Apologies for this, I also replied to you over in the new Open Thread, starting here.

https://www.thenewneo.com/2023/01/31/open-thread-1-31-23/#comment-2664343

But to address your stuff here….

So I would ask, is there any NATO military hardware to the east of Germany?

To which I respond, obviously.

For a couple of reasons.

Firstly: While Baker’s “we agree” was probably reflective of not merely his personal views but that of the Bush Administration in 1990, the world of 1991 was already vastly different from that of 1990 and the Bush Administration’s opinion was not universal among all Americans, let alone all Germans or other Central/Eastern Europeans.

This is something Baker makes painfully clear when parsing his words in the source, which I quoted at greater length there.

Secondly: Baker and Gorbachev never made this assurance legally binding, probably because both knew Baker and Bush lacked the kind of broad support to make it stick the old fashioned way, in Congress.

So times changed. And not only was Bush replaced by Clinton and there became much wider support for NATO expansion (spearheaded in large part by the ex-Pact nations themselves clambering to get in against a backdrop of the Soviet periphery and Yugoslavia exploding into showers of blood), but even by the time there was a changing of the guard Bush and Baker had already started to reconsider. Especially since the Hardliner coup showed that the regime in Moscow might not always be a somewhat amiable Gorbachev.

I do think it wouldn’t be unreasonable for the Russians to think the United States was committed to containing NATO expansion.

I disagree for a few reasons.

Starting with the fact that while politics and diplomacy are famously cynical businesses involving a lot of self-serving and the Kremlin regimes have often had particularly blinkered ideas on how to interpret the world (see their misunderstandings of the Reagan assassination attempt and Nixon being given the boot), they were not utterly ignorant.

And in context, Baker and Gorbachev talk A LOT about foreign and public opinion issues, with the last excerpt featuring Baker complaining about “American conservatives” criticizing the US government’s detente with Gorbachev.

The Soviets also had a healthy knowledge and appreciation for the value of getting agreements passed through the US Congress, as we saw with arms control negotiations.

So in context I think it is fairly clear that Gorbachev at the time and Putin’s legal eagles looking back will recognize that Baker was mirroring the position of the Bush Administration in 1990, but A: that it was a position the Bush Admin either couldn’t (due to lack of political support ) or wouldn’t (due to perfidy/dishonesty/opportunism) cement in a treaty, and B: that the Bush Admin did not mean All Americans, let alone All of NATO.

James Baker, as Secretary of State is speaking for the United States government. Very interesting conversation, and contained many elements of perestroika, including the ramifications of German unification.

Agreed. But it also touched on the limits of a superpower intent on operating through consent, both at home and with its foreign partners. Which both Baker and Gorbachev recognize.

Which raises another thought. Do Russians consider the annexation of Donbas and Crimea something akin to the reunification Germans felt?

Probably a bunch of them do. After all one of Putin’s major propaganda smorgasborgs was a public broadcast titled “Crimea: The Road Home” or “Crimea: The Way Home” (the translations I’ve seen differ and I am a monolingual scrub). This is also something I point to when it comes to Putin admitting he lied about the presence (or lack thereof) of Russian Federation troops in Crimea in 2014.

The big difference however is that neither the GDR or FRG ever unilaterally conceded the claim to be the sole legitimate German government. Both went out of their way to avoid this, and retained hopes for reunification long into the future.

In contrast, the Russian Government formally recognized Ukraine as independent within its existing borders in 1994.

If that’s the case, Russian tolerance for the war will include the expectation that the Donbas and Crimea remain Russian territory.

I definitely agree that’s true within the forseeable future, especially for Crimea and the Eastern Donbas.

The issue is that much like East Germany, that project’s already started to run into issues. There’s a reason why the maximum “Separatist”/Russian occupation in the Donbas capped out at around 2/3rds in 2014-2015 before slingshotting back down to somewhere between a third and a fourth. The Kremlin SERIOUSLY overestimated how popular “reunification” would be among the traditionally Russophone, often ethnically Russian, and typically pro-Russian/”Blue” populaces. Or at least unification by these methods. Which is proving to be an issue.

What is the code for shading block quotes?

I do not know. Perhaps we could ask our host?

This probably sums it all up.

I feel like I’m cramming for a history final, reading through Turtler’s commentary from the 1/26 comment section. Truly information overload.

Apologies for that. It is one of my strengths and weaknesses.

NATO expansion requires unanimous consent by the members. The US could have prevented expansion eastward. Why not just say, based on the aggressive actions of Russia, those assurances given by the west were no longer valid?

For starters because most of the “assurances” cited didn’t rise to the level of assurances. There’s something incredible about seeing Putin try fanatically to turn the conditional assurances by Baker about the opinion of himself and the Bush Administration into official assurances from all of NATO that NATO/the US/etc “broke.” When again, the context of Baker’s statements make it very clear that isn’t the case.

(Maybe there are other documents that do fit that description that I haven’t read, I’ll have to slowly work through them. But this specific document isn’t so, in contrast to the claims of the co-authors.)

But another is because those times when assurances were given, they were generally A: Given to a Soviet regime under Gorbachev that would soon cease to exist, B: Given unofficially or by the politicos involved personally (like Baker and Major), or C: Both.

And finally, they consistently emphasized the need to be sensitive to the opinions of the various Central and Eastern European states and public, as well as their own.

Especially since – again -the wonders of Western politics meant that just because Bush agreed with Gorbachev about not expanding NATO did not mean that he wouldn’t be voted out and replaced by people of a different mind (which is one of the key inflection points of the co-authors).

In short, Putin’s looking to muddy the waters and detract attention from more recent and binding assurances like Budapest and Astana that he clearly broke, and is counting on unfamiliarity with the source material to help do it. I’m also of concurrence with Neo that nothing in these documents would justify the invasions of Ukraine and elsewhere (especially since the invasion of Ukraine in particular was not over NATO membership – which was only a distant possibility for Ukraine and not one it was particularly interested in prior to 2014 – but over a trade deal with the EU turned constitutional crisis in Ukraine).

Speaking of coups, wasn’t the 2020 election in reality a bloodless coup by the left?

I’d say so, with the caveat that it wasn’t so bloodless.

When is the last time The US military took over a foreign country, and made it the servant of the US: not the War in Afghanistan, not the 2003- War in Iraq, not the Persian Gulf War.

In the 20th century and after, the US hasn’t been really keen on- going to war, and using wars to take over other nations.
Since WW2 + The Korean War, the US + The US military haven’t been fond of going to war at all.

I have read news reports, that when the Berlin wall was being torn down, around 1990, that- Putin was a KGB soldier in East Germany, he watched in dismay as the wall was being torn down.

The wall being torn down was a symbol of the very real events of: the Communist + repressive…Soviet Union and the Communist + repressive…puppet nations of the USSR…including East Germany, collapsing before the world’s eyes.

The USSR and East Germany were harsh, dictator governments that Putin thought the Eastern-European nations, and the rest of the world, wanted and needed.

News reports that I have read said- that Putin, since The USSR fell, in 1991- has been making plans to: use the Russian Military to go to war- an retake all of the countries of the USSR, and make the USSR, all over again.

But this isn’t Russia’s 1980s + 1990s, anymore.

Putin is stuck back in the 1980s, and wants the ex-Soviet nations to be pulled together again, so he can [bring back “The good old days” of the Soviet Union].

But the world has moved on, leaving the USSR behind, + the world wants more freedom and more economic freedom than the USSR ever gave to people.

The USSR is like the 1950, Chevy car- a machine that people used in the past, but there is no use for it today, and there is no use for it in the future.

Putin is routing and cheering for a country, that doesn’t exist anymore.

Vlad looking for rationalizations to justify his aggression? Shocked! Shocked!

This probably sums it all up.

I feel like I’m cramming for a history final, reading through Turtler’s commentary from the 1/26 comment section. Truly information overload.

NATO expansion requires unanimous consent by the members. The US could have prevented expansion eastward. Why not just say, based on the aggressive actions of Russia, those assurances given by the west were no longer valid?

Speaking of coups, wasn’t the 2020 election in reality a bloodless coup by the left?

Imperial Russia used to control Poland and much of the rest of the Baltics. They used to effectively control (proxies and toadies) half of Germany and all of eastern Europe; you do remember that thing called the last century? Some Roosians speak of reestablishing that Imperial Roosia, or are you deaf to that?

But, but, but NATO.

re: Ray Dalio’s book. https://www.culturcidal.com/p/why-legendary-investor-ray-diallo

“according to Dalio, there’s about a “1-in-6 chance of severe internal conflict” in the US and we’re right on the precipice (there are some indicators he uses in the book) of a “1-in-3″ chance of a civil war.”

In my opinion, the only way we avoid civil war is for enough Democrat voters to develop a bit of moral discernment and refuse to support the totalitarians’ cancellation of the constitution. Starting with joining the demand for honest elections.

“So the most Baker is TALKING ABOUT is whether or not NATO military hardware or “jurisdiction” will be spread further East.” -Turtler

So I would ask, is there any NATO military hardware to the east of Germany?

This was also part of the transcript:

“Baker: I want to ask you a question, and you need not answer it right now. Supposing unification takesplace, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisprudence or troops will not spread east of the present boundary?

Gorbachev: It is quite possible that in the situation as it is forming right now, the presence of American troops can play a containing role. It is possible that we should think together, as you said, about the fact that a united Germany could look for ways to rearm and create a new Wehrmacht, as happened after Versailles. Indeed, if Germany is outside the European structures, history could repeat itself.”

I do think it wouldn’t be unreasonable for the Russians to think the United States was committed to containing NATO expansion.

James Baker, as Secretary of State is speaking for the United States government. Very interesting conversation, and contained many elements of perestroika, including the ramifications of German unification.

Which raises another thought. Do Russians consider the annexation of Donbas and Crimea something akin to the reunification Germans felt? If that’s the case, Russian tolerance for the war will include the expectation that the Donbas and Crimea remain Russian territory.

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16117-document-06-record-conversation-between

What is the code for shading block quotes?