Clinton was motivated by the mossadegh narrative, that we’ve reviewed in the past. That amir taheri in nest of spies, has debunked to make excuses for the iranianrevolutionary guard

Now W did not measureably improve the circumstance, because of iraq. Sadly as general suleimani became the kingmaker first under liz cheney then her successor who gave us maliki

It was left to Reagan to tackle the battle in beirut i think foolishly except for admiral ace lyons no one really knew what was going on

I wrote a blog about beirut and the tie to the 2009 iranian election (one of the reformists) obama was the continuation of clinton on steroids, particularly with his iran fixation

That would be my biggest regret, were I Carter.

Now, for the hysterical, a D of W does NOT mean a D Day invasion and occupation in a hopeless quest to turn Islamofascists into good little democrats. It would simply bring clarity to the conflict, and of course, we could legally seize ALL their commerce.

This loss of aid and support directly enabled the N. Viet victory.

Rep Nixon winning the “war” (1973 Peace Accords), and Dem Congress losing the peace.
Followed by Pol Pot’s Killing Fields in Cambodia (1000 murders each and every day of Jimmy Carter’s first 500 days?)
Where was Jimmy C’s “Human Rights” talk about Red China’s Pol Pot commie Cambodia? only stopped by Soviet N+S Vietnam’s invasion in 1978(?).

The biggest genocide the Baby Boomers lived thru, virtually never discussed (one Great! movie) — since the Dems enabled it.

And Jimmy C enabled the overthrow of the Shah.

His support for Habitat for Humanity was truly great (they are helping Roma build houses in Slovakia, and all over), but so much else he’s touched is terrible.

The USA has not really learned how to do post-WW II nation building; unless the idea is to copy Eastern Europe–first lose the place, let the other (Commie, Islamist) idiot-dictators destroy it, and wait for it to fall apart, hoping for huge rebuilding cronyism programs afterward (like Haiti) and the ex-commie central Europe.

That’s not necessarily a difficulty if Carter flips his citizenship to Iran.

The hostages were not in any specific danger when he ordered the rescue attempt! In fact, the attempt put them in danger. Carter knew that many hostages would likely be killed even in a “best case” successful rescue. Furthermore, a successful rescue would endanger hundreds of Americans in Iran who were NOT in the embassy. He probably decided to act due to the recent dramatic loss of public confidence in his handling of the hostage crisis, and the prospect that Iran would still hold the hostages during the election campaign. This is, of course, despicable.

The hasty decision to abort the mission was questionable. Ostensibly six helicopters were needed because RH-53s equipped with internal fuel tanks could only carry twenty passengers. However, Beckwith could have proceeded with five helicopters by removing the internal fuel tanks (RH-53s could easily reach Desert Two from Desert One with external fuel tanks alone) to make room for more people. As each RH-53 could carry 56 people without internal fuel tanks, only four would have been needed to transport 178 people from Tehran to Manzariyeh. If there were any casualties — and 45 to 70 casualties were expected — then three would have sufficed. Alternatively, the sixth RH-53 could have been flown despite its defective backup fuel pump, or could have been quickly repaired with a spare fuel pump from the Nimitz. If the RH-53 that earlier returned to the Nimitz brought the spare pump, Beckwith would have seven helicopters available!

Not to repair the sixth helicopter or improvise a solution using five helicopters was a profound failure of leadership. Also notable is the lack of determination at the highest levels. Carter insisted on establishing a communications capability that would allow him to cancel the mission until the moment the assault force entered the embassy, and deliberated only twelve minutes before ordering the mission aborted at the first sign of difficulty. One must ask, as New York Times columnist William Safire did in 1980, whether Carter ever intended more than a demonstration of resolve to bolster his public image: “Did the President see any advantage in making a feint and then withdrawing?”

See the incisive article: Richard C. Thornton and Alan Capps, “New Light on the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission,” Marine Corps Gazette (December 1991).

I don’t know where these nostrums keep coming from:

No permanent member of the UN Security Council may have their citizen appointed a General Secretary to the UN — or any other very high office within the UN.

I can’t remember if this is a soft rule based upon the veto powers they hold or whether it’s in the charter, itself.

Suffice it to say that no candidate has ever been even submitted from any of the five permanent members.

Which is why Gulf War 1 was what it was, Powell ran it, Schwarz carried it out and wanted to invade Iraq to save the Kurds or Shia. He kind of got stomped over, for various political reasons one way or another.

Gulf War II, is the result of VA Shinigami, General Shinseki, who wanted more troops in Iraq and talked about a “broken military”. Broken in the sense that the more troops that would be sent, the more casualties he could have his VA kill at home to make bank. Diversity Casey and other Democrat loyalist generals, were also part of the Pentagon plan. There’s only so much the cabinet level officers can do if their vassal officers are corrupt or basically already turned.

Carter was indecisive.

Vance was TOTALLY against it — and promptly resigned.

Vance was able to get Carter to delay the go signal until AFTER the weather window.

The military had already told the President that Iran’s climate is such that the window of opportunity was actually past!

To spell this out:

Tehran is not at sea level, far from it. To get airborne, the air temperature HAD to be low. Hot air, at altitude kills lift.

The massive desert south of Tehran has truly weird weather — which was fully known by the American military planners.

So the UNEXPECTED dust storm — was actually expected… indeed predicted.

The original time window was for no later than a month PRIOR to the actual attempt.

Of course, looking at the way Carter makes decisions, Vance was probably on to something.

Carter couldn’t make a cup of instant coffee.

Folks, you would NOT believe the level of second-guessing that Carter engaged in. He had the plans worked up back at the White House — not the Pentagon. Like LBJ, he kept inserting himself into astounding levels of detail.

One is reminded of der Furher meddling on the Eastern Front. The man is a disaster, as he could NEVER delegate anything to anyone. His penchant for scheduling the tennis courts at the White House being a particular indictment.