Iraq’s prime minister upbraided his top government spokesman for saying some U.S. soldiers might need to remain in the country for many more years. “What was announced about the Iraqi forces needing 10 years in order to be ready is only his personal point of view and it doesn’t represent the opinion of the Iraqi government,” Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s office said in a written statement Saturday.

The spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, told reporters in Washington this past week that the Baghdad government would be open to negotiations that would keep troops in Iraq past the agreed upon withdrawal date.

It is evident from this that while the Iraqi Government certainly does not want to make it public knowledge in Iraq that the Agreement’s deadlines are adjustable that among themselves the deadlines – all US troops out of urban areas in 6 months, all US troops out of the country in 3 years – are very flexible, that indeed this is exactly the situation. This is also confirmed by US military authority:

Even with the mandate in the recently approved U.S.-Iraq security agreement, there have been suggestions some troops would not leave urban areas. But Gen. Raymond Odierno was the first military leader to acknowledge some forces would remain at local security stations, as training and mentoring teams.

“We believe we should still be inside those[urban areas] after the summer,” he said the sprawling U.S. base in Balad, north of Baghdad before welcoming Defense Secretary Robert Gates on a brief visit.

It is nice to see that the Iraq Government has more common sense than my opponent. Just as the post-WW2 Germans realized that a US presence guaranteed freedom from Soviet aggression the Iraqis also realize that a strong US presence can be a good thing.

We have not heard from my opponent for awhile. Perhaps he could be roused enough by this post to attempt further comment.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/ML_GATES?SITE=NVREN&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

I don’t really know what the above means but it seems to me that the difference between an agreement with an amendment and one without is that one can be amended and the other cannot be amended and thus a new agreement must be negotiated should any of the parties desire a change in any of the provisos. However, the present Agreement wisely contains provision for amendment of any part of the Agreement.

Seems pretty symbolic to me.

I am gratified that the writer believes that at least some of the Agreement is symbolic. I wonder, are there any other parts of the present Agreement that the writer thinks are symbolic – or is it solely the amendment clause that he deems symbolic?

On three other points:

You claim to have replaced Saddam by a democratic ally, except that the “ally” relationship in this case only goes one way.

Iraq is in no position now to provide much to the US, except of course the present Agreement. After all, no one is sure at this point whether Iraq can even provide security to their own government and this will not be finally determined until all the US forces are out of Iraq 3 years from now(IF the Iraqi government does not sometime in the interim extend the 3-year deadline) – THAT will be the true test. It’s WAY too early to be thinking about what the Iraqis can do for the US in other ways. For now, for me, it is more than enough that the nascent Iraqi government has acquiesced in a US presence and Saddam’s shenanigans are over for good. After a year or 2 of true independence we will see just how good of an ally Iraq will be.

And just to note: if you consider Islamic militancy the problem, you have replaced a secular dictator with a confessional democracy.

I would have welcomed a Saddam-led Iraq that was friendly to the US. His war against Iran was a point in his favor and he did give some freedom to the women of Iraq and attempted to modernize the economy and culture of Iraq. But alas, he chose the hard road by invading Kuwait and then ignoring the agreements he made after his defeat. He would no doubt be secure in his power in Iraq this very day if he had acted differently.

Ask any Iraqi Christian (I believe the majority now live in Jordan, Syria, and so on) what having the governing party entitled “Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq” has meant to them.

The Iraqi Christians, like the Iraqi general population, are rightly concerned about security from terrorism. They, along with other minorities in Iraq, have been the special targets of terrorists since the beginning of the insurgency. It will be one of the tests of the Iraqi security forces viability whether this can be brought under control. But I don’t believe the Iraqi Christians are particularly worried about what the Iraqi governing party is called.

Progress in Afghanistan has ground to a halt; if anything, the “West” has lost ground since 2002.

Other than preventing another Taliban or Taliban-like regime from taking control in Afghanistan I don’t believe there is much at stake for the US there. As long as the terrorists are kept holed up in the apparently ungovernable mountainous tribal regions of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan and confined to occasional raids into the Afghan/Pakistan border area the US has little to fear. The country is just not that strategically important to the Middle East to devote much blood or treasure there.

Likewise in Pakistan.

Pakistan has always been a ‘sometime’ ally with a spotty record of cooperation with the US – a situation that existed before the Iraq War. If the country ever attains a stable government some progress might be made but the deposal of Saddam had absolutely nothing to do with the turmoil that has festered there for several decades.

Likewise in Somalia.

The above area(it’s never attained real nationhood) has been the site of numerous coups, assassinations, wars and general unrest since at least the 60’s – long before any War on Terror.

Want me to go on?

The writer seems to be taking the tact now of listing every Islamic nation or region that has had longstanding issues of political stability and violence and declaring progress has been lost there due to the deposal of Saddam. It’s a standard debating tactic of the anti-war folks.

Nor do I think the Iraqi model will cut much ice with the Syrians and the Iranians. Democracy loses some of its appeal if democratically electing the “wrong” people gets you bombed.

Perhaps I’m overlooking the obvious but I simply do not comprehend what the writer means with the above reference to bombs. Does he mean that the Iraqis will bomb Iran and Syria and thus provide a poor example of democracy to Iranian and Syrian citizens? Or that if Iran and Syria eventually become democratic that their elected representatives will bomb their own folks? If the writer would elaborate I will attempt a reply.

Cosmetic— yet another “spin” word. If these prohibitions involve nothing but appearance, why did the Bush Administration push so hard to avoid them?

It has become evident as the debate has gone on that the writer has no idea what a negotiation entails. I will simply reiterate here that a standard negotiating tactic is to start out demanding much more than is expected.

1) with This amendment, agreed to by both parties, replaces section 1.6 with…
2) without This agreement, made with the consent of both parties, replaces agreement x, incorporated in the present agreement by reference, except for section 1.6, which in the present agreement reads…

Seems pretty symbolic to me.

On three other points:

You claim to have replaced Saddam by a democratic ally, except that the “ally” relationship in this case only goes one way. And just to note: if you consider Islamic militancy the problem, you have replaced a secular dictator with a confessional democracy. Ask any Iraqi Christian (I believe the majority now live in Jordan, Syria, and so on) what having the governing party entitled “Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq” has meant to them.

Progress in Afghanistan has ground to a halt; if anything, the “West” has lost ground since 2002. Likewise in Pakistan. Likewise in Somalia. Want me to go on? Nor do I think the Iraqi model will cut much ice with the Syrians and the Iranians. Democracy loses some of its appeal if democratically electing the “wrong” people gets you bombed.

Cosmetic– yet another “spin” word. If these prohibitions involve nothing but appearance, why did the Bush Administration push so hard to avoid them?

Oblio:
You pronounced on the subject of what keeps people from committing violence. I wonder what basis you have to make those claims. If you make grand statements, I don’t consider a question about the source of your claimed expertise “irrelevant”.

Your questions are not relevant.

You can declare victory any time you want, of course.

And the writer can claim defeat anytime he wants.

Earlier, by me: …[the Agreement] ensures the Iraqis can call for help if they need it…

You call this a feature of the agreement? And you consider it a feature favorable to the American position? Anybody in the world can call for help from the United States, and in Iraq’s case, they would probably get it, with or without an agreement.

Yes, anyone can call for help from the US. Iran can call for help, so can Syria. As these 2 nations stand, as violators of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and leading sponsors of terrorism, does the writer really believe the US would jump in to prevent their governments from collapsing if such a collapse were eminent? No, not just “anyone” can ask the US for military assistance and expect to get it.

I said earlier: …[the Agreement] can be amended if the parties feel it is necessary.

I don’t think you can have an agreement that you can’t amend with the consent of both parties. Your continuing to trumpet these as “successful” features of the agreement shows what thin gruel it really contains for the Bush Administration.

If an amendment clause is not in an agreement, then amendments are not possible. A new agreement would have to be drawn up – that is if the parties wanted a new agreement.

I stated earlier: …the so-called prohibitions and limitations in the Agreement are somewhat symbolic as they stand and may become entirely symbolic if the Iraqis get into a tight spot militarily.

Still just words. Spin. Look, if you really want to trumpet the democratization of Iraq at a “mere” cost of somewhere between 50 and several hundred thousand Iraqis killed,

Many of the Iraqis killed were murdered by Jihadists, many were killed resisting US forces at the outbreak of the Iraq War. Folks die on both sides during any war. To refuse to go to war because casualties are certain to occur is to give the enemy an insurmountable advantage.

over two million made homeless,

Does the writer believe that wars can be conducted without displacement? Like I’ve said before, the anti-war folks possess a paucity of commonsense.

four thousand American dead, two trillion dollars,

The Iraq War has been the least costly in treasure and blood than any major war ever conducted by the US.

and a virtual halt to progress elsewhere in the war on terror, fine.

I think the writer and I would have differing views on what would constitute “progress” in the War on Terror. A deposing of a troublesome murderer(Saddam) replaced by democratic ally bordering 2 rogue states so all their citizens can see the contrast between the despotism in their own nations and the democracy in Iraq – I call that progress. And where has this “virtual halt to progress elsewhere in the war on terror” happened? The writer doesn’t say …

I think with better management you could have achieved far more at far less cost to everyone, but you have a right to your opinion. However, you can make that case without resorting to spin techniques, such as calling the prohibitions you don’t like “so-called”.

The writer wrote earlier that the US forces were constrained entirely by the Agreement from all combat in Iran, which was a misreading of the Agreement(wishful thinking?). US forces are allowed to defend themselves without approval, to initiate combat if the Iraqis approve or to assist the Iraqi security forces should they feel the need for help. As I’ve said before I believe these “prohibitions” are somewhat cosmetic in nature.

The Iraqis have insisted on, and the Bush Administration has now accepted, a prohibition against using bases in Iraq for operations against any third country.

Wow. The writer AGAIN beats the dead horse of a hypothetical invasion of Iran by the US from Iraq – an eventuality we BOTH have said is “unlikely.” A restriction on something that is not likely to occur has to be seen by any rational person as symbolic.

The Iraqis have insisted on a US withdrawal from active combat in six months, and a total withdrawal in three years. Nothing “so-called” or symbolic about any of that.

Yet anything in the Agreement can be amended at any time by the parties to the Agreement. Speaking of symbolism, does the writer believe that the amendment clause in the Agreement is symbolic?

As I’ve stated before I am reasonably satisfied with the final version…

You can declare victory any time you want, of course.

…ensures the Iraqis can call for help if they need it…

You call this a feature of the agreement? And you consider it a feature favorable to the American position? Anybody in the world can call for help from the United States, and in Iraq’s case, they would probably get it, with or without an agreement.

…can be amended if the parties feel it is necessary.

I don’t think you can have an agreement that you can’t amend with the consent of both parties. Your continuing to trumpet these as “successful” features of the agreement shows what thin gruel it really contains for the Bush Administration.

…the so-called prohibitions and limitations in the Agreement are somewhat symbolic as they stand and may become entirely symbolic if the Iraqis get into a tight spot militarily.

Still just words. Spin. Look, if you really want to trumpet the democratization of Iraq at a “mere” cost of somewhere between 50 and several hundred thousand Iraqis killed, over two million made homeless, four thousand American dead, two trillion dollars, and a virtual halt to progress elsewhere in the war on terror, fine. I think with better management you could have achieved far more at far less cost to everyone, but you have a right to your opinion. However, you can make that case without resorting to spin techniques, such as calling the prohibitions you don’t like “so-called”. The Iraqis have insisted on, and the Bush Administration has now accepted, a prohibition against using bases in Iraq for operations against any third country. The Iraqis have insisted on a US withdrawal from active combat in six months, and a total withdrawal in three years. Nothing “so-called” or symbolic about any of that.
oblio
OK, then, how many violent people do you know? And how many violent situations have you worked in? Do you make all these claims about what people will and will not do from personal experience, or does this all come from books and classrooms?

You wrote, “We therefore have a choice between a system in which nobody has the right to use violence, except in limited self defence, which necessarily entails an end to war, or else a state in which everyone has the ability to use violence.”

In the end, rights are not self-enforcing. Rights are not respected because of their moral weight, but because someone can coerce someone else to respect them. Absent that, and especially in the context of super-empowered individuals, you end up in a Hobbesian war of all against all. States won the monopoly of force very recently and almost as an accident of technology and finance, and many have never been able to maintain that monopoly.

In this context, it is silly to talk about a “right to use violence.” If you think that you will get universal adoption of your preferred ethical position to restrict yourself to self-defense, I think you are showing a very weak understanding of the diversity of human values; of human ability to perceive threats (even when there are none); of human feelings of shame and victimization, and the desire for revenge; human capacity for aggression; and the way that weakness acts to encourage predation.

Without universal adoption of your values, you can choose not to use violence for yourself and perhaps for your government, but you will be at the mercy of the super-empowered individual who makes a different choice. Hence my quote (or paraphrase) of Trotsky above.

Since people in the real world understand this, you will have BOTH war and terrorism until the people who want war or terrorism believe that the cost/benefit and risk/reward analyses are very negative for either, and you will see full spectrum military action from states. For states who refuse to do so, you can expect super-empowered individuals to take self-defense into their own hands in response to the perceived threats.

With respect to a “framework,” we are talking geopolitics here, so the proper kind of analytical framework would consider the multiple goals and pressures at work on the various decision-makers, the dynamic nature of the resources and correlation of forces, and the objective benefits of the outcome. For good examples, think about Kissinger’s writings about Metternich and perhaps Louis Napoleon. (I’m writing from memory, but I’ll find citations if you care.)

It is this kind of framework that is required to answer the larger questions about the Iraq War and whether the final status of forces agreement represents a political loss or a reasonable compromise than consolidates the results of the war policy and serves US interests well, and is thus a political achievement. You haven’t come close to making the case for the former as the correct analysis.

The analogy is lost on me since I consider “global warming” nothing more than a lot of bunk.

Look, the Bush Administration stated clearly and repeatedly that they wanted a more open status of forces agreement. Members of the Bush cabinet, as well as the President, repeatedly rejected any agreement that would oblige the United States to withdraw troops from Iraq by date certain. They repeatedly rejected any limits on the operating authority of American troops in Iraq. All these statements went on the record.

All of the above are simply standard negotiating tactics. You start out by demanding much more than you expect to get. As I’ve stated before I am reasonably satisfied with the final version which keeps US forces in Iraq for at least 3 more years, ensures the Iraqis can call for help if they need it, allows US forces to act without Iraqi approval in self-defense situations and can be amended if the parties feel it is necessary. I think it is a good idea that the Iraqis try to ride the bicycle without training wheels.

That the status of forces agreement now contains a date certain for withdrawal, a prohibition on the use of Iraqi airspace and bases by the US military for anything but the limited (in time and function) role of supporting the remaining military presence in Iraq represents a clear rejection of the Bush Administration’s stated requests and intentions. More straightforward conservative voices have honestly deplored this.

Just for the record, I am not a “conservative.” I believe both ends of the political spectrum, conservative and liberal, are on the wrong side on many issues. I probably fit into the neoconservative mold more than any other category.

But back to the issues: To use an adjective used before, the so-called prohibitions and limitations in the Agreement are somewhat symbolic as they stand and may become entirely symbolic if the Iraqis get into a tight spot militarily. For instance, does the writer really believe the Iraqis, who have no air force to speak of, would hesitate to call upon the US for air cover if needed? I would think that any military commander, Iraqi or otherwise, would be abysmally stupid not to use available troops, aircraft and other military hardware in the event of a troublesome military operation. But then commonsense is not exactly the hallmark of the anti-war folks.

J. Peden:
What I say here contains mostly factual and logical analysis; I deliberately avoid making personal revelations in political contexts, and I refuse to engage any attempts to appeal to “psychology” to induce me to change a conclusion based on fact and logic. So if you have a rational, logical argument to offer, feel free to present it. If you don’t, then don’t bother trying to address my conclusions any other way.

Oblio

Increasing “complexity and interdependence” is not inconsistent with the continued large scale armed conflict and lethal violence, however much we may abhor war…. The rise of “the super-empowered individual” inevitably leads to more Mumbais, Balis, Madrids, and 9/11’s.

Please explain the sense in which the second statement does not refute the first. An increasingly technological society will empower the individual, because we intend it to do that. Empowered individuals have the ability to perpetrate acts of terrorism. Because of the increasing interdependence of society these acts will have a far greater effect. Thus, in a technological society, the traditional monopoly on the use of force enjoyed by the state erodes significantly. We therefore have a choice between a system in which nobody has the right to use violence, except in limited self defence, which necessarily entails an end to war, or else a state in which everyone has the ability to use violence.

As for a “framework”, we have the words of the agreement at issue and the Bush Administration to go by. If, as happened here, one side stakes out a position and rules out any deviation, then signs an agreement that yields on every significant point, while the other party gets all they want, it makes sense to say the first party has suffered a political defeat. If someone then calls the provisions at issue “purely symbolic” because the party that insisted on the concessions in the first place can always change their mind, then I call that spin.

Increasing “complexity and interdependence” is not inconsistent with the continued large scale armed conflict and lethal violence, however much we may abhor war. This sounds like Norman Angell all over again. As someone else said, you might not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.

The rise of “the super-empowered individual” inevitably leads to more Mumbais, Balis, Madrids, and 9/11’s.

We are still lacking the framework that justifies calling a competing argument or analysis “mostly spin.” Spinning is undoubtedly all around us; therefore, we need methods to separate false claims, misrepresentations, and misinterpretations. (Where is Occam’s Beard when you need him?)

I think you know a lot more about economics than you know about war.