You’re welcome. This matters. The prevalent false narrative against OIF and those who benefited from propagating, validating, and protecting it are patient zero for the wrong turn in US foreign policy. Setting the record straight remains important because the public’s understanding of the Iraq mission with its fundamental premises of American leadership bears directly on the course of American foreign policy.

By the way, the propaganda against the US-led Iraq enforcement didn’t begin with Bush. It was employed against Clinton’s Iraq enforcement. Like I talked about in my comment upthread at July 24th, 2014 at 11:20 pm, the change from Clinton to Bush’s Iraq enforcement was the Democrats adopting the same anti-US propaganda for domestic partisan profit.

Here’s a good article:
http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/08/who_lied_about_iraq.html

The above article debunks the following simplistic description of the Iraq war:

“The United States invaded Iraq based on false premises. The administration orchestrated a public relations drive to prove that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and connections to the 9/11 terrorists – both proved false.” (USA Today)

I think it’s a very good article and would recommend it to anyone interested in this.

Eric, many thanks for your knowledgeable assistance.

I said it at the time and I believe it more now: Bush should have enlisted Clinton as his spokesman on Iraq. POTUS activating an ex-POTUS like he’s a retired General is unorthodox, but OIF was that important. No less than the future of American foreign policy pivoted on the Iraq mission.

Fall 2002 was not far removed from Jan 2001. At that point, no one in the US understood the US case against Saddam as well as Clinton understood it because the US case against Saddam was Clinton’s case against Saddam. Clinton’s whole presidency had been preoccupied by the Iraq enforcement and he developed the law, policy, and precedent – the operative enforcement procedure – used by Bush to resolve the Saddam problem. Bush only carried forward Clinton’s case against Saddam with the addition of 9/11 threat considerations.

Had Clinton been Bush’s spokesman on the Iraq enforcement, one, it would have kept the Democrats in check, two (related to one), it would have permanently fixed Clinton’s initial endorsement, and three, Clinton would not have fumbled the presentation of his case against Saddam like Bush and his officials initially fumbled it.

It’s a nice way to avoid the SS knocking on your door for making negative comments about the US President, however.

Here’s a good article:
http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/08/who_lied_about_iraq.html

It’s worth for you to pick up Hoven’s analysis. His take on the issue tracks closely with mine.

This research tip might also help. The key for me was the discovery that Clinton didn’t cite to the intelligence at all when he pronounced with Op Desert Fox, which was the penultimate military enforcement step, that “Iraq has abused its final chance” and Saddam was a “clear and present danger” that would require regime change to resolve. Clinton only cited to Saddam’s noncompliance in terms of insufficient cooperation and deficient account of weapons.

Moreover, the record strongly implies that Clinton’s intel with ODF was no better than Bush’s intel with OIF. (Which only makes sense if you think about it.)

That key discovery opened the door to the realization that demonstration of Iraqi possession – which goes to the foundational false premise of the anti-OIF position – was not necessary in the operative enforcement procedure that Bush inherited from Clinton. The test for enforcement was strictly whether Iraq proved compliance, which was determined by other means than demonstrated possession.

The “clear and present danger” (Clinton) and “grave and gathering danger” (Bush) of Saddam were imputed from Iraq’s noncompliance, not demonstrated possession.

Related to your questions, Iraq’s actual possession of WMD stocks in 2002 was only relevant insofar that a demonstration of Iraqi possession would have been dispositive evidence of noncompliance. However, a demonstration of Iraqi possession was not the expected nor normal way to test Iraq’s compliance.

In terms of the policy and procedure of the Iraq enforcement, if not the distorted politics, whether Saddam actually possessed WMD stocks was only one of many possible triggers in the spectrum of weapons and non-weapons mandates.

One more tip. Try not to feel let down, as I did, when you find out just how straightforward the Iraq enforcement actually is. There’s no cabalistic conspiracy. There’s no convoluted theory of the case. Instead, OIF is simply what over a decade of plain, open-source law, policy, and precedent for the Iraq enforcement said it is.

So Gary, again, my feedback to you is take a step back from where you are now in the OIF debate. Critically examine the premises and context that are presumptively imputed by anti-OIF activists. Begin the debate on OIF by setting the record straight and correcting the frame.

I immediately noted your point about “burden shifting.” This is a common tactic of the left, eg they’re the ones making extraordinary claims about imminent, man-made climate disaster, but we’re supposed to prove it’s not going to happen; even though they’ve not yet come close to proving their case (and their models did not predict the current 15-year hiatus in global warming).

I appreciate your feedback regarding OIF and will follow up by looking at some of the links you provided. As you say, understanding the context is key and the tendency is almost always to look at events in isolation.

They’re left activists playing the activist game with the narrative contest to control the zeitgeist and with it, the general will of We The People. It’s the only social political game there is.

If it helps, I made a comment over there:
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/why-am-i-moving-left-109241.html#comment-1502798513