No one disputes that Saddam was a bad man. But as had been noted, the worst of his purges was over.

Ask the Kurds or the Marsh Arabs if they believe that.

Saddam was incapable of purging the former with as much brutality or thoroughness as he did in the 1980s not because of a lack of will or malice, but a lack of means: Allied enforcement of No-Fly-Zones in the North deprived the Iraqi central government of a traditional advantage it enjoyed for half a century over internal rebels and allowed the Peshmerga to fight Iraq ground forces up close, where they stood decent chances of winning. The Marsh Arabs had no such luck because while the Southern No Fly Zone also covered it, they lacked the demographic strength or military organization to offset the fact that Saddam’s armies already occupied their land, and so the slaughters and displacements continued apace.

His ruthless consolidation of power is textbook dictator– make extreme examples of power, and the remaining will clap in fear until their hands bleed.

That fits for his consolidation of power over the Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi Government, but doesn’t change either his internal campaigns or the less… savory aspects of the Hussein Government (the Iraqi one, not the American one) in office. Allowing your eldest son Uday and other leaders the ability to do things like rape underage children in detention centers hardly benefitted Iraqi stability in a conventional sense but it is what happened.

While Saddam was meddling in ME affairs, Iraq did provide a counterbalance to Iran.

True to a certain extent, but I think this has to be measured against the undeniable harm he was doing. Especially the shapes such “counterbalance” took, such as post-9/11 bidding wars with Iran to see who could provide more support to AQ franchise orgs without it destabilizing their government.

After his overthrow, the destabilizing effects of Iran in Syria, Lebanon, Somalia and other areas and now their support for Russia’s efforts in Ukraine are a direct result of Saddam’s overthrow.

Sorry, can’t agree; Iran was very much active in those other regions before Saddam had his card punched and while we can say that being done gave them more leverage, it didn’t create the problem.

In sharp contrast to the destabilization and particularly the amount of internal leverage Iran gained in Iraq with the ascendant Shiite Majority, which is a direct result of Saddam being dealt with.

The Bush administration’s miscalculation of this result neutralized any positive outcomes.

I can’t agree, especially given what we now know of Saddam’s financing for the likes of Abu Sayyaf. The issue is it should have been managed better.

Chalabi certainly gave cover for the administration pre-invasion. Did the administration really believe him?

Probably a little bit of yes and a little bit of no; I know a lot of veteran Middle Eastern hands had him pegged as a buffoon from the start and some were probably in the Bush Admin (and Totten – before he went full BDS – pointed out how many journalists would not even take notes when he spoke), but he was still a high profile and reasonably connected Iraqi Exile that could at least seem competent to some, so others did.

And there was the not-so-golden-mean of being skeptical of much but believing others.

Re: the Foreign Policy Piece, I can agree with some of its points but I believe on the whole they are seriously missing the plot in most aspects.

“The Donbass has consistently supported Ukraine’s most retrograde, anti-reformist, anti-European, pro-Russian, and pro-Soviet political forces. It was the Donbass that made Viktor Yanukovych, whose political career was dedicated to bringing Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit, president in 2010. It was out of the Donbass that came his corrupt Party of Regions. And it was the Donbass that opposed popular pro-democracy uprisings in 2004 and 2014.”

While this is true to a POINT, I think it is overstating matters. Yanukovych was a creature of the Donbas, but like the wider Donbas he could never have become such a monster without deep connections to the wider Ukrainian and Russian political landscapes, including the central bureaucracies in Kyiv and Moscow. Which I think is a good point on the whole and does not necessarily recommend a separation of the Donbas from Ukraine.

Moreover, I think this seriously overestimates the degree to which the wider Party of Regions signed up to the worst of Yanukovych’s crimes, given how they ultimately turned on him and supported his removal from office, as well as the degree to which the Donbas is inherently “retrogressive.” There’s a reason why prior to the 2022 invasion the Kremlin could only sustain occupation in about a third of the Donbas; public support was just not there.

“Russian President Vladimir Putin’s occupation of the eastern Donbass in the summer of 2014 effectively disenfranchised its voters. That was bad for the voters, but it enabled pro-democratic forces in unoccupied Ukraine to win the presidency and control of the country’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada,

There are few more braindead takes than this.

Yanukovych had so polluted the “anti-democratic forces” in Ukrainian politics that a shift to the Orange, “Pro-European” faction was all but inevitable in the next invasion, with a “Pro-Democratic/Pro-European” caretaker government being appointed in a compromise between the Regionnaire/Blue Majority in the Rada and the Orange/Euromaidan leaning minority in the Rada and mass popular movement. Indeed, the Regionnaires were going into the 2014 election denouncing Yanukovych and running to one degree or another as Orangists-Lite, at least for this election.

Which means that a “Pro-European” outcome of the vote was all but inevitable. And most of us who were regular Ukraine watchers knew it, including the Kremlin. Which is one reason why it timed the invasions to be when and where they were, in order to exploit the weakness of the caretaker government(s) to try and force a fait accompli.

But on top of that, there is the fact that the Russian invasion *DID NOT* in fact “disenfranchise” all the voters of the Donbas; only those in the areas that were occupied, and particularly those occupied prior to the 2014 elections. Which was relatively small.

And reading the author, Motyl is a Ukrainian but also an anti-Donbas crumudgeon who has been pretty scathing of the region and its people for a long time and I think has this overly color his view.

In particular, you COULD make similar arguments in regards to Crimea, but Motyl doesn’t… probably because while the populace in Crimea is if anything MORE pro-Russian than that in the Donbas nobody can deny Crimea’s strategic and economic benefits in contrast to the Donbas Rust Belt. Which makes Motyl’s suggestion reek of hypocrisy and motivated “reasoning.”

in 2014. Most of the reforms that have been adopted in the past five years—along with Ukraine’s steady march toward Europe—would have been impossible had the Donbass remained a part of Ukraine.”

Again, provably false. Look at the territorial possessions around the 2014 elections. Also look at how the Regionnaires were posturing themselves at the time. It would probably have been less far-reaching or drastic, but still present.

“If the eastern Donbass is brought back into Ukraine’s fold, many of these changes could be reversed or stalled,

Even if this were true, it would have to be measured against Ukraine’s territorial integrity being rebuilt and more strategic depth to protect it against a Russian invasion. Also, I’m going to go out on a limb here and guess the people of the Donbas have by and large not gotten more pro-Russian during the occupation than they were. Being at the mercy of people like Strelkov and suffering mass conscription is hardly going to make favorability ratings increase.

and whatever hopes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has for pursuing more reform would be dashed.

I would argue that EVEN if that were true -and I really don’t think it is, especially when you factor in how these regions would likely have legal justification to exclude many of the most pro-Russian powerbrokers from holding office – I would argue it is a necessary evil compared to allowing a permanent dismemberment of Ukraine’s sovereign territory.

By the same token, Putin would be emboldened by Ukraine’s appetite for self-destruction to make even greater encroachments on its sovereignty.”

And this is where I think Motyl’s bias REALLY shines through. A violent, decisive repulse of Putin’s encroachments on its sovereignty would embolden Putin to try more?

It might not completely DETER him from doing so, as the costly defeats North of Kyiv and now in Kherson underline, but I doubt it would make him more eager to do so. Especially in light of how when the Kremlin faced military defeats it moderated its desires, such as how “Novorossiya” was abandoned by about 2015, only to be dug up in the wake of advances in the open war in 2022, only to now be suffering losses due to things like the liberation of Kherson.

Interesting opinion by FP, and possibly a realistic statement of the need to recognize the intractable nature of the dispute between Donbass separatists and Ukraine.

For the reasons above, I really do not view it as such. Especially since the “Donbass Separatists” are by this point primarily Russian Federation military forces and members of “The Organs.” Donbas Separatism was never PURELY an astroturf, but it was also never primarily homegrown or organic even in comparison to Crimea (and while Crimea had a much more prevalent and vested autonomy/secession movement what mattered was the Russian Fed Spetznaz deployed there).

The main reason the “Donbas Separatists” are intractable is because of the Rus Fed Government and regulars.

Another point worth considering is this from Donbass separatists. Couldn’t the same principle that allowed Ukraine to declare its independence from the Soviet Union be applied to other regions that didn’t share the same allegiance to Ukraine?

Not in the way it happened, absolutely not.

Firstly: the referendum for Ukrainian independence was quite telling and binding throughout its territory, with majorities even in the Donbas and Crimea. It was also remarkably honest by the standards of Post-Soviet Space Shenanagins. That created a binding allegiance to Ukraine – reflected in the Constitution – that could not be undone easily.

Secondly: the main avenue for negating it would be another honest vote. Which is absolutely not what happened. Instead either a foreign military force illegally occupied Crimea and much of the Donbas, created local puppet organizations, and shoehorned in a laughably illegitimate, corrupt vote to get the result it wanted… or said local “separatist” organizations invited a foreign invasion and occupation and did said vote.

I think the evidence points to the first case as being the more likely, but in either case which one is true is less important than the fact that both are utterly illegitimate. Especially since the Kremlin has steadily rejected all offers by even Zelenskyy and other relative doves for a legitimate plebiscite in the Donbas on condition of demilitarization and internationally supervised elections.

I understand the reluctance of the west to endorse such an idea, but in the case of Donbass, the referendum of 1994 shows overwhelming Russian influence.

And that was before years of tariff wars, the extent of Kremlin corruption, and now military occupation

Part of the problem, is of course, whether Russia could be trusted to keep any treaty, if the eastern region was given the choice of integration with Russia,

Answer; No.

Putin has been “kind” enough to establish and re-establish this multiple times over.

as did Crimea in 2014, the results of which were disputed. What would the results be if a secure election were held?

I’d argue they are relatively immaterial for a number of reasons, but starting with the fact that the Kremlin has shown it has zero interest in a secure election being held.

Also, saying the results of the Crimean Referendum of 2014 were disputed is being generous. While I for one COULD see Crimea voting to join Russia by majority, the amount of arm twisting and corruption involved showed Putin was not willing to allow an honest vote in the most.

“the text of the Act on the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine is also interesting. It refers to “the deadly danger hanging over Ukraine in connection with the coup d’etat in the USSR on August 19, 1991”. Excuse me, but did Crimea not hold its own referendum on 16 March 2014 for the same reason?

Excuse me dumbfuck terrorist shill (Not you Brian E, but the person you are quoting), but no, it did not hold “its own referendum for the same reason.”

Firstly because there was no coup in Kyiv in 2014. There was the democratically elected, Regionnaire-dominated Legislature jettisoning its Presidential Cabinet on grounds of failure to carry out his constitutional duties. This is in SHARP contrast to Yazov and the gang arresting Gorbachev in secret without due cause and trying to impose martial law.

Secondly: Crimea didn’t hold its own referendum; the thinly-veiled Russian military occupation force did so, and did so in a laughably illegitimate and rigged manner that confers no legitimacy and tells us nothing about the wishes of the people in Crimea. Especially when you realize that the Rada members from Crimea were still present and holding office in Kyiv during all this time.

“Proceeding from the right to self-determination provided for by the UN Charter and other international legal documents” – does this only apply to Ukraine, but not to the Crimea, Donbass and other regions?”

It applies to Crimea and the Donbas and other regions, which is precisely why no vote held under the conditions Russia imposed in said regions in 2014 can be respected.

It is SELF-Determination, not Violent-Neighbor-Determination.

And you Mr. Donbas Insider Writer (not you Brian E; sorry for this) probably know that enough, which is why Mr. Donbas Insider has to fall back to the old canard that an abusive, tyrannical, and unconstitutional dictator being ousted by his own legislature amounts to a “coup.”

So “neocons” posting comments is a good thing or not?

And you consider yourself a con?, paleo con?, proto con?, philo con?, pseudo con?, or just a Dr(Md) con? Dr cons are not to be confused with Phd cons.

It turned out that extreme conservatives were not ex cons, nor conservative after all.

I’ve noticed that “neocon” is one of those words that are now defined any way the speaker or writer wants to define them, becoming a protean label of opprobrium.

“The Donbass has consistently supported Ukraine’s most retrograde, anti-reformist, anti-European, pro-Russian, and pro-Soviet political forces. It was the Donbass that made Viktor Yanukovych, whose political career was dedicated to bringing Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit, president in 2010. It was out of the Donbass that came his corrupt Party of Regions. And it was the Donbass that opposed popular pro-democracy uprisings in 2004 and 2014.”

“If the eastern Donbass is brought back into Ukraine’s fold, many of these changes could be reversed or stalled, and whatever hopes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has for pursuing more reform would be dashed. By the same token, Putin would be emboldened by Ukraine’s appetite for self-destruction to make even greater encroachments on its sovereignty.”

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/ukraine-better-without-donbass-costly-reconstruction-pro-russia-west/

Interesting opinion by FP, and possibly a realistic statement of the need to recognize the intractable nature of the dispute between Donbass separatists and Ukraine.
Another point worth considering is this from Donbass separatists. Couldn’t the same principle that allowed Ukraine to declare its independence from the Soviet Union be applied to other regions that didn’t share the same allegiance to Ukraine?
I understand the reluctance of the west to endorse such an idea, but in the case of Donbass, the referendum of 1994 shows overwhelming Russian influence.
Part of the problem, is of course, whether Russia could be trusted to keep any treaty, if the eastern region was given the choice of integration with Russia, as did Crimea in 2014, the results of which were disputed. What would the results be if a secure election were held?

“the text of the Act on the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine is also interesting. It refers to “the deadly danger hanging over Ukraine in connection with the coup d’etat in the USSR on August 19, 1991”. Excuse me, but did Crimea not hold its own referendum on 16 March 2014 for the same reason?

“Proceeding from the right to self-determination provided for by the UN Charter and other international legal documents” – does this only apply to Ukraine, but not to the Crimea, Donbass and other regions?”

https://www.donbass-insider.com/2020/05/14/the-donbass-referendum-of-1994-on-which-the-whole-world-turned-a-blind-eye/

Escobar was bad everyone who came after was worse same with guzman loera

Sykes means da Joos.

Unfortunately, VDH has degenerated into yet another shill for the Ruling Caste, much like Walter Russell Meade. He should stick to writing about his neighbors in rural California, if he hasn’t moved.

Uh what? Are we reading the same VDH? Because VDH has plenty bad to say about the Ruling Caste and he has not turned on Trump, for starters. Indeed, many of his most scathing columns are about the Ruling Caste and their inflated self-worth.

To which I respond: Shamshi-Adad the First, Hammurabi, Tiglath-Pileser the First, and Hulagu Khan have entered the chat.

See Barbara Tuchman on accounts of ancient atrocities.