000 targets in first ~100 hours). Pace settled to 300–500 targets/day after initial surge. Additional strikes continued into June 2026 (e.g., multiple targets on June 9–10 in response to specific incidents).
Aircraft and flights: Thousands of combat flights (e.g., >13,000 reported in one March summary). Assets included B-2, B-1, B-52 bombers; F-15E, F-35, F-16, etc.; carrier-based aircraft; and extensive tanker/refueling support.
Cruise missiles and other: Hundreds of Tomahawks (e.g., >850 in first four weeks) and other standoff munitions (JASSM, etc.). Naval and air-launched strikes on ships, bunkers, radar, and missile sites.
Combined US-Israel: ~15,000+ targets by mid-campaign.

– Grok

Military planners knew how embedded IRGC targets were. President Trump specifically said regime change wasn’t our goal. It’s my understanding Mossad’s plan was to use the Kurds as the beginning ground operation. This would have required a protracted support phase to the ground forces. Add this to the fact the Persians were against that plan along with the President/US planners it was never given an opportunity.